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Abstract
Rails to Revolution: Railroads, Railroad Workers, and the Geographies of the Mexican
Revolution
by
Hector Agredano

Advisor: Professor Juliana Maantay

This dissertation is a historical geography of the role of railroads and railroad workers in the
Mexican Revolution. It shows that despite the presence of railroads in the popular imagination of
the Mexican Revolution, the role of railroads and railroad workers themselves remains largely
missing from scholarly accounts of the conflict. I argue that railroad workers were central to the
revolutionary process from its beginning, and I demonstrate that their close relationship to a
critically important transportation network allowed them to intervene at crucial moments of the
revolutionary process. Undoubtedly, this relationship to transportation networks also had a
formative impact on their political involvement and their relationship to the revolution. I contend
that during the revolutionary process, revolutionaries and railroad workers took advantage of the
capacity for time-space compression and time-space expansion in order to achieve their aims.
Workers and revolutionaries also mobilized these capacities to engage in multi-scalar struggles
against the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz to contend for power in the aftermath of the Mexican
Revolution of 1910. In the process, the railroad is transformed from a means of accumulation to
a means of liberation by becoming a vehicle for revolutionary social change.
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“The locomotive is the great heroine of the Mexican Revolution. She too is a soldadera who
moves with confidence, huffing and puffing, arriving late, true, but only because she’s
overloaded.”
Elena Poniatowska
Chapter 1: Introduction
The Mexican Revolution remains one of the defining moments of Mexican history and
within this process, the railroad and railroad workers appear in films, photographs, novels, and
songs about the conflict. Consequently, these figures have been impressed in the public imaginary
of the revolution. So strong is the association between railroads and the revolution that the
government issued a commemorative bill picturing rebels on a train to celebrate the centennial of
the Mexican Revolution (Figure 1). Despite the presence of railroads in the popular imagination
of the Mexican revolution, the role of railroads and railroad workers themselves remains largely
missing from scholarly accounts of the conflict. Consequently, the Mexican Revolution is usually
thought of as a predominantly agrarian revolt where industrial labor remained mostly at the
margins. Nevertheless, ample evidence suggests that while campesinos may have played the most
prominent role in the making of the revolution, industrial workers, especially railroad workers,
were also central to the revolutionary process from its beginning.

Figure 1. Currency issued in 2010 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Mexican
Revolution. Source: Bank of Mexico (2010).
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The discrepancies between the place of railroads in the popular imagination and their
absence in the scholarly literature raise some important questions: What role did the railroad and
the railroad workers play in shaping the history and the geography of the Mexican Revolution?
Who were the railroad workers that participated, where did they come from, and why did they
participate? How did the operation of transportation infrastructures shape the relationship of
workers to the revolution—and, by extension, the labor geographies of the Mexican Revolution? In
what ways did revolutionaries exploit the contradictions of fluidity and fixity inherent in these
means of production to advance the revolutionary struggle? And how did the revolution change the
railroads from a simple means of accumulation to a means of liberation?
In this dissertation, I argue that the close relationship between railroad workers and
transportation infrastructures had a formative impact on their political involvement and their
relationship to the revolution. Furthermore, I contend that railroad workers were able to intervene
at crucial moments of the revolutionary process because of their close relationship to a critically
important transportation network. For example, railroad workers helped with preparations for an
armed uprising using their mobility on the railroads. Once the revolution is underway, railroad
workers participate openly and provide important logistical support and even participate in
battles. Thus, from the democratic revolution of Francisco I. Madero in 1910 to the military
campaigns of Francisco Villa in 1914, railroad workers shifted the course of history through their
active engagement with the railroads.
Through this research, I answer these questions and help develop new insights that expand
on current understanding of the participation of railroad workers in the Mexican Revolution.
Furthermore, I show that the early efforts at unionization by railroad workers were part of the
political backdrop for the rise of Francisco I. Madero’s popularity and that the railroads were
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crucial to his democratic campaign against the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. Railroad workers
also play a key role in the preparations for the democratic revolution under Madero and they play
an even more important role during the constitutionalist revolution under the command of the
Northern Division which is led by Francisco “Pancho Villa”. Thus, as an intervention into
Mexican historiography, my work engages the scholarly literature on this topic.
Railroads, Labor, and Revolution
Although the Mexican Revolution has been extensively documented, for the most part, the
role of the railroads and railroad workers and the use of rail infrastructure during the revolution
remain largely unexplored, from either a geographical or historical perspective. Even as early as
1976, Goldfrank identified this gap in scholarship, noting that “nothing extensive has been written
on the participation of railway workers in the various phases of the revolution” (20). In their
social histories of Mexican railroads, Lewis (2007) and Van Hoy (2008) reach similar conclusions
about the railroad, and Lewis notes that “the study of Mexican railroads remains a substantial hole
in the historical scholarship of Mexico, the American West, transportation history and border
studies” (xi). Thus, not just the role of railroad labor but also the role of the railroads remains
under-studied in both English and Spanish works on the subject. 1
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Recent publications on Mexican and Mexican-American railroad workers have appeared, but these don’t focus
specifically on the revolutionary period. See Jeffrey Marcos Garcilazo (2016) and Robert F. Alegre and Elena
Poniatowska (2014).
3

Figure 2. United States of Mexico, 1910.
Even though the recent centennial celebrations of the Mexican Revolution in 2010
prompted many historical retrospectives, only three studies address the subject of the involvement
of railroad labor directly (Gorostiza 2010; Guajardo 2010; Yanes 2010). Yanes’ short article, for
instance, emphasizes the dearth of research on the role of labor during the revolution and points
out the contributions of well-known historical figures in the railroad sector. Guajardo (2010)
contributes a few substantive chapters on the role of railroads under Zapata’s army but, for the
most part, only emphasizes the breakdown of labor discipline during the conflict. Though useful,
Guajardo’s work focuses on the center and the south; however, in the first phase of the conflict,
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railroads and workers had a bigger impact on the course of the revolution in the north of the
country, specifically in Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango and Zacatecas.
Thus, Gorostiza’s (2010) wide-ranging study on the railroads in the Mexican Revolution is
a welcome contribution to the discussion. In its more than 700 pages, Gorostiza provides a
chronological retelling of railroad-related events from 1876 to 1926. The book also contains
maps, photographs, journalistic accounts, popular ballads, and fragments of literary works that
refer to the railroad. Unfortunately, the task is as big as the subject itself, and Gorostiza’s work is
more valuable as a general reference on the topic. In addition, there are important limitations in
Gorostiza’s work, since citations are sparse, therefore making it difficult to track down the
sources of the information he uses. Furthermore, Gorostiza’s heavy emphasis on the railroad fails
to account for the role of workers in the conflict, thus accentuating the absence of labor
geographies.
Several reasons have been offered to explain the ubiquitous absence of railroad workers
throughout the historical literature of the revolution. Gorostiza (2010) claims that workers could
not act openly on their political convictions because they feared retaliation, and therefore left very
few traces of their participation in the press. Yanes (2010) reaches similar conclusions and
believes that railroad workers were not too keen on supporting a revolution, since by 1909, they
had already won important gains after the Mexicanization of the railroads. Consequently, after a
decade of labor struggles to secure employment, few workers wanted to jeopardize their
newfound security; instead of embracing the revolutionary call of “Land and Liberty,” they rallied
around the pacifist slogan of “Peace and Work” (Knight 1984; Yanes 2010). These accounts
suggest that it was difficult for workers to support the revolution openly, and that many did not
take an active part in the struggle, resulting in the scant records of their participation.
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Still, these explanations are only partially satisfactory. All major works on the Mexican
Revolution, albeit in general terms, acknowledge that railroads played an important role
supplying military campaigns (Katz 1998; Gilly 2005; Salmerón 2006). For example, when
Francisco I. Madero was arrested by the regime during his electoral campaign, railroad workers
helped him escape to Texas by disguising him as a railroad worker. Hence, railroad labor was
actively involved in aiding the revolutionaries, even if the workers risked their jobs and their lives
to do so. Other accounts suggest that once the revolution had become an armed struggle, railroad
workers also joined in the fighting. For example, in the lead-up to the assault on Torreón, the
American journalist John Reed writes of an “engineer and fireman hung with cartridge belts [and]
their rifles handy” (2006, 184).
These contradictory versions suggest that support for and involvement in the revolution
was varied and uneven. Thus, in order to assess the participation of railroad workers, my research
focuses on northern regions and revolutionary groups aligned with Francisco I. Madero and
Pancho Villa. From oral histories, memoirs, newspapers and secondary sources, I conclude that
workers were hesitant to get involved in the conflict at the early stages, yet they still got involved,
even if only through small actions. Following Gilly’s (2005) lead, I focus on the Northern
Division, which at its height (1913-14) was the largest popular army of the revolution and due to
its location in the expansive north, one of the divisions that relied heavily on the railroad. Once
the railroads came under control of the Northern Division, railroad workers became more active
as the revolutionaries took control of more territory and as the revolution pulled more social
sectors into the conflict.
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Figure 3. “Zapatistas and railroad conductor posing on locomotive” by Hugo Brehme (1911).
Source: DeGolyer Library, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
Besides the works already mentioned, several key works were used to reconstruct the life
of railroad workers and their relationship to the railroad before the revolution. Sandra Kuntz
Ficker’s Empresa Extranjera y Mercado Interno (1995) is the main oeuvre on the Central
Mexican Railroad to date; the CMR’s strategic location running north to south made it the most
coveted infrastructure during the early years of the revolution. Sergio Ortiz Hernán’s seminal Los
Ferrocarriles de México (1987), Meyer Cosío’s Ferrocarriles y la revolución mexicana (2011)
and Roy B. Brown’s Introducción e impacto del ferrocarril en el norte de México (2009) help to
inform our historical background. Besides these works, the classic Insurgent Mexico by John
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Reed (2011), originally published as a series of articles in 1914, helps provide insights into the
revolution’s impact on both the railroads and Mexican society.
Transportation Geography
Throughout this work, I demonstrated that access and control of railroads has important
consequences that affect the course of history. Therefore, these infrastructures must be analyzed,
understood, and theorized beyond their one-dimensional utilitarianism. Seizing on the dearth of
theoretical-political research on transportation from within geography studies, I follow Keeling’s
(2007) call for new theoretical contributions to our knowledge of the relationship between
transportation and society. By focusing on the railroads, revolution, railroad workers and
revolutionaries, I explore the intersection between transportation and social change. My work
shows that under a revolutionary process, in the hands of the rebels, the railroad ceased being a
means of accumulation and instead became a means of liberation, because its appropriation
allowed revolutionaries to advance their political agenda against the regime.
Thus, this project is inspired by the call for more theoretical research and an active reengagement with transportation within the broader discipline of human geography (2006; Shaw
and Sidaway, 2011). A common criticism of transportation literature is that geographers tend to
engage with transportation after the fact, and, whenever it is considered, transportation remains
largely in the background. Even more problematically, as Keeling (2007, 219) notes,
“Transportation is treated as so obviously fundamental to society that there is no need to explain
how or why.” Progress on railroad geographies, specifically, has been “less than inspiring,” and
railroads seem to have become “the stepchild of transport research” (222). The lack of critical and
theoretical approaches to the study of transportation has exposed transportation geography as a
moribund (Hanson 2003, 469) and, in extreme cases, even “ghettoized” sub-discipline (Goetz
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2006). While there is disagreement with such characterizations (Goetz 2006), Docherty (2005)
concedes that transport geography needs to reassess the dominant epistemological and ontological
paradigms that dominate the discipline.
Such deficiencies are due, in part, because the discipline has not kept up with theoretical
and methodological advances in human geography at large since “it has remained within the
analytical framework of the 1960s” (Hanson 2003, 481). The rise of the mobilities paradigm and
the popularity of books like Levinson’s The Box (2006) show that there is widespread interest in
transportation, however, they also show that there is a need for new interpretations and theoretical
exploration within the discipline. According to Freudendal-Pedersen, engineers, planners,
policymakers, and practitioners have traditionally dominated the study of transportation, and
research has traditionally been concerned with accessibility, risk, optimizing infrastructures, or
just getting from point A to point B efficiently (2009, 2).
This “common sense” approach to transportation has resulted in the decoupling of
transportation from its social, political, and ideological elements. Henderson (2013) notes that
“this tendency is especially evident in quantitative, data-driven methods in which there is often a
claim of apolitical, dispassionate, objective and unbiased professionalism in transportation
analysis” (17). The result is that transportation and transport-related research has become
disembodied from its social and political context when, in fact, it is inherently political. However,
a new wave of critical research into transportation shows the way for new engagements between
transport and critical theory. For example, Henderson’s (2013) own work has shown how
struggles over cycling and automobility are ideologically charged; Cowen’s 2014 work on
logistics has shed light on the criminalization of labor for the benefit of trade flows; and Shell’s
(2015) work on multimodal transportation has explored the subversive potential of mobility. My
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work takes inspiration from this new wave of critical transport research, and thus I focus on a
thoroughly politicizing process for the railroad—a revolution.
Theoretical Foundations for Critical Transport Studies
At the turn of the 20th Century, American and European capital—aided by Porfirio Díaz—
developed a railroad system and created the economic conditions that gave rise to an industrial
labor force in Mexico. Yet this industrial technology that allowed for a successful accumulation of
capital and political strength, also became a crucial technology that would help topple the regime.
Using Karl Marx’s political economy, and in conversation with the works of critical geographers
and mobility scholars, this dissertation explores this contradiction.
Marx’s work on transportation and circulation, though incomplete, is very useful to our
understanding of the railroads as a means of capital accumulation that have the power to
transform the built environment. While part of the process of production, by “selling change in
location,” transportation is also part of the process of capital circulation, through the annihilation
of space by time, as it brings commodities to market (Harvey 1977, 2006, 2013, 106–07).
To decipher the impact of the railroad on Mexico’s geography, I deploy David Harvey’s
concept of the “spatial fix” to lay the foundations of a geographical-historical materialist
framework as a way to approach an understanding of transportation systems under capitalism.
Conceptualizing railroad development and its infrastructures as a spatial fix, we can understand
the railroads as fixed capital in the landscape and as a “spatial fix” for capital accumulation
(Harvey 2014, 152). Besides contextualizing railroad development in northern Mexico, I also
show that unionization struggles by Mexican workers also altered the political terrain within the
broader process of the capitalist production of space, and they often challenged this status quo
with their own labor actions. Weaving these conflicts with a geographical analysis of uneven
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development, I show how these conditions gave rise to a mass movement for democratic rights,
land-redistribution, and economic justice.
In addition to the work of Marx and Harvey, I explore the mobilities/moorings dialectic
(Urry 2003, Adey 2006) to understand how revolutionaries and railroad workers took advantage
of the fluidity and fixity of the railroad to advance their revolutionary struggle. Here I engage
mobilities literature, specifically the work of John Urry, who theorized the mobilities/moorings
dialectic (Urry 2003), as I seek to better understand the dialectical relationship between mobility
and fixity as it played out during the conflict. However, to keep consistent with Harvey’s
vocabulary, I will speak of this dialectic as fluidity/fixity instead of the mobilities/moorings as is
preferred in mobilities studies. Thinking through my work dialectically between fluidity and fixity
allows me to deploy concepts like time-space compression (Harvey 1990) and time-space
expansion (Katz 2001; Jung and Anderson 2017) and, therefore, to have a better grasp of the
contentious nature of transportation infrastructures and labor geographies in the Mexican
Revolution. As will be shown, the railroad came with many advantages to those who possessed it
and it served the revolutionaries extremely well in their military campaigns, however, it also came
with important disadvantages that demonstrate the dialectic of fluidity and fixity in action.
To emphasize the role of railroad workers in the shaping of the geographies of the
Mexican Revolution, I follow Herod’s (1997) call for labor geographies. In my work, I conceive
of workers as persons who belong to a working class, who sell their labor power to make a living
through waged labor and who are essential to the process of capitalist production as creators of
surplus value; these workers also exercise a spatial agency, and they produce space in their own
interests throughout the different stages of the conflict. Furthermore, by centering on worker’s
interventions before and during various phases of the revolution, I contribute show that there is

11

potential to develop insights towards a study of labor mobilities, which, like work in labor
geographies, also analyzes the structural and social relations that shape the agency and the
positionality of labor (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011) with an emphasis on the capacity for mobility
and fixity.
Although actor-network theory (ANT) has come into vogue over the last two decades as a
lens through which we can understand the more-than-human world, I don’t think that it is a useful
set of ideas to study the research problem I am dealing with. The work of Michael Callon (1986),
John Law (2002, 2008) and Bruno Latour (1999) played an important role in raising awareness
about the role and relationship of human and non-human actors in the making of society. They
attempted to do this by learning from actors instead of imposing predetermined explanation by
social scientists. As these researchers traced these actants (humans and things), they emphasized
their hybrid connections and networks to conceptualize socio-mechanical imbrications. However,
what once seemed to be a coherent analytical edifice has been unable to withstand the stream of
critiques against it.
As Laurier and Philo (1999) have argued, ANT’s “radical flattening” pretends to treat all
actants and networks as equals, but in doing so, it is greatly indifferent to the power relations
between the actants and the networks it purports to analyze. Indeed, issues of class, race, and
gender are discarded altogether. Sheppard (2002) doubts the assertion that networks are nonhierarchical and correctly critiques the tendency for ANT to underplay the role of power in the
creation of networks. Therefore, unlike Castree (2002), I don’t think that it is possible to bridge
the gap between Marxism and ANT and to seek a rapprochement between these. My position in
this debate is much closer to that of Kirsch and Mitchell (2004), whose blistering critique raises
the issue that ANT is unable to explain why some actants are excluded from some networks.
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Furthermore, as Kirsch and Mitchell argue, by treating all actants as equals, ANT relegates
exploited workers as passive cogs in a machine (network) who are unable to dispute their sorry
state of exploitation (695).
Since I understand power as a capacity based in relationships (racism, capital, private
property, the State) that change over time through contestations from above and from below
(Gilmore 2007, 28–29), my dissertation does not give equal standing to human and more-thanhuman actants (e.g. machines, infrastructures). Thus, unlike ANT, I contend that power is centered
in institutions and individuals and structured in social relations (Kirsch and Mitchell 2004, 691).
Within these relationships, humans are agents with the capacity to change and be changed by
histories and geographies. I emphasize the directedness of social relations in composing,
challenging, and transforming socio-technical relations, and I recognize that different actors can
exercise unequal power. Thus, I demonstrate that a small number of individuals can make
important interventions at key spatio-historical junctures because of their relationship to
transportation networks and infrastructures.
The cross-fertilization of these literatures allows me to conceptualize the co-constitutive
relationship between railroads and railroad workers, since both capital and labor have coproduced
the geographies of the Mexican Revolution along the main network of the National Railroad from
1910–1914. From the construction of the very first sections of the Mexican railroad, American
railroad companies sought to divide American and Mexican workers, who in turn developed
organizational structures to surmount this challenge. However, as the nation was swept by a series
of revolutionary waves, railroad workers adapted to the changing conditions of their work and
made their own contributions to the revolutionary struggle.
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Broader Literature
Outside of strictly transportation and Marxist geography circles, several additional works
make important contributions to our understanding of infrastructures in the built environment
(Castleman 2005; McGreevy 2009; Cowen 2014; Shell 2015). My research is part of a broad
conversation with this literature on infrastructures, and I take several theoretical and
methodological cues from these works. For example, drawing on Castleman’s (2006) social
history of road construction laborers in Bourbon Mexico, I have adopted mini-prosopography as a
research technique to recreate the lives of a social group, railway workers. This project also
develops in conversation with Shell’s Transportation and Revolt (2015) and Cowen’s The Deadly
Life of Logistics (2014) and advances a more critical transportation geography that sees
transportation connected to broader structures of power and capital accumulation. My
contribution to this conversation shows that workers can appropriate transport technologies for
revolutionary purposes; thus, I conceptualize them as active agents of revolutionary processes and
its geographies. Most important, this integrative approach contributes a case study that puts
transportation at the center of theory by demonstrating its fundamental contributions to society,
the production of space, and the making of history.
Archival Research
As a work of historical geography, primary sources play a key role in my work. There
exists a wide-ranging set of economic and historical works that talk about the development of the
railroads up until 1910; yet there doesn’t exist a definitive work on the role of the railroads during
the revolution. The work of Chedraui et al. (2014) focuses on the economic issues faced by
railroad companies during the revolution. Interestingly, Chedraui et al. conclude that the first
years of the revolution (1911-13) did not lead to a sharp decline in passenger and cargo volume,
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but that this changed dramatically during at the height of the revolution (1914-15). Nevertheless,
this work does not cover the actual use of the railroad by revolutionaries. Furthermore, current
research on the role of labor is also scant, and most of it is focused on labor’s involvement with
the Zapatistas or during the civil war of 1915 (Meyer Cosío 2011; Guajardo 2010). Therefore, it
has been necessary to look for information about the use of the railroads during the revolution and
to center railroad workers, their background, their reasons for involvement in the revolution, and
their activities on the railroad during the conflict.
This concern is raised by one of my focus questions, where I show who were the railroad
workers that participated in the revolution, where they came from and why they participated. To
answer this question the fundamental methodological approach that I am using is archival
research, and all methods employed in this study rely on archival data. Archival methods are
necessary for three reasons: 1) At its core, this is a historical project and therefore it is necessary
to consult historical records and archives to contribute new findings; 2) To focus on railroad
workers, this project integrates a set of oral histories gathered by the National Institute of
Anthropology and History (INAH) during the 1960s and 1970s known as the Proyecto de
Historía Oral (PHO).
The PHO interviews are rich with biographical data of individuals who were part of the
Mexican Revolution. Although there are important limitations to these interviews, I was able to
gather a set of 25 interviews of persons who had worked as railroad workers both before and
during the revolution. Appendices A-C summarize the specific characteristics of each worker and
by combining these oral histories, we can discern some general patterns. For example, on average,
railroad workers were in their late teens when the revolution got underway. These workers came
from different states, though mostly from the northwest, a pattern that makes sense since the
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railroad did not extend into southern states and therefore these laborers were not part of the
mobile labor market of the northwest. They had diverse occupations on the railroad, and most had
attended primary school, and some had attended secondary or technical school. Literacy and
mathematics were essential since most jobs on the railroad required the reading of signs, symbols,
instructions and telegrams. Lastly, they all emerged from working class and peasant communities,
and they recognized the hardships endured by the peasantry.
Besides important autobiographical information, the oral histories also reveal their
political views, and their role in the revolution. Appendix B shows that less than half of these
workers had participated in labor organizing in the years prior to the revolution, however, it does
show that most identified with or joined a political organization or newspaper in the years
immediately before the revolution. Once they join the revolution, we see that many of them
entered as supporters of the democrat Madero and as they radicalized, they became supporters of
Villa. Others that joined in the midst of the revolution joined with different revolutionary camps
and often switched allegiances as the revolution took its own political twists and turns. Appendix
C shows their widespread participation with different military brigagdes and under the orders of
different revolutionary generals.
While at the Center for Railroad Research (CEDIF) in Puebla I consulted the magazine
Ferronales, a magazine by and for railroad workers published by the nationalized railroad
company after the 1920s. The magazine contains testimonies and memories from railroad
workers, which helped me compliment the oral histories of the PHO. In addition to the memoirs
themselves, Ferronales is a valuable secondary source to register events during the revolution.
My study also makes use of photographic images from the national photography library of
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Mexico, the Fototeca Nacional, and its system of photo libraries, the Sistema Nacional de
Fototecas (SINAFO).
The archives I consulted at the Hemeroteca Nacional, a newspaper and magazine library,
gave me access to the pages of the newspaper El Ferrocarrilero. El Ferrocarrilero, published
from 1904–1906, was the newspaper of the Great Mexican League of Railroad Employees. In its
pages, we can observe a progressively radicalizing editorial board under the pen of Félix C. Vera,
a railroad worker and journalist who helped support the strike of 1906 and organized the strike of
1908. Because of his labor activity, Vera was persecuted by the government, and El
Ferrocarrilero recorded these events until its closure by government censors. This newspaper is
evidence of the challenges of organizing a labor union during the Porfiriato and it helps us
understand the grievances of railroad workers. Among these, unequal pay between Mexican and
American workers and denied employment in top positions. Besides a tool for agitation and
propaganda, however, the newspaper also gives us a glimpse of the organizational strategies
deployed by labor organizers in the years immediately preceding the revolution.
In addition to oral histories, magazines and newspapers I also use the letters of Francisco
I. Madero found in the Epistolario which contains his letters from 1900-1910. I used the
Epistolario to corroborate and compliment key primary and secondary sources (Salmerón 2006;
Portilla 1995; Sánchez 2011). Together with photographs from SINAFO of the Anti-Reelectionist
campaign I provide a multifaceted and much more complete picture of the electoral phase of the
revolution.
I use historical GIS (HGIS) to build upon my archival data and to recreate a series of maps
that help the reader understand the geographic extent of the railroad network, the location of
important labor unions, the campaign tours of Francisco I. Madero and revolutionary events of the
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Northern Division from 1913–1914. For the creation of these maps, I have used the georeferenced
data (shapefiles) available through Mexico’s National Institute of Geography and Statistics
(INEGI), and I have acquired digital copies of blueprints and railroad infrastructures from the
Center for Railroad Research (CEDIF) and the Mapoteca Nacional Manuel Orozco y Berra—the
national maps library. I cross-reference the oral histories from the PHO interviews with the
writings of Gorostiza (2010); Sánchez (2011); Salmerón (2006); Katz (1998) and Reed (2006).
With GIS software, I have created maps that accompany this study and that provide general as
well as specific context through GIS. Lastly, I used triangulation as a research method that adds
greater depth and nuance to my analysis, and this enhances validity of results and claims. This
approach allows me to look for convergence as well as inconsistencies that highlight new and
interesting findings in my study (Patton 2002). By comparing the information in my methods, my
sources build confidence in my research findings and reveal new ways of the revolutionary
process and the intersections of labor and railroads.
Chapter Summaries
My dissertation is divided into two main parts, each consisting of two chapters. The first
part is composed of Chapters 2 and 3, and this section lays out the socioeconomic relations of the
period before the revolution. In Chapter 2, I provide the historical context of the Porfiriato2
through a historical geography of the Central Mexican Railroad and I set the background context
of this period of Mexican history by describing the development of capitalism in Mexico under
the dictator Porfirio Díaz. Here I expand on the political alliances and economic interests that
brought immense wealth to a minority and misery to the majority. The main protagonist of this
chapter is the Central Mexican Railroad which connects Ciudad Juárez to Mexico City. Following
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The word Porfiriato is used to refer to the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz from 1870-1910.
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the railroad north to south— Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Torreón, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, and
Mexico City—I engage in a historical political geography of the railroad as it traversed the arid
landscapes of the north to connect them with the seat of power, Mexico City.
In Chapter 3, I focus on labor history and the struggles of railroad workers and their
unions from 1900-1910 to lay the groundwork for the revolutionary period. Thus, in this chapter,
I discuss the development of labor organizations and I follow the attempts of Félix C. Vera and
his collaborators in the newspaper El Ferrocarrilero as they attempt to organize a labor union, the
Great Mexican League of Railroad Employees. Here I also engage the labor histories of early
mutualist associations, the formation of craft-union brotherhoods, and the move towards industrywide labor unions. I pay special attention to the labor press, specifically El Ferrocarrilero, and its
role in organizing railroad workers for the strikes of 1906 and 1908. Throughout this chapter, we
see that American railroads discriminated openly against Mexican workers. Thus, the struggle
against national discrimination and towards Mexicanization will guide labor organizing until the
nationalization of the railroad in 1909.
The second part of the dissertation is composed of Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 begins in
1909 and introduces the electoral campaign of Francisco I. Madero against the dictator Porfirio
Díaz. Here we follow Madero’s democratic revolution against the dictatorship from 1910–1911,
which ends with Madero taking power. Madero is the main protagonist in this chapter, and we
follow him though his campaign tours across the country, a political process unprecedented in
Mexican history, which relies heavily on railroad mobility. When the democratic transition fails,
the Mexican Revolution begins in earnest, and in this chapter, I follow closely the uses of the
railroad during the electoral campaign and during the armed uprising. Using oral histories, we
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explore the involvement of railroad workers in this phase of the revolution and follow Madero’s
victory against the dictatorship.
Chapter 5 focuses on a new revolutionary wave known as the Constitutionalist Revolution,
and the main protagonist is Francisco “Pancho” Villa’s Northern Division. In this phase, railroad
labor took an increasingly active role in the revolution and through oral histories, we follow the
revolution through military campaigns from north to south, seeing the increased power and that
the revolutionaries derived from the railroads. This chapter ends with the Revolutionary
Convention of Aguascalientes, a gathering of revolutionaries who sought to form a new
government favoring the interests of workers and peasants. In concluding, I reflect upon the
historical lessons and theoretical contributions offered by the geographies of Mexican railroad
workers and the railroads and propose future lines of research to continue exploring this decisive
period in Mexican history.
Conclusion
Scholars of the Mexican Revolution will agree that the railroad and railroad workers are
understudied since most works written about the revolution often focus on revolutionary leaders
or the struggles of the peasantry, and rightfully so, since they were the main heroes of the conflict.
However, in this dissertation I center the railroads and railroad workers because they help us
understand the crucial role played by this overlooked social sector and its role in the success of
the revolution. Furthermore, the focus on the railroads is way to explore the relationship between
transportation geography and social change—another subject that is understudied. Altogether, this
intervention seeks to advance our understanding of transportation infrastructures in the midst of a
revolution and therefore, to provide insights for present and future revolutionary struggles that
will have to engage with the dialectics of fluidity and fixity.
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“The uneven distribution of the railways, their uneven development—sums up, as it were, modern
world monopolist capitalism” (1939 [2002]:10).
V. I. Lenin
Chapter 2: Capitalist Development and the Railroads
Any study of the impact of the railroad on the Mexican Revolution must consider the
circumstances that gave rise to such a cataclysm in Mexican history. As Gilly notes, the
establishment of the world market, the integration of Mexico into the world market, and the
capitalist development of the railroad during the 34-year reign of Porfirio Díaz should not be seen
separately but viewed as three interrelated aspects of a single process. Indeed, Gilly’s argument
situates Mexico’s integration to the American economy with the rise of imperialism, and this
phenomenon developed simultaneously with the expansion of foreign investments in railroads,
mining, and other industries. Thus, Díaz’s reign, often referred to as The Porfiriato, took place
during the crucial transitional period between the Age of Capital and the Age of Empire, when
emerging technologies like the steam engine profoundly impacted the development of different
parts of the world (Hobsbawm 1986, 1989).
Another sign of the changing times was the rise of national industrial economies (British,
German, French, and American) that dominated international markets through economic trusts,
cartels, and monopolies. These trends help to explain the explosive development of the railroad
seen in Mexico from 1880–1910, as well as the conditions of “backwardness” that established a
relationship of dependency between Mexico and the United States. As Díaz rose to power, he
developed an apparatus that modernized the state to connect the Mexican economy to American
capital, and the railroad became an integral part of this modernization process. But just as the
railroad was a civilizing machine (Matthews 2013), it also produced hyper-exploitation of the
masses until the situation became unbearable, and a revolution was finally unleashed. In this
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sense, the historical geography of Mexico’s railroads becomes the historical geography of the
Mexican Revolution, as for a short period, railroad workers transformed the railroad into a means
of human liberation. This is the story of that process.
Railroad Development in Mexico and the Rise of Porfirio Díaz
In the wake of independence from Spain, the Mexican economy was in shambles, and the
Mexican state found itself in complete disarray. Government in-fighting between liberal and
conservative factions continued in the aftermath of the American intervention and throughout the
French Intervention (1862–1867), which contributed to the general sense of disorder and
economic stagnation across the territory (Meyer et al. 2010, 290). Under President Benito Juárez,
the liberals finally regained control of Mexico in 1867 and began to craft new legislation to
systematically regulate trade and commerce. The new laws brought significant changes to policies
that affected transportation infrastructures and attempted to assimilate the technologies of the
industrial revolution. Since the colonial period, inadequate transportation had been one of the
main obstacles to economic growth in colonial Mexico (Coatsworth 1978, 91), and, recognizing
this, the liberals laid the foundation for the period of modernization to come. Thus, during
Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada’s presidency, the Mexican Railroad, commonly known as El
Mexicano, was finally opened between Mexico City and Veracruz on 1 January 1874. To
encourage more railroad development, the government negotiated contracts with American
companies for the construction of railroad and telegraph lines. Unfortunately for Tejada, however,
the opposition instigated anti-American nationalism and used these railroad concessions against
him, costing him his second term in office and leading to the rise of Porfirio Díaz.
The year 1876 marked the beginning of the thirty-year period of socio-economic
development known as El Porfiriato. The changes brought about during the Porfiriato deeply
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influenced Mexican society and marked the full integration of the Mexican economy and the
North Atlantic capitalist market (Katz 1981, 3). Porfirio Diaz’s first presidential term was driven
by three key objectives: promoting rapid economic growth, enhancing the security of the
country’s borders, and acquiring more revenue to balance a chronically under-financed budget
(Holden 1990, 581). Díaz set out to accomplish these tasks by applying the motto “order and
progress,” with a strong emphasis on order. Díaz’s most important accomplishment was to gain
official recognition of his government by the United States and to convince American capitalists
that Mexico was a safe and reliable environment for American investments, especially in mining
and railroads. Although there was widespread mistrust of American investments in the railroads,
the Díaz regime recognized the strategic need to clearly demarcate land and foment the railroad’s
development along the nation’s borders, from the southern jungles of Chiapas to the vast deserts
of the northern states (Ortiz Hernán 1987, 179; Holden 1990, 582). Thus, the railroads constituted
the first large-scale foreign investment project in Mexico during Díaz’s rule.
The direct involvement of the Díaz government in the promotion of railroad development
produced clear results that further legitimized his rule. For example, at the beginning of Díaz’s
first administration, Mexico had only 893 kilometers of track and a poor transportation
infrastructure throughout the country. By the time Díaz was overthrown in 1910, Mexico’s
railroad network had grown to more than 19,000 kilometers. There had been many prior attempts
by U.S. capitalists to establish railroads in Mexico, but 1880 marked an explosion of investment
in railroad construction (Knapp 1952). From 1878–1880 the federal government granted
concessions to the states, to attract capital and develop local railroads. But states were largely
incompetent and lacked capital; thus, Porfirio Díaz pushed the concessions from the Mexican
government to great success. For example, in 1880, there were 16 railroads with 1,052 kilometers
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of track; by 1884, there were 49 railroads, with 5,897 kilometers of track (Chedraui 2014, 60).
The construction contracts offered by the government carried with them highly profitable
returns—in some cases $9,500 per kilometer of track laid (Meyer 2011, 326). Guarantees, land
grants, and subsidies offered to the railroad entrepreneurs by the government further encouraged
the railroad boom. This infusion of foreign capital provided a much-needed jolt to Mexico’s
stagnant economy, and under the aegis of an obsequious administration, British and French
capital began to invest in Mexico. Nevertheless, many of these investments had a negative impact
on rural communities, since the government also carried sweeping legislation to appropriate lands
the railroads deemed necessary for construction; in the process, the railroads became large
landowners, and these lands were sold to private investors (Meyer 2011, 326).
Railroad construction was one of the most profitable investments in Mexico, and besides
generous contracts, large tracts of land were also granted to railroad and land-surveying
companies during Díaz’s time in office. Therefore, the regime introduced the expropriation law of
1882, which was very specific in its implementation and aimed to transfer land from proprietors
to railroads. This law marked a turning point in establishing the framework to attract foreign
investment to develop the railroads (Van Hoy 2000, 34)3. In addition to the expropriation law of
1882, Porfirian land reform established land-surveying companies that were privately owned,
mostly by Mexican nationals, although there were important American ones as well. Landsurveying companies were responsible for, and the beneficiaries of, the greatest turnover of public
land in the nation’s history. This survey of “vacant” lands caused widespread speculation, not
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A memo from one of the directors of the Ministry of Development, Fomento, stresses that “the expropriation law
gave ample grounds so that an intelligent person can wield successfully the weapons which [the law] offers” to gain
access quickly and cheaply to the land necessary for railroad development.” The director went on to mention that an
agent from the government could easily challenge the possession of land titles in the states of Puebla and Oaxaca, and
if necessary to invoke tax debts to disposes the landowners. Van Hoy concludes that “the tone of the memo
underscored the ministry’s intention to displace residents from their lands” (Van Hoy 2000, 34).
24

only in the lands next to the railroad tracks but also in adjacent public lands. The nearer the land
to a station, the more valuable the property (Coatsworth 1974).
During the Porfiriato, one of the most important concessions granted to American
investors from Boston was the Mexican Central Railroad line from Mexico City to the U.S.
border in El Paso, Texas. In keeping with the agreement—and to avoid territorial annexation by
the Americans—the line had to be built simultaneously from its southern and northern terminals.
The Central was completed in a record four years and, soon after it was finished, became the main
trunk of the Mexican railroad network to the north. Besides the Mexican Central Railroad,
Mexico’s National (Mexico City to Eagle Pass, Texas) and Southern Pacific railroads (Guaymas,
Sonora, to Nogales, Arizona) also integrated Mexican railroads into the United States’ extensive
railroad network. By the end of the Díaz administration, Mexico had one of the largest railroad
networks in the world.
While the Transcontinental railroad opened a “vast wilderness” in the United States, in
Mexico, the introduction of the railroad connected an already existing network of cities that had
been previously communicated by the colonial Camino Real de Tierra Adentro from Mexico City
to Santa Fe, New Mexico (Jackson 2006, xvi–xvii). In northern Mexican territories, mule trains
had facilitated communication between the capital and its northern regions for centuries, and
water, lodging, food, and fuel were available to travelers along the Camino. Thus, in innumerable
ways, the Camino’s network facilitated the rapid construction of the Central Mexican Railroad
(Ortiz Hernán in Márquez 2010, 30).
Although we don’t see such dramatic changes in northern Mexico as those brought about
by the Transcontinental in the United States, the changes the railroad did bring to Mexico were
quite pronounced. Trains linked far-flung cities in the northern and southern regions of the
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country to state capitals and to the nation’s capital—thus opening up the possibility of fast, safe,
and reliable travel.4 The northern states had been a backward, isolated part of the nation until the
railroads connected these territories to the rest of Mexico and the rapidly developing Southwest of
the United States. Train stations became centers of activity, and the newly built tramways
connected them to city centers. Demographic changes in the north were the most pronounced and
spoke volumes of the rates of economic growth during the Porfiriato. Anderson (1976) writes that
while the population of Mexico increased by 25 percent between 1885 and 1900, states of the
north such as Durango and Chihuahua doubled that rate, and Coahuila’s population increased 105
percent in the same decade and a half. Much of this growth was driven by the introduction of the
railroad, the telegraph and steamship lines in formerly isolated cities that were now connected to
the most important centers of global capital in New York and London. We now turn to the
historical geography of the Central Mexican Railroad, which eventually became part of the
National Railways of Mexico, and the impact of the railroad on the north of Mexico.
El Paso and Ciudad Juárez: Border Boomtowns
Before the arrival of the railroad, El Paso, Texas, wasn’t much different from its Mexican
neighbor to the south, Ciudad Juárez (formerly Paso del Norte). The train finally arrived in 1881,
and with it, the machinery to industrialize construction and the colonizers who would change
these sleepy border towns. The trains also brought tin roofing and glass panels, and recent
developments in mass production brought cheap steel nails and lumber for construction. Thus, El
Paso’s railroad connections changed the traditional adobe buildings to modern American
Midwestern styles, and soon enough, these styles crossed the border south to Ciudad Juárez.
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The railways expanded together with the whole communications system: the telegraph lines built alongside the
track; the roads, on which banditry was reduced and sometimes even eliminated; the military and postal installations;
and the first urban systems of electric lighting and drinking water” (Gilly 2005, 23).
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There too, adobe buildings began to give way to Midwestern-style wooden structures. The
establishment of a free trade zone, which gave investors generous terms of trade, also brought
more American businesses and commerce to Ciudad Juárez (Martínez 2011).
The convergence of several American railroads in El Paso turned that city into an
important railroad terminus, and by 1882, the railroads were important economic players in the
region. Three main trunks converged in El Paso: the original Topeka Railroad, the Atchison
Railroad, and the Santa Fe Railroad, which connected the city to Albuquerque, Kansas City, and
Chicago. The southwestern Pacific line connected El Paso to Los Angeles and San Francisco, and
the Texan line connected the region to Houston and New Orleans (Clark 2003, 99). With such
intersection and connectivity, the railroads became an important engine of economic growth, and
their economic weight was felt across the border. By 1911, the yearly average cargo crossing the
border between Ciudad Juárez (Paso del Norte until 1888) and El Paso reached 776 million
pounds (González-Herrera and León García 2000, 247, 256). With the connection from Ciudad
Juárez to Mexico City, Ciudad Juárez gained new importance as a border city.
The relationship between the cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez is deeply marked by their
status as border cities and as commercial and transportation gateways to different countries,
particularly once the railroads between Ciudad Juárez and Mexico City were connected. Political
movements agitating against Porfirian rule also took advantage of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez’s
strategic connections. For example, in 1906, the exiled leadership of the Partido Liberal Mexicano
(PLM) established its headquarters in El Paso, Texas to throw off the detectives that were
tracking them in Montreal. From El Paso, Ricardo Flores Magón and fellow journalist-agitator
Juan Sarabia attempted two insurrections in Mexico, in 1906 and 1908 (Romo 2005, 55).
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Guns and munitions were easy to come by in El Paso, and members of the PLM weren’t
the only ones exploiting El Paso’s strategic location. During the revolution, border cities,
especially El Paso, became centers of arms smuggling, journalism, and espionage. Railroad
workers facilitated these transactions and eventually used the railroads to move goods for
revolutionary camps. According to Romo (2005), El Paso was a crucial border town for the
revolution:
…the battles of the Mexican Revolution were sometimes won and lost, not out
in the field, but back in the streets of El Paso. Whether or not a faction was
successful in getting arms across the border into Mexico through the major
customs port of El Pas-Juárez often meant the difference between victory and
defeat. This state of affairs was good for many local businessmen who made a
real killing selling weapons. The Shelton-Payne Arms Company at 301 South El
Paso Street, a major supplier of arms and ammunition to all nations of the
revolution, had assets exceeding $1,100,000 in 1913 (109).
Besides weapons, the railroad moved commercial goods, and industrial machinery also moved
steadily from El Paso into Ciudad Juárez and further south to the big state of Chihuahua and its
capital.

Figure 4. “View of El Paso” by Léon Trousset. Source: El Paso Museum of Art (1885).
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Chihuahua City and the Terrazas Clan
As the train rode south to Chihuahua City, it crossed a flat, desert landscape. In 1880s
Chihuahua, these lands were undergoing a deep transformation, as enclosures were converting
open public lands into cattle-ranching terrain for the richest man in the state, Luis Terrazas. Both
Mexican and American authorities worked together throughout the Apache Wars (1849–1886) to
exterminate the Apache and Comanche groups that were resisting capitalist development in their
home region, especially after the 1880 railroad development boom. With the newfound security
and the entry of the railroads, land values increased dramatically and haciendas began to turn to
cattle ranching wholesale to supply the growing American Southwest. In Chihuahua, the Terrazas
clan emerged as the most powerful family in the state and became partners with the railroads,
using them to participate in land speculation and mining. Foreign capitalists found ready business
partners in the Terrazas family, and such investors acquired the rich mines of Batopilas, Santa
Eulalia, and Cusihuriachic. Thanks to the railroad, investments became viable in far-flung parts of
the state in territories that had once been vacant public lands. Through land surveying companies
and enclosures, these territories were reproduced for farming, forestry, and cattle ranching
industries (Aboites 2006, 128–131).
By 1890, The Terrazas family had become the largest landowners in Mexico, and the
railroad helped their territories thrive, since many of the stations were on hacienda lands
themselves. Salmerón (2006) notes two especially good periods of cattle exports that allowed the
Terrazas to amass a fortune. 1883–1889 and 1895–1898 stand out as particularly good periods of
cattle exports to the United States because of the harsh winters that decimated American and
Canadian herds (Hine and Faragher 2007, 121). During this period, Americans relaxed restrictions
on beef imports from Mexico, and the Terrazas were able to ship their cattle to California and the
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Midwest. These particularly good years allowed the Terrazas to gain a foothold in the growing
American markets, and, as González-Herrera and León García (1996) note, these export booms
were also closely related to the expansion of Chihuahua’s banking system (247, 255).
Thus, cattle ranching became consolidated as the main economic activity of the region,
and exports grew at an exorbitant rate: from 10,000 heads of cattle exports in 1887 to 310,000 in
1897 (Aboites 2006, 132). The profits from these sales were immediately invested in other
economic sectors and in other regions of the country. Between 1880 and 1907, the Terrazas clan
bought or built flour mills, meat packing plants, transport companies, a smelting company, and a
brewery. In addition to their investments in the Mining Bank of Chihuahua, the largest in the
state, they also invested in the Laguna and in Monterrey. All in all, the Terrazas employed more
than 13,000 workers in their haciendas and in their industrial ventures (Salmerón 2006, 63).
Chihuahua itself experienced an economic boom, and Ciudad Juárez became one of the
most important custom houses of the country. New railroad lines were built all over the state, and
a new northwestern railroad connected Ciudad Juárez with Casas Grandes and Chihuahua with
the mills at Madera. New lines to the east brought Chihuahua in contact with mining towns in
Coahuila, and to the south, a new railroad parted from Jimenez to Parral and then on to Durango
state. To reach the Pacific coast of Mexico, in 1903, the Kansas City, Mexico, and Orient
Railroad began construction from Ojinaga on the Texas border through Chihuahua and towards
the port of Topolobampo in the Pacific.
In this period, the state’s population soared from 180,000 inhabitants in 1877 to 405,000
by 1910. Chihuahua also grew rapidly: in 1865, the city had 10,000 inhabitants, and in 1910, the
number had risen to almost 40,000. Between 1895 and 1910, Parral grew from 7,300 to 14,000
inhabitants and Ciudad Juárez from 7,000 to 11,000. Much of this growth was aided by railroads,
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which brought immigrants from the center of the country to settle in the north. These immigrants
were employed by textile factories, railroad yards, and by the mining giant ASARCO, the
American Smelting and Refining Company, which established operations in Chihuahua
(Salmerón 2006, 61–63). Sparsely populated areas like the city of Madera became thriving towns
in the sierra, where Americans like Colonel William C. Greene owned lumber mills. Religious
immigrants also began to settle in the state, and Protestant and Mennonite congregations began to
establish agricultural colonies. Modern urban amenities began to make their presence in the cities:
public lighting arrived in 1897, the cinema in 1899, and the automobile in 1903. During this
period, Chihuahua City became the most important city of the state, thanks to the Central
Mexican Railroad that directly connected it to the “Pearl of the Lagoon,” the city of Torreón
(Aboites 2006, 134–35).
The Impact of the Railroad Upon Torreón and the Laguna Region
At the southernmost part of the Basin of Mapimí, in the desert valleys between the Sierra
Madre Occidental and the Sierra Madre Oriental, lies the Comarca Lagunera, also known as La
Laguna. The region is named after the seasonal lagoons at the southern portion of the Basin that
receive the floods of the Nazas and Aguanaval Rivers. The railroad was a latecomer to this
unforgiving territory, but when it did arrive it complimented and revolutionized existing ventures.
Colonization ventures sprang up in the region towards the end of the nineteenth century, and with
them a system of canals and aqueducts that guided the sometimes unreliable, sometimes
unpredictable waters of the Nazas and Aguanaval Rivers. In the 1870s, cotton became the most
important crop of the region, and the cotton plantations provided the raw material for Mexico’s
booming textile factories. These plantations were the foundation for the dynamic growth that took
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off in La Laguna after the 1880s, and a new capitalist class was born in the region (Cerutti 1999,
832).
With the arrival of the Central Mexican Railroad in 1883, new irrigation technologies,
telecommunications, and electricity, the Laguna began to export its cotton to the United States,
England, and Germany. Local and foreign investors took advantage of the cotton’s derivatives,
and the economy diversified. Two textile factories were built, along with two soap factories that
took advantage of the cottonseed. The leftovers were then turned into dynamite and glycerin.
Between 1882 and 1888, three railroads were built in Laguna, all of them connecting the country
with Texas’s extensive railroad network. This interchange gave Mexican markets access to
industrial cities in the Midwest, like Chicago, and to the American Northeast, where the second
industrial revolution was underway (Cerutti 1999, 859; Salmerón 2006, 172, 176–77).
The junction between the Mexican Central Railroad and the International Railroad made
Torreón and Gómez Palacio important railroad hubs, and in a generation, these cities would
concentrate the industrial and financial capital of the region in highly profitable business ventures
connected to global markets. The population of the Laguna grew rapidly during this period, from
20,000 in 1880 to about 200,000 in 1910. Thanks to its spectacular growth, commercial strength,
and grand public buildings, Torreón became known as “The Pearl of the Lagoon,” since it had
zero inhabitants in 1883 and upwards of 40,000 by 1910. Between the industrial workers and
miners, La Laguna held one of the largest concentrations of industrial work in all of Mexico, with
more than 30,0005 workers (Salmerón 2006, 176–77).
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According to the conservative politician Vera Estañol (1910), La Laguna was “in plain development and progress,
since year after year the agricultural zones had been growing with the improvement of irrigation while the region had
repelled the attacks of the savage tribes. The previously arid and inhospitable lands, and the dens of the barbarian
tribes had transformed into the most fertile fields, cities and towns, thanks to the irrigation works” (63). (Cerutti
1999, 827).
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The introduction of the railroad connected this formerly isolated region and cohered the
scattered towns and haciendas into a growing urban region within a generation. Foreign capital
had a strong influence in the development of La Laguna, the urban region of which comprised the
cities of Torreón, Gómez Palacio, Ciudad Lerdo, and San Pedro de las Colonias. La Laguna’s
business directory, printed by Baca y Aguirre (1904), listed more than 40 factories. The influx of
foreign capital is part of a shift of capital investments from the industrialized countries to fresh
regions for investment. From 1880–1900, 62% of foreign investments to Mexico came from
European capital (mostly British and French) and 38% came from the United States. Towards the
end of the Porfiriato, American investments eclipsed European capital, and railroads and mining
(mostly American ventures) accounted for 60.3% of foreign investment (Gilly 2005, 25–26).
An example of how the railroad influenced the merging of national and international
capital is the way the Central Mexican Railroad influenced the soap manufacturer La Esperanza,
which established its main factory in Gómez Palacio. La Esperanza became a very profitable
business partnership for Brittingham and Terrazas; they began to export animal feed paste (cake)
to England, and they also produced glycerin. By 1907, the soap factory of La Esperanza was one
of the largest of its kind in Latin America6 (Cerutti 1999, 861–63). Besides cotton, rubber
production also boomed in La Laguna from an abundant desert shrub known as guayule. In 1900,
two processing factories of guayule were established in La Laguna. The largest was the
Continental Rubber Co., part of the Rockefeller-Guggenheim consortium, and another one owned
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According to Cerutti, a fair assessment of the companies, factories, and banking houses located in La Laguna
(Lerdo, Gómez Palacio y Torreón) during the 1880s should include: La Esperanza, La Amistad, La Alianza, the shoe
factory of La Unión, the Industrial Soap Company of La Laguna, El Brillante, the Electronic Railroad from Lerdo to
Torreón, The Brick Company of Gómez Palacio, El Fénix, La Victoria, La Nacional, La Constancia, The Electric
Company of Torreón, La Fe, the soap factory of La Unión, the Metal Smelter of Torreón, the Continental Mexicana
Rubber Co., the Compañía Guayulera de Torreón, the Bank of La Laguna, the Chinese Bank and the regional offices
of the National Bank of Mexico, the Bank of London and México, the Comercial Bank of Chihuahua, the Bank of
Nuevo León, the Mining Bank of Chihuahua, the Bank of Durango, the Mercantile Bank of Monterrey, the Bank of
Coahuila and the Bank for Agricultural Credit (Cerutti 1999, 858).
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by the Casa Madero, whose guayule business was headed by Francisco I. Madero. After 1904, the
price of guayule rose sharply and by 1907, the processing, packing, and shipment of guayule
employed more than 12,000 persons in La Laguna. By 1907, rubber production had displaced
cotton as the primary export of the region (Salmerón 2006, 158–59).
At first, guayule was exported by train in bulk out of the Laguna for processing, but with
the development of new extraction methods, mills became concentrated in the region. The
concentration of rubber production exacerbated the problems of the water and land that came with
the cotton boom. A direct result of the guayule boom was that land formerly worthless became
very valuable almost overnight, and the haciendas began restricting collection of guayule on
their—formerly unproductive—lands. However, many peasants began collecting and selling
guayule illegally. In response, the haciendas sent men to patrol the sierras, and soon complaints
of abuse became widespread in the communities of Cuencamé. The haciendas of Cuencamé were
some of the largest producers of guayule. The hacienda of Sombreretillos de Jimulco, for
example, produced more than 2,000 tons of guayule from its 87,000 hectares in 1910. Many of
these lands, however, were under dispute by the Ocuila Indians, who accused the hacienda of
dispossessing them of their lands (Salmerón 2006, 159–61).
Despite these problems, La Laguna was booming, and it became the pride of the regime:
In 30 years, a desolate region had been transformed by the railroads and foreign capital into one
of the most industrially advanced centers of Mexico. In short, it symbolized “the triumph of the
regime and the resurgence of a new, modern and progressive Mexico.” In the eyes of the regime,
the railroad was a great civilizing machine and La Laguna was evidence of this progress.
Nevertheless, as the most well-connected region to the international market, La Laguna felt the
immediate impacts of the stock market crash of 1907. Immediately after its aftermath, the crisis
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exacerbated local struggles over land and water that had pitted local capitalists against
international investors close to the regime. Furthermore, struggles over wages and democratic
rights added to the grievances of the local bourgeoisie and, by 1910, all of this crystallized in a
political campaign to challenge the regime (Salmerón 2006, 172, 176–77).
Zacatecas: The Railroads, Mining, and Uneven Development
Further south from La Laguna, the railroad followed the original path of the Camino Real
to the city of Zacatecas. Zacatecas was built on a north-to-south axis along the creek of La Plata,
and it is surrounded by several cliffs and hills, of which the most well-known are those of La
Bufa, the Cerro del Gato, Las Bolsas, and el Grillo. The uneven topography in this canyon
resulted in a zigzagging urban grid upon the hilly terrain and forced the train to the outskirts of
the city (López Marchán 2014, 122–23). In 1884, when the Mexican Central Railroad reached
Zacatecas, it took over the 10-kilometer line of the Ferrocarril Zacatecano that connected the
capital with the city of Guadalupe, and, in turn, these two cities connected to U.S. cities in the
north and Mexico City in the south.
However, unlike Chihuahua or the Laguna Region, Zacatecas did not see explosive
industrial growth because of its reliance on mining. Towards the end of the nineteenth century,
mining was the main economic activity in the state besides agriculture, which fed the workforce
of the mining towns. From 1875 to 1888, the state was responsible for 20 to 25 percent of
Mexico’s total silver production. Overall, the region’s heavy dependence on mining became a
burden for the economy, because when mining suffered, the agricultural sector also suffered,
since most agricultural products were destined for local consumption (Flores Olague et al. 2003,
143–44). Unlike other regions of the country, Zacatecas did not see large sums of foreign
investment or a diversification of its economy with the introduction of the railroad.
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For Zacatecas, overreliance on silver became a huge problem at the end of the nineteenth
century because of silver’s depreciation in value. The fall in the price of silver wasn’t stabilized
until 1905, when the government switched to the gold standard. Thus, while new chemical and
technological developments in mining (cyanide milling) helped to produce larger amounts of
silver, these methods allowed silver production to increase elsewhere and eventually brought
down the value. The adoption of new extractive technologies led to a global “silver rush” at the
end of the nineteenth century in places such as Arizona, Argentina, and New Zealand.
Furthermore, the railroad impacted the state in a negative way, because it allowed for bulk
shipments of material out of the state where silver was extracted in the smelters of Saltillo and
Monterrey, thus losing the profits from silver extraction (Flores Olague et al. 2003, 144–46).
Although the mining sector was in a constant decline, the capital city did see modest urban
development thanks to the railroad and the commercial and public investments it brought to the
city. For example, a new neighborhood grew around the railroad station, complete with a new
church and a new market. After 1890, the public hospital and the Bank of Zacatecas were built.
By 1896, Zacatecas also had a smelter, a dynamite factory, and two flour mills. In nearby
Guadalupe, there was also a textile factory that housed 120 workers (Flores Olague et al. 2003,
147–48). By 1900, a system of urban trains pulled by mules was also built in the city, followed by
the Calderón Theater and the main market hall. Towards 1910, the electric plant was expanded,
and it provided electricity to the Alameda Park, the aqueduct, several city parks, the main market,
several shopping arcades, government buildings, and the men’s and women’s prisons.
The railroad also brought a new commercial culture to Zacatecas. Businesses were housed
in opulent buildings along with banks, hotels, offices, and religious spaces in the center of the
city. Commodities from Europe, the United States, and Mexico flooded the newly opened
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warehouses and department stores like El Trébol, El Progreso, La Violeta, and El Monte de
Piedad along the Portal de Rosales (López Marchán 2014, 125–28). Nevertheless, the growth of
Zacatecas pales in comparison to the boom underway in Chihuahua and the Laguna, because
unlike in those cities, large factories did not dot the countryside—not even near the mines. Thus,
it is remarkable that the capital city grew at all, despite the crisis in the mining and agricultural
sectors and widespread emigration.
Aguascalientes and the Railroad Yards
For the most part, Aguascalientes remained a sleepy town along the Camino until the late
1800s, when the advent of the railroad turned it into a regional industrial center. The Central
Mexican Railroad arrived in Aguascalientes on February 24, 1884, and, to commemorate the
occasion, the city organized a series of celebrations to welcome the first passenger trains. The
State Marching Band and the Federal Army’s Marching Band were placed at the train station and
at the main plaza to provide entertainment to the celebrations, and fireworks went off at midnight
as the train pulled in to the station. The program also encouraged the neighbors to illuminate the
front of their houses for the occasion (Medrano 2006, 34).
Thanks to an agreement between the state government of Aguascalientes and the Mexican
Central Railroad Company, Aguascalientes became the headquarters of the Central’s main repair
workshops. The contract stipulated that the government be responsible for acquiring the land
necessary for the workshops and that the Central would become the owner of these lands. The
State was also responsible for providing great amounts of water for the rail yards free of charge.
The Central offered some concessions; among them, they agreed to hire as apprentices “young
men that the Government would recommend and who are subject to the order and discipline
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established for the workers.” However, the company did retain the right to dismiss these workers
if they threatened the integrity of the company (Medrano 2006, 37–40).
Aguascalientes was also chosen as the location for the repair shops because of its central
location and because the Central Railroad opened a new line from Aguascalientes to the Port of
Tampico in the Gulf via San Luis Potosí. Thus, in 1897, construction began on the Main
Workshop of Construction and Reparation of Locomotives and Rolling Stock. A government
report from 1899 enthusiastically announced that in Aguascalientes there was a railroad
roundhouse being rapidly built and that it would be just as big, if not bigger than, the one the
company owned in the nation’s capital, which was a sign of how important Aguascalientes had
become for the railroad. In 1900, the department of repairs was inaugurated, along with a new
employee hospital and the rail yards. The whole complex was finished in 1903, and it employed
more than 1000 workers. Among them one could find smiths, tinsmiths, welders, carpenters,
mechanics, electricians, and others. The railroad workshops became very important in the life of
the city, especially in the life of labor, since it was there where many workers received training to
operate and repair machines (Medrano 2006, 45–46).
Railroad and warehouse management offices were also alongside the repair shops in what
became known as the “Casa Colorada,” a large, two-story structure of red brick in Victorian style.
The 60-ton cranes and the shop’s electric plants were also located nearby. In the eastern section of
the lot, the company built houses in the American bungalow style for its engineers and
technicians; this zone became known as the “Ferronales Colony.” Towards the end of the
Porfiriato, Aguascalientes built a new train station designed by the Italian engineer G. M. Bosso.
The new two-story station had a cafe, a waiting room, and a mail office on the first floor and the
station’s offices on the second. A map from 1903, prepared by the engineer Lewis Kingman and
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titled “Mexican Central Railway—New Yard at Aguascalientes,” shows the extensive grounds of
the property, which also housed five large parks, a playground, a school, a church, and a large
warehouse (Guajardo 2010; Medrano 2006, 44–46).7
The impact that the advent of the railroad and the construction of the main railroad yards
of the Central Railroad had on the city of Aguascalientes cannot be underestimated. The city
became an important node on the north-south and east-west axis of the Mexican Central Railway
Company’s network. The arrival of the railroad and the installation of the main railroad shops
gave the city an industrial character. The changes brought about by these developments were felt
in the social and economic life of the city as it brought with it new industries—among them, the
Aguascalientes Electric Light and Power Co. and a flour mill named “La Perla.” As the center of
industrial development, the railroad yards attracted other commercial and industrial ventures to
the city, including a starch mill, The American Hotel, the W. P. Oil Company, and the
Aguascalientes Lumber and Mercantile Company, which had a lumber yard adjacent to the
railroad. These ventures joined the already successful investments of the Great Central Mexican
Smelter owned by the Guggenheim family which, at the turn of the century, controlled more than
half of the ore production in the state of Aguascalientes (Medrano 2006, 36; Wasserman 2015, 3).
Mexico City and the Nation
At the southernmost end of the old Camino Real de Tierra Adentro and the terminus of the
Central Mexican Railroad, stood Mexico City. For three centuries, the wealth of the colonies
flowed through Mexico City to Spain. Colonial rule, the War of Independence, and struggles
against the French Intervention all marked the city, and the Mexican Revolution would do the
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Mexican Central Railway: New Yard at Aguascalientes, Mexico, Dec. 24 1903. Scale: 1:2000. Chief Engineer:
Lewis Kingman. Fuente: Centro de Estudios del Patrimonio AF, Aguascalientes.
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same. At the turn of the century, Mexico City was well connected to the rest of the country,
thanks to the numerous railroads that converged there. A map of Mexico City from 1910 shows
the rail yards and stations established in the capital. There is, for example, the Estación Colonia
and the yards of the National Mexican Railroad at the foot of the tree-lined Reforma Boulevard.
Just north stood the largest rail yards of the city at the Buenavista Station, which housed the
Central Mexican Railroad with its famous roundhouse. Adjacent to Buenavista is the neoclassical
station of the Mexican Railroad, and to the northeast, stood the station of the Hidalgo Railroad.
To the west of the city—below the newly built penitentiary—were the rail yards and roundhouse
of the Interoceanic Railroad, connecting Mexico City to the eastern states. As the railroad hub of
the nation, Mexico City had one of the largest and most politically active populations of railroad
workers from the numerous stations and workshops (Guajardo 2010,172–73).
The railroad served to illustrate the relationship between the central government and the
rest of the country: It allowed the central government to exercise its power through tax collectors,
ministers, bureaucracies, and the army, which could be quickly sent to the provinces. The
politician Pablo Macedo wrote that unlike in the past, the “government of the Republic can now,
thanks to the railway, make its power and authority felt in the remotest part of Mexico, quashing
any sign of unrest or rebellion in fewer days than it used to take months” (Gilly 2005, 25). As was
common in the nineteenth century, industrial revolution technology was immediately adopted for
imperial and military purposes (See Stein in May and Thrift, 2001). Nevertheless, as Knight
(2010) notes, Macedo failed to notice that the army would be confined to these same
infrastructures and the cities they connected. Thus, a perceived advantage also had its
disadvantages, and it would be these disadvantages that would be exploited by the revolutionaries
who would bring down the government (45).
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The railroad brought industrial growth to the capital, but commerce and finance were its
most important activities. The city’s downtown housed national and international banks that
orchestrated the financial operations of the country. Politicians collected fees and issued licenses
and mining permits. Up to a quarter of the nation’s commercial transactions occurred in the
stretch between the Zócalo and the Alameda. During the Porfiriato, modern department stores
were built in Mexico just like they had been in Paris and London. Americans were also well
represented in the commercial groups of Mexico City, and the American railroad companies had
their offices downtown. Foreign investors also played an important role in the rise of Díaz’s
Mexico, and the Mexico-based but British-owned Banco de Londres y México became the
country’s second largest creditor (Johns 1999, 16–17).
Like other Mexican cities, the capital also experienced sharp growth during the three
decades of Porfirio Díaz’s government. This growth must also be understood as connected to the
railroads, since six railroads had a terminus in the capital. The city that Alexander von Humboldt
had named “the city of palaces” was shifting in its tastes, and the fine colonial buildings that
inspired the German explorer gave way to stately mansions. In the emerging neighborhoods,
merchants, politicians, and landlords sought to build a new European city anchored by the three
train stations in the west side of the city. The newest neighborhoods had access to the amenities of
modern urban living as well as to the railroad stations and an extensive electric trolley network
(Johns 1999, 11–15).
The neighborhoods that developed along Reforma Avenue—Cuauhtémoc, Juárez, and
Roma—enjoyed the comforts of modern urban living: public lighting, sewage, public parks, clean
water, and paved streets. The newly built offices were decorated in the Beaux Arts style, and they
shared the streets with colonial mansions. The state also made its mark in the city and erected
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several monuments to Columbus, Cuauhtémoc, and in 1910 the statue of the Angel of
Independence—a gift from the French government to celebrate 100 years of Mexican sovereignty.
As the centennial celebrations approached, the federal government began a spending spree of
public works in the capital. Around the Alameda Park, the government also built an imposing
neoclassical palace for the Ministry of Communications and Public Works, the new post office
and the Palace of Fine Arts (Johns 1999, 18–19, 21).

Figure 5. Railroads of Mexico, 1910.
Many Mexicans were enthusiastic about the advancements made during this time, and
they believed that the railroad was a civilizing machine that would uplift even the most
downtrodden. For example, the writer Ignacio Manuel Altamirano observed that the once-
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wealthy neighborhood in Plaza San Lázaro had died but that the new Hidalgo Railroad could
revive it. When a train pulled into the station, Altamirano heard a “majestic and dominant” lion’s
roar. The train was the lion of progress; it brought welfare, modernity, and benevolence.
Nevertheless, the progress sought by Altamirano would not be evenly distributed. The
neighborhood of San Lázaro and its plaza was the place where all those disposed of by society
had gathered. There, a miserable proletariat succumbed to malaria, forsaken men, and animals
mingled in the shadow of a majestic railroad station.
Marxist Analysis of the Railroad
The forceful shifts in the Mexican economy brought about by the railroad established the
foundations for Mexico’s capitalist modernization. The development of efficient and reliable
conveyors of goods, labor, and capital figured as important prerequisites for the accumulation of
capital and a broader engagement with the world market. As Mexico’s railroad network facilitated
foreign investment, it also carried with it the most advanced industrial machinery to the remotest
parts of the country, effectively reproducing the patterns of combined and uneven development
(Smith 2008). Thus, upon leaving the Buenavista station on his trip north to the United States,
Justo Sierra—a famous historian and liberal politician of the period—remarked that “the sad and
the enchanting aspects of our country are these contrasts between refined civilization and an
absolute lack of culture, of clouds that crash on rising mountains, of cities and solitude, of deserts
dying of thirst that can be contemplated savoring a glass of cold and delicious lemonade”
(Estaciones 2010, 31).
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Interestingly, in 1879, Marx had observed tendencies towards uneven development; in a
letter to Nikolai Danielson, he accurately describes the fate of countries like Mexico, which
primarily exported raw materials, because “from the moment every local production could be
converted into cosmopolitan gold, many articles formerly cheap… such as fruit, fish, deer, etc.,
became dear and were withdrawn from the consumption of the people” (Marx 1879).
Simultaneously, the railroads changed local production and in turn fostered the cultivation of
crops for export, such as sugar, cotton, guayule, and henequen. In short, the railroad undermined
traditional modes of production and further exploited local labor, as it subjugated labor with the
priorities of international capital.

Figure 6. Train passing through the aqueduct of Queretaro. Source SECRETARIA DE
CULTURA. -INAH.-FOTOTECA NACIONAL.-MEX. SINAFO: Núm: 122607 (1905).
Reprodución Autorizada por el Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia
Marx also understood the railroads, steamships, and telegraphs as the “couronnement de
l’oeuvre”—the crowning achievement—of modern industry, because these technologies “were the
means of communication adequate to the modern means of production” (Marx 1879). Thus, along
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with the telegraph and the ocean steamer, the railroad forged the globe “into a single interacting
economy [and] was in many ways the most far-reaching and certainly the most spectacular aspect
of industrialization” (Hobsbawm 1996, 40).
Besides the prowess of the railroads, however, in the 1870s Mexico found itself as the
recipient of large capital investments since European and American capital sought new fields for
investment after the crisis of 1873. What began as a stock market crash in Vienna spread to the
United States and brought down the investment house Cooke and Co., which had invested in the
Northern Pacific Railroad. This happened at a time when the post-Civil War railroad boom had
peaked, in 1871, after the construction of the Transcontinental Railroad in 1869 (Roberts 2016).
Mired in debt, overproduction, and speculation, railroad companies were no longer profitable at
home and had to invest abroad.
The flurry of investments into Mexico demonstrates a classic case of what Harvey (2006)
calls capital’s “spatial fix,” a strategy where capital invests in new markets and creates windows
of stability by projecting the crisis of capital onto new landscapes and into the future. The concept
of the “spatial fix” is important to understand the development of transportation infrastructures
during the Porfiriato. As noted above, foreign capitalists and the Porfirian state understood the
need to modernize Mexico’s transportation system and took measures to produce the spaces of
capital because “capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus, the creation of the
physical conditions of exchange – of the means of communication and transport – the annihilation
of space by time – becomes an extraordinary necessity for it” (Marx 1993, 524).
The tendency of capital to shrink space with speedy means of communication is well
known, and it is related to the equally important internal dynamics of industrial transportation
systems tied to the capitalist mode of production. As a commodity, transportation is a very
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specific type of service, and in Volume 2 of Capital Marx states that the formula for the transport
&
industry is ! − #$%
… ( … !) (Volume 2 1992, 135). This means that transport is consumed as it

is produced, and therefore the value it creates or the value it carries over to the commodity
transported can be realized in a shorter period of circulation. Furthermore, transport occupies a
crucial place in the production process, and its role in speeding up the circuit of capital means it
can reduce capital’s turnover time— “the time spent by capital in the circulation process”
(Heinrich 133, 2004). This is a revolutionary quality because since capital is value in motion
(Harvey 2010), speed is very important so that “…capital throws off its commodity-form and
assumes that of money” (Marx 1992, 124), and the universal commodity that can then be
redeployed in cycle ! − # − !) .
Most trends in technological development under capitalism share a concern to reduce the
time of circulation, since for capital “time is money,” and as Harvey notes, “Traversing space
takes both time and money. Economy of time and money is a key to profitability” (2014, 147).8 In
a sense, it could be said that transportation is “hooked on speed” (Hanson 2003), and under this
logic, “even spatial distance reduces itself to time: the important thing is not the market’s distance
in space, but the speed – the amount of time – with which it can be reached” (Marx 1993, 538).
This tendency to reduce distance with speed creates “a strong incentive to reduce the circulation
time to a minimum, for to do so is to minimize ‘the wandering period’ of commodities” (Harvey
1977, 270).
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This logic guides current research and technological development in modes of transport such as Maglev trains,
Hyperloop transportation, and the potential return of the Concorde supersonic jet. The emphasis on speed is not
accidental, and with projected speeds of 760mph, the Hyperloop would shorten a six-hour drive between San
Francisco and Los Angeles to a trip of 30 minutes. The consequences of such “annihilation of space by time” are
legion. Although we are nowhere near physical “spacelessness” and teleporting goods isn’t yet possible, current
trends in mobile technologies and virtual reality can lay the foundations for a future where the circulation of capital is
almost instantaneous and “spaceless.”
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The railroad also plays an important role in the circulation process since, “hitherto no one
has discovered the art of transporting commodities and objects from one place to another without
changing their location” (Smith 2008, 117) and because “commodity capital likely has the most
marked materialities and spatialities” (Cowen 2014, 101). As a conveyor of commodities, the
railroad carries out a “locational moment” that can be regarded as the transformation of the
product into a commodity for, according to Marx, a product is only finished when it is on the
market (Marx 1993, 534). Schivelbusch (1986) supports this conclusion and shows how the
railroad contributed to the process of commodification since the bringing of the product to the
marketplace separated the product from the place of production and thus contributed to its
sensuous qualities as a commodity away from the factory, the farm, or the field (40).
At the heart of the theory of the annihilation space, there is a dialectical relationship
between the tendencies of capital to expand and contract. While capital seeks to conquer the
whole earth for its market, it strives to reduce to a minimum the time spent in motion from one
place to another (Marx 1993, 539). The need for the annihilation of space is one of the most
revolutionary qualities of capital and a key driving force in the development of speedy means of
conveyance since “capital accumulation is bound to be geographically expansionary and to be so
by progressive reductions in the costs of communication and transportation” (Harvey 1977, 270).
Neil Smith also notes that capital aims to “conquer the whole world for its market”
through the simultaneous extension of the market and the annihilation of space. He argues that
these aims reveal the historical tendency of capitalist society to emancipate itself from space and
that “in this context, the “universalizing tendency of capital” represents an inherent drive toward
spacelessness…” (2008, 127). This drive towards spacelessness can be partially explained
through the concept of time-space compression (Scheivelbusch 1986; May and Thrift 2001; Warf
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2008), which stipulates that changes that revolutionize the mode of production also revolutionize
space-time. The railroad played a significant role in the process of time-space compression in the
nineteenth century; in North America and Britain, for example, the railroad adopted a uniform
time system to coordinate its operations that established the basis for a system of World Standard
Time9. This system was a practical necessity for a vastly expanded railroad network, and it also
helped coordinate the emergence of capitalism as a global economic system coordinated through
railroads, steamships, and telegraphs (Martineau 2016).
The impact of infrastructures like the railroad has deep consequences for the geographies
of capitalism, since an efficient transport system can lead to the rise and fall of centers of
production (Capital, vol. 2, p. 250 cited in Harvey 1977, 271). This is the case because
improvements in the means of transport decrease turnover times and further concentrate new
capital near existing or improved transport nodes. These improvements contribute to a process of
agglomeration that we see with the explosive growth of cities like Torreón and Monterrey during
the Porfiriato. Furthermore, time-space compression introduces new scenarios since the markets
connected in a network—including in the colonies—are disciplined by the same rules and
demands of capital across space-time. For example, Stein shows how the increases in
technological speed also led to speed-ups at work and how technologies like the telephone and
electric lighting were tools used to better control and exploit factory workers.
However, focusing on the capacities of railroads to increase speed tells only half of the
story, since a study on the circuits of capital circulation must not only investigate time-space
9

Martineau adopts Harvey’s concept of “socially necessary turnover time,” which is defined as the “average time
taken to turn over a given quantity of capital within a particular sector, under the normal conditions of production and
circulation prevalent at the time.” As Harvey notes, “Firms with shorter than necessary turnover times will receive
excess profits or relative surplus value. There will likely be, therefore, a competitive struggle to accelerate turnover
times. We can also see that a faster turnover time yields a higher rate of profit on an annual basis when all else is held
constant. Turnover times can be reduced by a variety of means…” (Harvey 2006, 186). In our case, we argue that
technological and infrastructural developments in transport are some of those ways to reduce turnover times.
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compression but must also consider time-space expansion (Katz 2001, Jung and Anderson 2016).
Taking a cue from the mobilities literature, I have sought to explore the dialectical relationship
between mobility and fixity, a dynamic detected by Harvey (2006) early on but not fully
developed until recently through the mobilities literature (Adey 2006; Sheller and Urry 2006).
Saskia Sassen also identifies this relationship and claims that “there is no linear increase in
fluidity without extensive systems of immobility and that the global city, capable of generating
global flows, has massive resources in place (cited in Sheller and Urry 2006, 210). Massey (2014)
also notices the interdependence of the mobile and the immobile (fixed), arguing that “mobility
and fixity, flow and settledness; they presuppose each other. …The impetus to motion and
mobility, for a space of flows, can only be achieved through the construction of (temporary,
provisional) stabilizations” (Massey 2005, 95). We can clearly see these patterns emerge from the
railroad as a technology that is anchored by fixed rails and fixed stations that simultaneously
allow for the mobility of trains. Of course, the rails and the stations are not the only
infrastructures that must remain in place: workers, water tanks, and coal supplies must also be
readily available to produce railroad mobilities.
Nevertheless, infrastructures of capital accumulation tend to give preference to capital and
capitalists in their access to time-space compression and selective time-space expansion, a
capacity that is not granted to all persons equally. Thus, I recognize this power difference in my
work and I argue that mobility and fixity are mediated through power relations where mobility
and fixity are understood as capacities deployed by different actors to exert and exercise power
(Adey 2006). Urry, Sheller, and Hannam note that “there are new places and technologies that
enhance the mobility of some peoples and places even as they also heighten the immobility of
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others, especially as people try to cross borders” (Hannam et al. 2006, 3, emphasis in the
original).
The Mexican Revolution is an ideal terrain to study the contentions for mobility/fixity
between different groups. On the one hand, these infrastructures allowed railroad workers to
organize unions across the national territory, as well as the political campaign of Francisco I.
Madero to challenge the regime—thus taking advantage of the fluidity of transport. Nevertheless,
workers and revolutionaries also seek to exploit this contradiction through work slowdowns,
sabotage, and, ultimately, the interruption of circulation through strikes. The Revolution makes
the targeted aspect of mobility and fixity evident since, as Addie argues, “The mobilities of
everyday life—whether for social reproduction, work or play—are thus always emergent and
contested, over multiple pathways and scales” (Addie, p. 190 in Cidell and Prytherch 2015).
In our case, these insights from mobilities lead us to understand the Central Mexican
Railroad, the main trunk of Mexico’s national railroad system, as one of the most contested
pathways of railroad mobilities during the Revolution, one on which the government became
highly dependent (fixed). Throughout the Porfiriato. the railroad was used as a military tool for
repression, and thanks to the expanding railroad network, army troops were easily dispatched to
the remotest regions of the nation to crush any rebellions (Knight 2010, 45). Rebels contested
these pathways of mobility by destroying bridges or obstructing rails with rocks. But the rebels
didn’t just obstruct the army; they also captured railroads and deployed these infrastructures to
redefine power relations by exploiting the dialectic between mobility and fixity.
Conclusion
As the railroad connected landed interests to international markets, the haciendas became
important exporters during the Porfiriato. Nevertheless, the railroad also exacerbated the
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conditions of exploitation because the railroads and foreign markets brought higher demand for
agricultural goods. This in turn brought more workers into plantation economies, but these
workers were forced into debt peonage and they were also required to purchase from the company
store at significantly higher prices. Debt peonage was most prominent in the henequen plantations
of Yucatan and tobacco plantations of the Valle Nacional in Oaxaca. Thus, Yucatán and Oaxaca’s
Valle Nacional became popularly known as a “tropical Siberia” after the American socialist John
Kenneth Turner published a series of articles that caused an international uproar against Díaz
(Lomnitz 2014, 150–161). These unbearable conditions eventually forced masses of peasants to
join the ranks of the revolutionary armies.
Opposition to the Díaz regime came from several sectors of society—including workers,
the middle classes, and sectors from the ruling class—and these groups took advantage of the
railroad to fight against Díaz. For example, radicalized railroad workers distributed the anti-Díaz
newspaper Regeneración edited by the Flores Magón brothers and their supporters in the
American Socialist Party (Lomnitz 2014). During the Porfiriato, there was a blossoming of the
opposition, and as workers developed their own organizations, they also developed a labor press.
Telegraph workers had Trenes y Alambres, mechanics had La Unión de Mecánicos, and
machinists had El Maquinista. Félix C. Vera worked for the Great Mexican League of Railroad
Employees and published El Ferrocarrilero to unite all railroad workers under one union. As
workers developed their own organizations, they also developed a labor press, which fused with
the liberal ideas of the period, and many of these publications were influenced by socialism,
anarchism, and syndicalism (Cumberland 1974, 25–26; Bringas and Mascareño 1988, 41).
While the railroad brought modernization and industry, it also brought economic
instability and fierce competition. These new conditions of trade forced sections of the ruling
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class to compete against each other, and land and water disputes intensified. The railroad and the
telegraph also connected Mexico to the rising global economy and brought with them competition
at the international scale. Of course, capitalists who were not politically connected with the
regime usually found themselves on the losing end of legal disputes. In the Laguna, the wealthy
Madero family began to challenge the regime’s political bosses, and pushed by personal
convictions and political circumstances, Francisco I. Madero launched an electoral campaign to
challenge Porfirio Díaz for the presidency.
The railroad had changed Mexico forever. It had unified the national economy and it had
connected Mexico to the booming United States and the flush capitalist economies of Europe. But
while it brought modernity and progress, this progress was not equally enjoyed by the majority
for whom it brought exploitation, dispossession, and displacement. These contradictions
crystalized in a revolutionary process, and there too, the railroad made its mark, this time led by a
radically different vision of progress.
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Chapter 3: Railroad Labor and the Struggle for Mexicanization
Introduction
In its need to unify the country’s geographical space and to connect its economic markets,
the Porfirian government embarked on an ambitious railroad construction project led by the
investments of American railroad companies. This ambitious development was limited early on
by a largely agricultural economy pinned down by the demands of the landed estates on labor. In
a country where most of the industrial development was confined to the mining sector and the
textile industry, the railroad companies had to create a new type of industrial worker, one who
would be disciplined by the dictates of wage labor. Yet, to the dismay of American capital, this
new industrial worker would also be influenced by American railroad labor and its organizational
forms. Nevertheless, the American railroad brotherhoods—American craft unions—were
anything but fraternal to Mexican workers. Therefore, Mexicans saw the need to organize along
nationalist lines to resist the exploitation of American railroad companies and the discrimination
of American railroad workers. Thus, Mexicans organized their own labor unions to compete
against the American brotherhoods to gain their positions within the railroad hierarchy. Even
though this socio-political consciousness allowed them to organize Mexican workers, it also
weakened their position against the government when the railroads became nationalized.
All of these processes occurred in the last decade of the regime of Porfirio Díaz, when the
national territory became integrated and when the country became widely connected to the global
economy. The grievances of the railroad workers also aligned with those in other sectors, though
they pursued their own organizational means. The Mexican railroad labor movement became
closely integrated with and influenced by the increasingly critical and liberal movement that
emerged as a dispersed but incessant opposition to the regime. These politics and alliances
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marked the development of railroad unions and helped raise political and class consciousness in
the process. One of the most remarkable contributions to the labor geographies (Herod 1997) of
the Porfirian period came from a small group of workers who sought to organize a national,
industry-wide railroad workers’ union, generally referred to as the Great Mexican League of
Railroad Employees. The Great Mexican League faced significant challenges exercising their
spatial agency (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011) and trying to overcome the scalar tensions
(McFarland 2014; Savage 2006) of geographically expansive labor conflicts.
Railroad Construction and Labor
The construction of the Central Mexican Railroad began in 1880, and early in its design,
the government and the Mexican Central Railroad Company agreed to build the main trunk of the
railroad, from Mexico City to Paso del Norte, and that construction would begin simultaneously
from both ends. The material to build from Mexico City was imported from Great Britain and
transported by the Mexican Railroad from Veracruz to Buenavista Station in the capital. By 1880,
the company had stockpiled material in the station’s environs and was ready to begin
construction. Construction of the northern end of the line did not begin until May 1881, however,
when the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad arrived at El Paso, Texas.
To build the railroad, teams of engineers, headed by a chief engineer, would survey the
land where the route would pass. Then the right of way was traced, and the plans were verified
and approved by the Ministry of Development. Once these procedures were complete,
construction began in earnest. The land was cleared and leveled along the predetermined route,
together with ditches, bridges, and tunnels. The last step was to erect telegraph poles and wires
(Kuntz Ficker 1995, 93).
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In her summary of construction of the Central Mexican Railroad Company, economic
historian Sandra Kuntz Ficker calculates that the number of workers during these phases of
construction fluctuated but grew exponentially over time. When construction began, the company
had about 4,000 workers on its payroll, and by the end of the year, that number had grown to
8,000. In 1881, the number ranged from 10,000 to 12,000, 16,000 in 1882, and in 1883, the
company employed around 22,000 workers in all its divisions during the summer, the high
season. Kuntz Ficker estimates that in the coastal sections, construction was much slower than the
main trunk due to insalubrious conditions and periodic fevers during the rainy season (93–94).
Often, construction was slow because labor was scarce, and these labor shortages were a
dynamic that contributed to the first labor conflicts along the railroad. For example, on the San
Blas branch, Mexican workers went on strike to demand a wage increase of one peso per day, the
same as foreign workers. In the same section, engineers and their supporters walked off the job
when they received a 20% wage cut, and the route surveying came to a halt. Skilled workers seem
to have been the most active, since, unlike construction workers, they were not easy to replace. In
one particular case in 1887, locomotive engineers went on strike to demand that the company not
promote firemen with similar skills to their posts. Among other demands, the engineers also
wanted to decide the number of cars to form a train. The company refused to make these
concessions and fired them, arguing that most of them were good workers but had been deceived
by “professional agitators.” Another case of unrest took place that same year in their labor camp
near Tierras Blancas, Guanajuato. Workers rioted because the company was late on payments and
the local authorities had to intervene to quell the unrest. Nevertheless, based on the scarcity of
reports, we can conclude that labor conflicts were not common during the early years of the
railroad, especially during its construction, where the itinerant nature of the work, the temporary
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aspect of the work, and the low levels of organization did not offer favorable circumstances to
labor organizing (95).
Construction on the line also faced other challenges, such as the local traditions and ways
of life that came into conflict with the demands of an industrial operation. Many workers refused
to work Sundays and holidays, and during Easter week, all work would stop, much to the
frustration of the company. The historian Cosío Villegas (1973) writes that in the countryside, the
demands of seasonal agriculture also affected the availability of workers who had to leave the
railroad to tend their harvests (143–147). Furthermore, local demand for labor in the mines or the
haciendas also came into conflict with the demands of the railroad. Even though the railroad paid
better than local employers, the temporary nature of the work dissuaded some workers from
leaving a stable job to take up a temporary position with the railroad. Thus, in many cases, the
railroad saw the need to import workers from other states, a need that became even more acute as
construction moved north, where low population also contributed to the railroad’s labor shortages
(96–97).
To meet these chronic labor shortages, the company hired foreigners. Early in its
construction, the company hired blacks from Kansas, Jamaica, and other parts of the region to
work on its lines. For other railroads, like in Sonora, Chinese workers also figured among the
workforce, and the National Railroad even listed four African cooks among its workforce in
1888.10 However, for the most part, Mexicans made up the bulk of workers. According to Kuntz
Ficker’s estimates, 89% of the Central Railroad’s workforce on the line between Leon and
Mexico City was Mexican. This trend continued as the industry matured, and by 1902, out of the
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Cosío Villegas writes that there existed discrimination by white Americans against blacks and that in the Tampico
line blacks were refused medical attention by the company hospital. Mechanics and blacksmiths also said they
preferred to work with Mexicans instead of blacks (1973, 172).
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17,500 employees of the Central, 90% were Mexicans. The remaining 10% was made up of 1,246
North Americans, among them 5 blacks, 373 British blacks, 37 Englishmen, 39 Germans, and a
few dozen French, Spanish, Chinese, and workers from “other” groups.
Most North Americans occupied posts as engineers, firemen, machinists, and blacksmiths,
while Mexicans occupied middle ranks as station agents, train agents, telegraphists, painters,
carpenters, construction workers, and day laborers. As early as 1884, some Mexicans, though
very few, did occupy a few high-ranking positions as firemen and machinists. Thus, ranks and
nationality were factors considered in wage differences among workers. But geography, labor
shortages, and experience also factored in. Still, by the end of the nineteenth century, Mexico’s
continually developing labor market was different across the country. Nevertheless, the Ministry
of Development calculates that on average, a Mexican railroad construction worker received 75
cents per day, equivalent to an average artisan’s wages. Still, the railroads paid better than textile
manufacturing (50 cents per day) and much higher than agricultural day laboring.
For American railroad companies to attract qualified workers for higher posts, they had to
entice them with higher wages to work abroad; this difficulty was coupled with the railroad boom
of the 1880s in the United States, which contributed to a labor shortage of these workers. In the
four wage categories that existed in 1884, the highest rung was made up of American
superintendents, engineers, station agents, and managers of important railroad stations that were
paid, on average, 350 pesos per month. Within these categories, however, there were considerable
differences, and the Mexican third-class station managers earned as little as 40 pesos per month.
The middle ranks consisted of two tracks, one for specialized artisans (carpenters, blacksmiths,
and painters), and the other for train workers, station agents, telegraphists, and machinists,
averaging from 45 to 100 pesos per month; within this group, engineers and conductors of
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superior rank could earn 100 to 150 pesos per month. The lowest rank was occupied by day
laborers and construction workers, earning on average the 75 cents per day already mentioned.
Kuntz Ficker notes that as the industry matured, the wage structure at the Central Railroad
evolved, and the four wage classes of 1884 were divided into 13 wage classes by 1900. The new
wage structure differentiated between middle ranks (chiefs, masters, captains, and agents) to the
lowest qualified positions (baggage carriers, peons, night watchmen, and other workers). In her
study of the company’s workforce, Kuntz Ficker remarks that the Mexican Central Railroad
Company went through several important developments in this period, becoming in 1902 the
largest private employer in Mexico, with 17,500 workers. At the same time, Kuntz Ficker’s
research shows that over a fifteen-year period, the wages of the railroad company’s top and
middle ranks increased significantly, while its lowest ranks stagnated around 50 to 75 cents per
day (98–103).
Thus, early on, the company’s labor force was segregated by nationality, and, as we’ve
seen, in some cases by the racist attitudes of American workers. The company’s rationale that
Mexican workers were not well trained to occupy higher posts that demanded technical
qualifications was not unfounded, since, for the most part, the railroad industry was new to
Mexico. Even the National Railroad, which had been established in the 1870s, employed
engineers and conductors from Britain. Furthermore, it was not uncommon for a foreign-owned
company to hire administrators and managers of the same nationality as its investors. When the
company did try to hire untrained Mexican workers as conductors and engineers to save money,
the action was harshly criticized, because it led to constant derailments, prompting criticisms that
forced the company to keep Americans in the company’s top posts (103–104).
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Figure 7. Railroad workers lift a destroyed locomotive. Source: SECRETARIA DE CULTURA. INAH.- FOTOTECA NACIONAL.-MEX. SINAFO: Núm: 33176 (1913).
Reprodución Autorizada por el Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia
Nevertheless, the argument against promoting Mexican workers to higher posts became
more and more unfounded by the early 1900s, since by then, Mexican workers had been trained
by other companies to fully operate a railroad, and some railroads were fully operated by a
Mexican workforce. Thus, the initial rationale of lack of technical ability lost its veracity (105).
Railroad Labor and Labor Organizations
Once the railroads were established and operational, American railroad companies often
hired from their own network in the United States and brought workers to occupy the highest
posts of railroad administration, as well as those of engineers, conductors, telegraphists, and
dispatchers. Besides their technical expertise, these workers also brought with them their labor
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organizations that were directly connected to American unions. Although there remain important
gaps in transnational trade unionism (McIlroy and Croucher 2013), in the case of Mexican and
American railroad labor history, Richard Ulrich Miller (1974) and Lorena M. Parlee (1984) stand
out as vital contributors. Miller focuses on the installation of American labor unions in Mexico
and sees this as a process of proletarian Manifest Destiny, whereas Parlee has developed a more
nuanced understanding of the benefits and conflicts this process produced for American and
Mexican laborers.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, as American capital and companies settled
abroad, American labor unions followed suit and began to call themselves internationals. It was
common for the American labor movement to have branches in Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico,
Panama, and Chile, as well as South Africa and Western Europe (Miller 1974, 239). Thus, by
1884, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) had established fifteen local lodges in
Mexico. They were followed by the Order of Railway Conductors, which counted eight lodges by
1885, and Locomotive Firemen’s Union, which had established four lodges by 1886. The carmen,
telegraphists, and clerks also had a lodge each, and their membership and presence was markedly
smaller. Despite the presence of these lodges in Mexico, neither the railroads nor the government
officially recognized any of these associations as official representatives of labor (Parlee 1984,
450).
Although the brotherhoods were supposedly open to all nationalities, in practice few
Mexicans joined them, and those who did often left them because of the discrimination by their
American co-workers, who often referred to Mexicans as “greasers” and “peons.” The
brotherhoods also benefited from the use of English as the official language for all railroad
communication, technical manuals, rule books, timetables, safety regulations, company reports,
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correspondence, and examinations for promotion (Parlee 1984, 450). Racism, a tiered wage
structure, and the use of English as the official language divided Mexican and American workers
early on.
The railroad companies and the government also fostered these divisions and went as far
as prohibiting Mexicans from joining the brotherhoods. This was quite useful because it allowed
the companies to pit workers against each other. For example, in May 1894, when American
machinists working in the Central Railroad’s repair shops in Aguascalientes walked off the job
demanding better working conditions and higher wages, the company hired Mexican machinists
of the Mexican-only Supreme Order of Railroad Employees, a mutual aid society that had been
founded in 1890. The company hired the Mexicans at the same wage that the Americans had been
paid; unable to maintain the strike, the American workers accepted defeat and returned to work.
Upon their return, the Central Railroad demoted the Mexican machinists to their original jobs and
salaries (Miller 1974, 250; Parlee 1984, 450). This experience brought internal conflicts and
disagreements into the Supreme Order of Railroad Employees and caused it to disband.
Unfortunately, the American brotherhoods did not learn from this defeat and refused to include
Mexicans actively in their associations.
At first, Mexican workers formed mutual aid societies that raised funds to support workers
who suffered accidents or illnesses or who died on the job. Overall, they rejected strikes and labor
actions and instead focused on the moral and intellectual improvement of their members. Railroad
companies and government officials preferred these to the more anarchist-inspired associations
common in the Mexican textile industry and often sponsored them as long as their aims remained
limited to mutual aid (Bringas and Mascareño 1988; Parlee 1984, 453). However, mutual aid
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societies did not address the needs of workers on the job, and wage discrimination and abuse by
American workers continued to be unaddressed by the government and the companies.
Mexican railroad workers continued to organize Mexican-only labor associations, which
took up these grievances as their main cause for organization. For example, in 1900, the Union of
Mexican Mechanics (UMM) was founded in Puebla by Teodoro Larrey, a mechanic who had
previously worked in the United States. The UMM was a craft union for mechanics from all
industries, of all nationalities and established branches at important railroad workshops, including
San Luis Potosí, Aguascalientes, and in Chihuahua, where Silvino Rodriguez became a nationally
recognized figure of the railroad labor movement.
The founding program of the UMM called upon its members to fight for equal wages and
privileges given to foreigners and against exploitation in factories and workshops. The growth of
the UMM also spurred other sectors to organize, and soon the Railroad Boilermaker’s Union
(Caldereros), organized by Cástulo Herrera, appeared in Chihuahua City (Parlee 1984, 454–55).
However, craft unions had many limitations, among them that they only organized workers of a
specific occupation. Therefore, if mechanics or boilermakers at a specific workplace went on
strike, they would not receive support from other workers because they were not unionized in that
craft. The shift to organize Mexican railroad workers along industrial lines came in 1904, with the
founding of the Great Mexican League of Railroad Employees (henceforth referred to as the
League). The founding of the League also coincided with the effervescent emergence of
independent newspapers, and its leaders used a newspaper, El Ferrocarrilero, to organize workers
and to establish a labor union. This was a decisive shift in Mexican railroad labor history because
for the first time, a single labor union sought to organize all railroad workers.
The Liberal Press and the Great Mexican League of Railroad Employees
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During the first decade of the twentieth century, there existed in Mexico a very active
print culture. Each state had its own newspaper that reported on government policy and politics.
There was also the commercial press, which included El Imparcial, pro-regime, and The Mexican
Herald, pro-American and pro-business, both based in Mexico City.
Counter to these, there existed a very active opposition press, often referred to as the
Liberal press, because they were influenced by the liberal reform movement that established the
Constitution of 1867 and that expelled the French Intervention. These newspapers used the
personality cult, Benito Juárez, against that of General Díaz to criticize the regime and undermine
its legitimacy. One of the longest-running opposition papers was El Diario del Hogar, established
by Filomeno Mata in 1881; as Díaz’s regime wore on, it became increasingly radical. By 1900,
the opposition press included Renacimiento and El Porvenir; in 1901, Vésper; in 1903, Excélsior;
and in 1904, La Humanidad, among others. El Paladín and Regeneración initially belonged to the
liberal opposition but became increasingly radical and openly critical of the government. Most
opposition newspapers were printed in Mexico City, but state capitals and larger cities also hosted
important regional publications, such as El Correo de Chihuahua in Chihuahua City. All
newspapers faced censorship, harassment, and persecution by the regime. Journalists were often
jailed and newspapers shut down, only to re-emerge in new guises and under different names.
Such was the case of the Ahuizotes, which had at least four different versions (Bringas and
Mascareño 1988, 29). Within this lively independent print culture, El Ferrocarrilero began
publishing in 1905 with the goal of starting the Great Mexican League of Railroad Employees.
To understand railroad workers and why they did or did not participate in the Revolution
of 1910, it is important to understand the precursors that informed their political consciousness.
The newspaper El Ferrocarrilero gives us an insight into this process, as issue after issue reveals
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how the working conditions of railroad workers influenced their political consciousness in topics
ranging from labor grievances to freedom of the press. Through the different articles in the paper,
we can also see that the League did not seek to overturn the state of affairs between labor and
capital; rather, it sought a reworking (Katz 2004) of power relations among the companies, the
state, and the railroad workers. A thorough reading of the newspaper has also allowed me to see
the growing spatial agency of the League in action as it sought to organize affiliated locals, first in
the central region near Mexico City and later at the national level. It also allows us to see its
weaknesses, such as its dependence on national leadership and its naive trust in the state, which
became an obstacle to its mission (Shabot 1984, 170–172).
The first issue of the newspaper sets the tone for the first volume, which ran from 26 May
1904 until August of 1904, when it was closed by government censors. During this period, the
paper listed Félix C. Vera as its owner and director, and Manuel Moreno Casasola as its editor-inchief. It was a biweekly, with its motto claiming it as a Periodico Independiente (independent
newspaper), and in its short circulation history, it garnered the support of railroad workers in
Mexico City, Veracruz, Aguascalientes, Puebla, and other points in between. The newspaper also
attracted managers and superintendents, and, eventually, the attention of the authorities. From its
first editorial, it spelled out its mission as “the champion [of railroad workers]” that had come “to
wage a struggle in the field of truth, bringing as its shield honor and as its motto, Loyalty, Unity,
Fraternity and Progress.” As a humble newspaper, it offered its intellectual efforts at the service
of its readers to defend just causes, not to be a voice for the powerful, and professed its aims to
the beautiful ideal of fraternity (1, El Ferrocarrilero, May 26, 1904).
This humble newspaper, however, was also a vehicle to organize an industry-wide union,
which was missing. Shabot writes that the newspaper was founded as the organ of the League at
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the behest of Ernesto Hernandez Espejel and Adolfo L. Castillo in 1904—both workers from the
Interoceanic Railroad—at the Banderilla Station in Veracruz. The League recruited Félix C. Vera,
a former worker of the National Railroad, while in Belem Prison, to become the writer of a
railroad worker’s periodical that would help organize an industry-wide labor association, the
Great Mexican League of Railroad Employees (El Ferrocarrilero, January 23, 1906; Anderson
1976, 91; Shabot 1982, 128).
One of the main tasks of the newspaper was to report on and denounce abuses by railroad
companies and American workers, and in the first volume, the paper reported regularly on wage
deductions. Several railroad companies deducted a small amount from a worker’s wages destined
for a “hospital fund”; nevertheless, the Ferrocarrilero denounced these deductions as extortion,
since workers in isolated areas did not have access to these hospitals but still had their wages
deducted to fund their medical care. Furthermore, the newspaper reported that instead of healing
injured workers, company hospitals often gave them amputations instead of treating them with
extensive procedures. It called on the Secretariat of Communications and Public Works
(Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas—SCOP) to look into the matter (2, El
Ferrocarrilero, May 30, 1904). Besides the hospital fund, the first volume also focused on the
abuses committed by American railroad workers against Mexican workers. Mistreatment and
abuses by Americans— “Yankees,” as the newspaper refers to them—were a topic throughout the
first two volumes of the newspaper, but disappeared in its third volume. In “It’s time to wake up,”
an article in its fourth issue, the newspaper pointed out that management always addressed
American workers respectfully, whether in person or by telegraph. That same article also
mentions that Americans were always awarded overtime when they asked for it, but that
Mexicans were always asked to work longer without overtime, and that when they asked, if the
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overtime was conceded at all, it was done so begrudgingly. Besides the clear advantages given to
Americans, Mexican workers also complained about the arrogant behavior of Americans. A letter
to the newspaper by a worker from the Central Railroad explains that Americans behaved “like
the greatest Czars” and “ordered” Mexicans and other foreigners around as if “workers were
slaves or peons” (6, El Ferrocarrilero, June 6, 1904; 9, El Ferrocarrilero, June 23, 1904).
Besides discussing the attitudes of American railroad workers, in its first articles, the
newspaper identified the railroad company’s management as its main enemy and directed most of
its attacks and ridicule to them. In its first issues, the paper singled out Teodosio Montalván, a
manager in the Electric Railroads, the tram company of the capital and its environs. The
newspaper reported that according to information gleaned from Montalván’s subordinates, the
company was forcing conductors to traverse a route in a short amount of time, which almost led
to accidents. When workers faced lawsuits for these accidents, the company refused to defend
them, and on the contrary, managers like Montalván insulted and abused them. This earned
Montalván a place in at least seven out of the eighteen issues of the newspaper’s first volume.
Two other managers who earned the ire of the newspaper were E. H. Decelles and Mr. Berumen, a
yard manager and station manager of the Central Railroad, respectively. In its regular column
Válvula Abierta (“Open Valve”), the paper criticized Decelles for running a clandestine business
of raising chickens and selling animal feed from leftover seeds at the warehouses of the Central
Railroad. In addition to Decelles, the newspaper also criticized Berumen, the general manager of
the Buenavista station, for favoritism in the hiring and intimidation of workers who refused to spy
for him (3–8, El Ferrocarrilero, June 2–20, 1904; 10, El Ferrocarrilero, June 27, 1904).
In addition to denouncing managers and criticizing American workers, the newspaper also
praised specific Mexican workers as being exemplary, and several railroads and crews at specific
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stations became early supporters of the newspaper. For example, El Ferrocarrilero constantly
upheld the Hidalgo and Northeast Railroad as offering the best working conditions and one of the
safest. According to the newspaper, this was due to the fact that it was a Mexican-owned and operated railroad, which reduced and almost entirely eliminated the discrimination, animosity, and
miscommunication between workers (12, El Ferrocarrilero, July 4, 1904). Another group of
workers who became early adherents to the newspaper were the mechanics who worked in the
railroad workshops at Aguascalientes. The workshops at Aguascalientes were the largest railroad
yards outside of Mexico City and concentrated one of the largest groups of mechanics in the
whole industry. The paper reports on the issues aggravating the workers from the beginning,
especially the issue of low wages, since many of them had been offered a wage increase that
never came. Aguascalientes workers were early adopters of the railroad and often sent in lists of
subscribers as well as reports on working conditions in the workshops (3, El Ferrocarrilero, June
2, 1904; 12, El Ferrocarrilero, July 4, 1904; 13, El Ferrocarrilero, July 7, 1904). Besides
supporting specific railroads and workers, another important contribution of the newspaper
throughout its life was its reporting on labor actions by different workers. For example, in its
seventh issue, the newspaper reported on the two-day strike at the Mexican Railroad, a strike
initiated by brakemen because of low wages (June 16, 1904). Through its reporting on labor
strikes, the newspaper tried to draw important lessons for Mexican workers about the need for a
labor association. Like the workers of the Hidalgo Railroad, the mechanics at Aguascalientes
became some of the longest-running supporters of the newspaper throughout its life and even
afterwards with their admission into the League.
The newspaper’s aggressive and denunciatory style earned it the ire of management
throughout Mexico City. Its effective reporting on abuses by management earned it a lot of
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support with railroad workers, who sent in clandestine reports about management’s threats to fire
any workers who read the newspaper. In its tenth issue, published on 27 June 1904, the newspaper
ran an article on a pending lawsuit by Teodosio Montalván against the paper itself, replying that it
was ready to go to court to defend itself. The following issue, published July 1, reported that Vera
was summoned to the penal offices of the infamous Belem Prison to testify in his own defense.
The case proceeded, and in the editorial of the 16th issue of that same year, the newspaper
defended itself, criticizing railroad companies for trying to silence it. Alongside the editorial, the
paper published an open letter from Belem prison written by Vera to his accusers. In his open
letter, Vera addressed Montalván, saying that he should quit his job or quit abusing workers if he
did not want the press to write about him. In the same letter, Vera also said that he was confident
in the court proceedings and that he trusted the law and the courts (July 26, 1904).
In the last two issues of the newspaper before it was shut down, Vera called on railroad
workers to join him in the struggle to shake off the yoke of foreign oppressors and asked them to
support the newspaper, because it would not cease to continue publishing. Throughout the court
proceedings and from prison, Vera demonstrated his confidence in the courts and also in his
convictions. In his last letter dated August 9, which he sent to the newspaper from prison, he
wrote that he would do his time in prison with a clear conscience, because even if he was
deprived of his liberty, he was “proud to have fulfilled his mission” (18). Thus ends the first
volume of El Ferrocarrilero, with its editor in jail and the newspaper itself shut down. It would
not re-appear until the following year, but the experience earned Vera a place in the Mexican labor
movement and a name as an honest and principled journalist in the eyes of railroad workers.
The second volume of El Ferrocarrilero reappeared as a weekly newspaper eleven months
after it was closed and was registered as a first-class article with the post office on 1 June 1906.
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The first issues of the second volume were not as biting, and the column “Open Valve,” where
managers were personally denounced by Félix C. Vera under the anagram Faver Cliex, or
“Silhouettes,” a section where managers were mocked and parodied, did not reappear until later
issues, when the paper was firmly reestablished and had a large following. Like the previous
volume, it focused on denouncing abuses, except that the emphasis was on railroad companies
and on individual “yankees.” From the outset, it took up the issue of the hospital fund, except that
in this volume, the paper criticized the “miserly” and “ungrateful”11 American railroads and called
on the Mexican government to force companies to establish a pension system.
One of the main targets of the paper’s reporting in the second volume was the Electric
Railroads of Mexico City. However, instead of focusing on its managers, this time the paper
emphasized the poor working conditions and the poor quality of service. Judging from the paper’s
reports and the letters from the company’s workers, conditions at Electric Railroads were
unbearable. For example, there was a hiring fee to begin working for the company, but once hired,
workers still had to pay for an expensive uniform with special plates and buttons sold by a
company-picked tailor (12–14, El Ferrocarrilero, August 11–25, 1905). Workers also wrote to the
newspaper claiming that the company eliminated night-time inspectors and rail operators in
attempts to save money. Thus, evening drivers would speed up to complete their routes and stop at
intersections to switch rail routes. These changes led to several near misses and a few accidents
(8, El Ferrocarrilero, July 14, 1905; 12–14, El Ferrocarrilero, August 11–25, 1905). Besides a
litany of abuses and poor working conditions, the paper also reported on the poor service offered
to the public: the poorly maintained rails, shoddy cars, and uncomfortable stations. In an attempt
to improve their lot, the tram workers organized a mutualist association, the Sociedad Juárez. As
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El Ferrocarrilero, Issue 2, Num. 33, January 14, 1906; Num. 37, February 11, 1906; Num. 39, February 25, 1906.
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the Sociedad Juárez began to grow and organize, its members faced repression and the company
began to fire its members (14, El Ferrocarrilero, August 25). Besides the Electric Railroads, El
Ferrocarrilero reported extensively on working conditions and issues of discrimination within all
railroad companies and, as a result, gained many supporters who wrote in to tell their stories and
to commend the newspaper for its work. In some cases, the newspaper also helped workers get
jobs at the different lines by posting letters from laid-off workers and more than once, it organized
fundraisers to help injured workers or widows of railroad workers (19, El Ferrocarrilero,
September 29, 1905; 52, El Ferrocarrilero, May 20, 1906). These acts of solidarity earned it the
sympathy of unaffiliated workers.

Figure 8. Félix C. Vera, standing second from the left, with members of the San Luis Potosí
branch of the League. Source: Ferronales, Volume 52, Issue 3 (1973).
To pursue its mission to start a labor association, the paper began its organizational drive
from June to December of 1905 in earnest. Through its regular section on “The League,” it carried
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on extensive propagandistic work about the benefits of labor associations. This section also
covered the League’s business extensively, giving us a glimpse into the organization’s rapid
growth from June 1905 to July 1905, when it celebrated its first congress in Aguascalientes.
Throughout the fall of 1905, El Ferrocarrilero launched an important organizational
effort, and Manuel Moreno Casasola, the paper’s first editor-in-chief, became the League’s
traveling organizer. In the newspaper, we learn of his trips to Veracruz and Coatzacoalcos, where
the League had immediate success and began local branches. The notes from founding branch
meetings also serve as demonstration of the benefits of League membership, as during the
founding meeting of the branch at Coatzacoalcos, the workers also held a fundraiser for workers
who had suffered accidents or who had been unjustly imprisoned for union activities, as was the
case of C. M. Eguiarte, in Parral, Chihuahua (44, March 25, 1906).
Casasola also traveled to Oaxaca to arrange the distribution of the newspaper and other
matters for the League, presumably to set up a chapter. Nevertheless, we learn that his travels to
Oaxaca were not as successful as those to Veracruz; a report to the newspaper mentions that he
faced many difficulties. Although he was unable to establish a chapter of the League in Oaxaca,
Casasola was able to establish an official representative for the newspaper there (Issue 27,
November 24, 1906; 29, December 15, 1906). From these reports, we can surmise that there
existed strong repression in Oaxaca, since El Ferrocarrilero reported that several independent
journalists from that city were in prison. From an article written in the 34th issue of the newspaper,
we see that the post office had been collaborating with the railroad company, as they held all
shipments of the newspaper and delivered them to company management instead of the intended
recipients (January 21, 1906). The reports of this type of collaboration corroborate with other
articles about the extensive surveillance and repression of labor activists in that city.
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Despite these obstacles, the League continued organizing. Manuel Moreno Casasola’s role
as the League’s leading field organizer was undeniable, and constant letters to the newspaper
attested to his qualities. His efforts to start chapters were more fruitful in northern Mexico, and by
February 11, a new chapter was founded in the city of Jimenez in the state of Chihuahua. A week
later, a new branch started up in the industrial city of Monterrey. An important branch was also
established in the city of Chihuahua, where the Union of Mexican Mechanics (UMM) also had a
chapter. A series of reports from April 29 mention that Casasola was given a well-attended
reception hosted by the president of the UMM, Silvino Rodriguez. A champagne lunch was also
held at the Jockey Club of Chihuahua in his honor, and the editor of the influential newspaper El
Correo de Chihuahua also expressed its support for the League and its newspaper (49, El
Ferrocarrilero, April 29, 1906).
The League’s rapid growth demonstrated its effective structure as well as the demand for
such an organization of its type among railroad workers. Throughout this period, El
Ferrocarrilero received many letters in support of the League, as well as donations whenever the
League organized a fundraiser. For example, when Félix C. Vera was hospitalized for several
months, members of the League sent in donations regularly. Once the League established an
extensive network of branches and supporters, it called for a national convention. Nevertheless,
an accident at the printing press held back the publication booklets containing the League’s
program, and so the congress was postponed. When this accident happened, the newspaper
became even more important, since it became the central organizer and published the program of
the organization in three different issues: 30, 32, and 34. This episode is another example of the
importance of the newspaper as the League’s key organizational tool.
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Finally, in July 1906, a year after the reopening of El Ferroarrilero, the League hosted its
first national convention in Aguascalientes with the support of the local chapter of the Mechanics’
Union. While at its national convention, the League also opened a branch in Aguascalientes, an
important railroad hub. El Ferrocarrilero reported extensively on the meetings between the
delegates and between the League and the Mechanics Union. It can be said that besides the
League’s newspaper, its decision to designate a traveling organizer like Casasola is one of the
keys to its success from 1905–1906. Through Casasola’s branch-building activities, the League
could jump scales (Smith 1992) by establishing an “active social and political connectedness of
apparently different scales” (66). Thus, exactly one year after the re-emergence of the newspaper,
the League was a reality. Its growing membership, the numerous ties with labor associations, the
liberal press, and supportive government officials seem to have finally turned the tide for Mexican
railroad labor. However, a newly confident labor movement also faced its biggest challenges in
1906, a year of historic labor strikes.
The growing Mexican labor movement found itself at a crossroads in 1906. On the one
hand, labor associations with mutualist fronts were growing in influence. Furthermore, efforts like
those of the League were also underway in the mining sector and the textile industry, which,
together with the railroads, represented the most industrialized sectors of the Mexican working
class. These three sectors also represented the largest number of industrial workers, since mining
employed about eighty thousand workers, the railroads employed about forty thousand workers,
and the textile industry another thirty-two thousand workers (Shabot 1982, 32). These industries
also shared another common aspect: all three sectors were dominated by American companies
whose investors and management were also American.
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Figure 9. Branches of the Great Mexican League of Railroad Workers, 1906.
The growing confidence of the Mexican labor movement and the unbearable conditions of
abuse and exploitation in the workplace became the catalyst for the strikes of 1906. These
conditions were evident to the liberals who continued to organize an opposition to Díaz; among
these liberals were the members of the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM), an initially liberal party
that had been moving towards anarcho-syndicalist politics and by 1906 would foment revolts
against the regime with hopes of touching off a general insurrection. El Ferrocarrilero and its
activists were also in touch with this radical wing of the liberal movement and reported on their
release from prison in issue 31, dated 31 December 1905, informing readers that the journalists
Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón and Manuel Sarabia had been released from prison. In
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subsequent editions of El Ferrocarrilero, editors published articles by the PLM, and shared
correspondence, denouncing abuses by American companies on Mexican soil. Vera and his
collaborators also published advertisements for the PLM newspaper Regeneración and
encouraged “every good Mexican to subscribe and help with their own grain of sand the good
cause of liberty” (38, El Ferrocarrilero, February 11, 1906).
However, as 1906 progressed, both newspapers and their editors grew apart. As the
League became more established, it sought support from local government officials, some of
whom agreed to support it. The PLM, on the other hand, moved in an opposite direction and
fomented strikes and labor actions, which the League was very cautious to address. In fact, from
its founding, the League stated in its program that it only supported orderly protests and not the
tumultuous strikes that led to the destruction of property (30, El Ferrocarrilero, December 22,
1905). The experience of the PLM was much more radical and internationalist in character
(Heatherton 2012, Lomnitz 2014). We can only speculate, but perhaps sustained interaction
among these two publications, their organizations, and their members could have produced a
stronger League with a more radical program, and the PLM could have recruited railroad workers
to better distribute its ideas and newspapers throughout the railroad network. Although a few
railroad workers did belong to the PLM, the party did not seem to have had a strategic focus on
them, or telegraph workers for that matter. Besides their opposition to Yankees and their support
for labor causes and a free press, both organizations organized separately; furthermore, constant
repression and sabotage on the PLM and labor organizers effectively limited collaboration across
sectors.
As in other industrial sectors, labor grievances were coming to a head. Excesses by
American workers and the lack of action by management were widely reported beyond the liberal
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and labor press. Furthermore, the lax attitude towards foreigners by local judges and political
bosses was also reported on, causing widespread indignation among Mexicans. In January 1906,
El Ferrocarrilero reported that a local judge in the Hipolito station constantly jailed Mexicans
without cause but allowed Americans to roam the streets of the town, causing a scandal with guns
at their waists. The League’s extensive relationship with the Mechanics Union gave it extensive
favorable coverage in the paper, resulting in extensive reporting about the abuses faced by
mechanics in the main workshops of the Central Railroad at Aguascalientes. In one particularly
notable case, El Ferrocarrilero reported on the firing of Mr. Ridgeway, station superintendent,
and Mr. Risque, a master mechanic, two Americans who treated Mexican workers fairly. In the
same article, the paper also denounced the administration of Mr. Tilton, because he continued to
lower wages, despite a yearlong demand by mechanics for a raise.
According to a report in the newspaper El Imparcial, workers in Aguascalientes went on
strike when the Central Railroad hired a group of Hungarian mechanics at a higher wage than
Mexicans. The workers were indignant because they had lobbied the company for a raise for
several years, but due to the Central Railroad’s monopolistic expansion years prior, it faced a debt
crisis in 1906 and argued it could not give workers a raise. This was a clear case of
discrimination, and the Mechanics Union filed an official complaint with the company, shifting
from its mutualist nature to a labor union. The complaint went unanswered, and several weeks
later, the mechanics went on strike. On August 1, mechanics walked off the job and delivered a
list of demands to management, among them a wage increase, recognition of the Union of
Mexican Mechanics as the official representative of the mechanics, overtime pay for holidays,
control over apprenticeship, and other demands on working conditions. They also demanded that
the company not retaliate against those on strike. The company refused to meet with the strikers
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and instead fired union leaders in Aguascalientes, Chihuahua, and other stations. Demonstrating a
higher level of organization between local branches and national leadership, as well as
consciousness, the Mechanics Union went on strike throughout the network, gaining widespread
sympathy from the public and other labor organizations that declared sympathy strikes. Within a
week the Central Mexican Railroad, the nation’s largest railroad company, was practically
paralyzed. Since the company refused to meet the strikers’ demands, the union president Silvino
Rodriguez sent a delegation to Mexico City to ask for government arbitration on the matter. El
Ferrocarrilero reported extensively and hailed the mechanics’ strike as an “eloquent protest of the
humiliations against Mexican workers that have said ‘enough!’” The newspaper also praised the
orderly, peaceful nature of the strike. When the mechanics’ delegation arrived in Mexico City, the
League held a banquet reception in Félix C. Vera’s house for the delegates, and its members
pledged their support to the strike. While in Mexico City, the union delegation was granted a
private audience with President Porfirio Díaz, where he also praised their orderly strike and
promised to support their efforts to receive the same wages as foreign workers. Nevertheless, he
also told them that he could not support unjust demands on foreign capital and called their
demands for union recognition “notoriously unjust and unacceptable.” After a series of arbitration
meetings between the government, the company, and the union, the strikers returned to work.
Although the company ignored all the mechanics’ other demands, they did concede to increase
wages, an act that the entire movement hailed as a triumph. A large part of the strikers’ success
was also their spatial cohesion around fixed shops, and in this sense, workers who stayed in one
place were able to build stronger unions. Furthermore, as skilled industrial workers, they were
also difficult to replace and could thus leverage their technical aptitude (Lalana Soto 2013). This
spatial fixity allowed them to see each other more often than station workers and mobile railroad
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workers, and therefore contributed to the strengthening of their bonds at the local scale, and to
build on a solid foundation towards a national strategy.
After the victory of the mechanics, El Ferrocarrilero proclaimed in its August 19 editorial,
“The Triumph of Reason,” that thanks to the peaceful strike and the involvement of the President,
“Reason has triumphed and peace reigns once again in the home, the future of the mechanics is
bright…” The article ends with a declaration that “all Mexican citizens are now authorized by the
laws of their government to associate themselves in labor unions to defend their honor and dignity
and to claim their rights” (63–65, El Ferrocarrilero, August 50–19; El Imparcial, July 26–29 and
August 1, 2, 5, and 7, 1906, cited in Parlee 1984, 461; Shabot 1982, 91–93).
However, before El Ferrocarrilero could celebrate this partial victory, it faced a major
setback. Once again, Félix C. Vera was imprisoned in Belem on charges of defamation by the
American E. W. Wuerpel, a manager in the Southern Mexican Railroad, a company whose abuses
El Ferrocarrilero had covered extensively. Out of the several threats from its managers, Wuerpel
managed to summon Vera to prison. Due to his delicate health, however, he was imprisoned at
Hospital Juárez. In addition to the lawsuit, Vera’s persecution and the newspaper’s denunciation in
the business press were due to a panic spreading from the Mexico-United States border. After the
brutal government repression of the Cananea strike a month earlier, the PLM and anarchist
newspapers affiliated with the PLM propagandized a revolt scheduled for September, during
Mexican Independence celebrations, in which the demand was to expel Americans and to take
back “Mexico for Mexicans.” These articles were picked up in the American press and reached
Washington. The American Ambassador in Mexico City, David Thompson, was actively involved
in investigating the veracity of these reports and met with representatives of the League and El
Ferrocarrilero, who reassured him that they had no part in these plots and constantly defended

78

themselves in the pages of their newspaper pointing to the League’s program, distancing
themselves from socialism and anarchism, and arguing that the violent Cananea strike was an
isolated incident, since in Mexico, labor and capital are inseparable brothers. Thus, conservative
attitudes of the League and its attempts to court government support brought more distance
between it and radical organizations like the PLM (68, El Ferrocarrilero, September 9, 1906;
Parlee 1984, 426). Following the September scares and his poor health and imprisonment, Vera
stepped down from the board of editors of El Ferrocarrilero and informed its readers that, as its
elected president, he would dedicate himself full-time to the League’s business. Abraham
Velazquez Jr. replaced him as its main editor. For his part, Manuel Moreno Casasola also resigned
as general secretary of the League. It is unclear if the resignation was related to political or
ideological disagreements, although there was a small announcement adjacent to Casasola’s
resignation that the League’s main correspondence would then be handled by others, since the
party responsible was unresponsive to letters from its members, perhaps hinting at Casasola (73,
El Ferrocarrilero, October 14, 1906).
1906–1907: Railroad Mexicanization and Labor Unrest
In the aftermath of the mechanics’ strike and the anti-foreign September scare, the
government stepped up its repression of journalists and labor activists. Even though the League
sought to convince the American ambassador and the authorities of its activities as apolitical and
focused only on labor, Vera’s imprisonment was in line with the censorship that was going on
across the country. Therefore, even though the President had stepped in as arbiter of the labor
dispute and had ruled in favor of the worker’s demand for equal wages, the government’s
involvement and positive resolution for the workers was an anomaly in what was otherwise a
wholly repressive record on labor issues.
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The government siding with the mechanics should also be understood within the broader
context of railroad consolidation taking place in Mexico under government aegis. Since 1902, the
government had been acquiring shares in small railroads in north-central Mexico. Fearing that an
American railroad magnate would monopolize Mexico’s transportation system, the minister of
finance, José Yves Limantour, led the government’s efforts to become a majority shareholder in
key railroad lines. By 1906, the government had also become a majority shareholder in the
Central Mexican Railroad. The Mechanics Union and the League saw this as a positive process of
consolidation and used it to pressure the government to begin enacting a policy of
Mexicanization. The movement for Mexicanization centered around three important demands:
equal wages between Mexican and foreign workers; the hiring of Mexicans as conductors,
engineers, and managers; and the use of Spanish as the official language of the new national
company. Using its newly acquired leverage as majority owner, the government was able to
pressure foreign shareholders to increase the wages of mechanics in the Central Railroad.
However, it also mobilized nationalism to ask the mechanics to support the government’s efforts
and to put off their demands for union recognition because it could hurt the national interests. This
move temporarily pushed back the pressures by railroad labor, and the government moved on to
consolidate the Central, the International, the National, the Hidalgo and Northeast, and the
Mexican railroad under a public railroad enterprise, the National Railways of Mexico. By 1908,
the government had consolidated the network into a single national system that appointed the
minister of finance and other Mexican officials to the company’s board of directors but which
retained the entire management structure staffed by Americans under an executive president, E. N.
Brown. In the new company, the government’s role became that of policy advisor, but the
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employment structure and practices remained the same as before (Miller 1974, 251; Parlee 1984,
463–464).
Within this new state of affairs, the League and the UMM sought to recalibrate power
relations with the state through what can be termed a reworking strategy (Coe and Jordhus-Lier
2010; Katz 2004) that had clear politics of scale at the national level. That is, the railroad unions
did not seek to resist the state’s takeover of the railroad lines; on the contrary, they supported it
because they could now mobilize a nationalist discourse to demand that Mexicans occupy the
positions of a Mexican company. Therefore, throughout 1907, Mexican railroad unions, especially
the League and the Mechanics Union, mobilized their membership around the demands for
Mexicanization. The League’s second convention was held in January “to discuss the national
situation of the railroads,” and out of its proceedings, it issued a call for complete nationalization
of the railroads owned by the government. Besides the calls to hire Mexican workers in top posts
and the establishment of Spanish as the official language, the League also called for maximum
hours, pensions, and clear paths to promotion (84, El Ferrocarrilero, December 30, 1906). In its
efforts to train and qualify Mexican workers for top posts, the League and the Mechanics Union
coordinated an effort to establish unofficial technical schools to train Mexican workers, and led by
Felipe Pescador, a chief dispatcher in Puebla, both organizations also began to translate and
publish railroad manuals in Spanish (Gorostiza 2010,148; Parlee 1984, 465). When Vera was
released from prison in November 1907, he continued as president of the League and dedicated
himself to organizing the League’s third national convention in Monterrey from January to
February of 1908, where the calls for Mexicanization became stronger. Members of the League
and the Mechanics Union were tired of the gradualism of reform in the National Railways and
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continued to mobilize around the issue, attempting a national campaign (Anderson 1976, 215–
216).
The Failed Strike of 1908
As Miller (1974) writes, “Bitterness continued to simmer below the surface until 1908”
(251). In April of that year, the League went on strike against the National Railways. Although the
League typically opposed unjustified strikes on principle, in this case, it was forced to act. In
March of that year, V. M. Holland, chief of the National Railways in San Luis Potosí, fired a
Mexican worker who had been in the company for fourteen years without a reason for dismissal.
Workers in San Luis Potosí suspected that the worker was fired because he was a member of the
League. Petitions to the company went unanswered, and in April, the local chapter appealed to
Félix C. Vera for support and told him that they were ready to go on strike. Vera authorized the
strike, and 300 workers in San Luis Potosí walked off the job, demanding the restitution of their
fired co-worker and the firing of American supervisors for discrimination (Anderson 1976, 215;
Miller 1974, 251).
Nevertheless, the strike’s prospects for success were tenuous from its beginning. Having
never directed a strike before, Vera and his collaborators in the national office committed a series
of mistakes that alienated important League branches that refused to join the strike. For example,
when the strike was called, the Monterrey local criticized the national leadership for its unilateral
action without previously consulting branch delegates, as was written in the League’s statutes. In
rejection of the order from the national offices, the division of Saltillo and Laredo also refused to
walk off the job because they were not previously consulted. The strike, in fact, was poorly
organized, poorly executed, and poorly funded. Antonio R. Ramos, secretary and treasurer of the
League, commented that although the strike action in San Luis was entirely justified, the League
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did not consult with the locals on strike action and that in some cases, the locals learned about the
strike a week after it had begun. Ramos also complained that the League had not prepared to
support any prolonged strike action and had not amassed any funds in anticipation. Vehement
opposition and criticism in the national press also forced the League on the defensive, and the
strike did not enjoy the public support enjoyed by the mechanics in 1906. Seeing his losing
position, Vera sought support from the president as mediator and met with him a week after the
strike.
The president, however, was not as lenient as he had been with the mechanics’ strike of
1906, and in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1907, the Mexican government refused to
tolerate any labor action by the League. In 1907, the global recession that began in the United
States and Europe also reached Mexico. With the drop in demand for exports, factories ceased
production and widespread unemployment ensued. This hit export plantation economies and
industrial regions in the north of Mexico particularly hard. Unemployment deportations and
restrictions on migration to the United States also led to an increase in the unemployed in the
border regions and the north of Mexico. The economic crisis was worsened by a drought, which
hit the north’s cotton and guayule harvests and thus led to even more unemployment and famine.
Out of work and away from the bosses’ supervision, more workers turned to the radical ideas of
the PLM (Gorostiza 2010, 52; Salmerón 2006, 180–181).
Thus, the government became more cautious of supporting labor activity and instead
sought to defend its interests and those of foreign capitals during the strike of the National
Railways. Instead of cooperating with labor, as Vera had hoped, the president ordered Vera to call
off the strike and threatened to use force to suppress it as it had in Río Blanco in the textile
factories’ strike a year prior. With the strike defeated, Vera stepped down as president of the
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League in May, and League members were persecuted and fired. With morale low and the
organization in disarray, League locals began to disband (Anderson 1976, 215; Miller 1974, 251).
Vera would never return to the head of the railroad workers’ movement. He went into exile after
the strike and later returned to write for the opposition in 1909. He was arrested by the
government for his journalistic activities and, without a trial, he was sent to Belem prison, for the
fourth time, in August of 1909.
Thus, the consequences of the strike of 1908 were nothing short of disastrous for the
League and for the organized labor movement in the railroad industry. Furthermore, unlike the
mechanics’ strike of 1906, the League was not able to jump scales (Smith 1992) from the local
San Luis Potosí strike to national actions, and this capacity proved decisive for its defeat. As Tufts
(2007, cited in Tufts and Savage 2009) has argued, labor organizing is tethered to “a spatial circuit
dependent on multiscalar action which occurs at a variety of reinforcing scales” (946). Thus,
coordination between locals builds regional and national infrastructures for action, such as
building the League’s Convention. However, in the case of the 1908 strike, the League’s barely
developing branch infrastructure demonstrated the contested scales (Savage 2006) and scalar
tensions (McFarland 2014) between the national leadership (Mexico City and San Luis Potosí)
and specific locals in Monterrey, Saltillo, and Laredo. Thus, we can conclude that the League’s
poor planning, its historic rejection of strikes, and its inability to jump scales at a decisive
moment led to its greatest defeat. This historic loss is even more tragic when we consider the
struggle and sacrifice it took to build the League from 1904–1908.
Labor Policy and the American Strike of 1909
Despite the defeat of the League in the strike of 1908, Mexican railroad labor was still
frustrated at the slow pace of Mexicanization and sought to pressure the government and exploit
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any opportunity that could speed up the process. Although the use of Spanish was being gradually
introduced into forms, correspondence, and examinations, the company’s hiring practices had not
changed. Facing pressure from workers and the press, the Mexican government moved to speed
up Mexicanization of the railroad, and on July 1, they called on E. N. Brown to begin hiring the
Mexican workers who had been educated through the company’s Department of Instruction. Then
Brown enacted these directives and instructed American dispatchers to begin training Mexican
“assistants.” Understanding that these “assistants” would be their replacements, the American
dispatchers refused and walked out on strike a few days later. Mexican unions had waited for this
chance and thus worked closely with the government to replace the striking American dispatchers
with Mexicans. Thus, when Mexican workers stepped in to keep the trains running, the strike was
quickly defeated. By mid-August, most American dispatchers had decided to leave the country.
When the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Order of Railway Conductors of
America saw the results of the dispatcher’s strike, they understood that they could quickly be
replaced by Mexican workers. To avoid the same fate as the dispatchers, they appealed to other
American brotherhoods in the United States for support against unfair treatment and
discrimination in Mexico, given the sudden “wave of anti-Americanism.” The American
Brotherhoods also appealed to the U. S. government to intervene on their behalf in negotiations
with the Mexican government. However, the American ambassador and the envoys of the Taft
administration sided with the National Railways of Mexico, arguing that the terms that the
brotherhoods wanted to impose on the union concerning the control of hiring and promotion were
unacceptable. Contemplating a sure defeat, the American conductors and engineers called off the
threat of a strike. Seeing the potential for future conflict that could put the company in a
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vulnerable position, the Mexican government continued training Mexican engineers and
conductors.
That conflict would not come until 1912, but in the meantime, the tension between an
increasingly Mexicanized workforce and the American brotherhoods continued to simmer.
Mexicans complained that the Americans subjected them to extensive scrutiny and that they
blamed them for accidents in order to undermine them on the job. Increasingly confident, the
Mexican railroad unions began to coordinate for a railroad-wide union confederation to be more
effective in their lobbying of the government and opposition to the brotherhoods. In April 1910,
delegates from several Mexican railroad unions met with President Díaz, expressing support for
the Mexicanization program. The government also reaffirmed its support for the program and
promised to continue working with railroad workers to implement it (Anderson 1976, 235–241;
Miller 1974, 251–54). Nevertheless, these efforts in railroad labor policy were cut short by the
political events in the autumn of 1910. After Francisco I. Madero from the Anti-Reelectionist
Party called for a revolution against the dictatorship of Díaz, the government’s efforts at
Mexicanization came to a standstill.
Conclusion
As we have seen, towards the end of the nineteenth century, Mexican unions quickly
transitioned from mutualist organizations to labor unions in everything but name. In part, this
transition was due to the example set by American brotherhoods that established locals in Mexico
in what Miller (1974) has referred to as “Labor’s Manifest Destiny.” Mexican industrial workers
modeled early labor associations on the brotherhoods and followed the craft union model that
these had. The racism and discrimination of the American brotherhoods antagonized Mexicans
from the start, and they launched their own organizational efforts in response. Thus, national and
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ethnic divisions divided both set of workers early on. American railroad companies exploited this
division to their benefit, pitting Mexican workers against the brotherhoods when these went on
strike, and vice versa. Twenty years after the establishment of the railroads as the most advanced
industrial sector of the economy, Mexican railroad workers felt emboldened to launch their own
labor unions due to the growing technical expertise and on-the-job experience gained by
Mexicans but not reflected in wages or promotion prospects. Thus, by 1910, Mexican railroad
labor unions had achieved a consistency and longevity that gave them an important platform from
which to organize for demands to improve their working conditions and their wages. Less
successfully, these unions also tried to gain official recognition as representatives of different
sectors and to have a say in hiring and promotion.
Within the brother context of social contestation underway in the last decade of the
Porfiriato, the Mexican labor movement in the railroads joined other social sectors mobilizing to
improve their social standing, wellbeing, and other conditions. The continued emphasis of
railroad workers on social betterment demonstrated that the workers saw themselves as a
particularly enlightened segment of the population, and, unlike the uneducated peasant masses or
the riotous miners and textile workers, they saw themselves closely aligned in values and
ambitions with the growing middle classes of Mexico. Thus, their relationship with the extensive
liberal movement surging against the regime situated the railroad workers as one more segment of
the population that sought to make social gains within the limits of what was permissible, but
which also sided with the opposition to make its own demands. As an attempt to cohere railroad
workers, El Ferrocarrilero became an important vehicle to express the grievances of railroad
workers, to rally public opinion to their cause, and to raise the consciousness of workers to the
power of labor unions.
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Attempting to break the pattern of mutualist and craft unions, the Great Mexican League
of Railroad Employees was remarkable in its attempt to cohere an industry-wide union. To
achieve its goal, it relied on mobilizing workers around nationalist ideology because of the
obvious discrimination by American companies, American brotherhoods, and American
management of the railroads. Though initially opposed to strikes, Mexican unions leveraged the
grievances of increasingly unbearable circumstances to gain government support, and when these
failed, they turned to strikes as a last resort. The repressive nature of the regime proved an
important deterrent for labor action, and the instances of violent repression in Cananea and Río
Blanco are exemplary cases of violent strike suppression in the annals of Mexican history. In this
sense, the strike of 1906 is unique because the striking party won its main demand for equal
wages. However, the strike of 1906 also coincided with the government’s interests in
nationalizing the railroads, a process where Mexican workers would be useful. Nevertheless, by
1908, when the League walked out on strike, the priorities of the government had changed, and
the need for the government to shore up its investments in the National Railways superseded
those of the workers. Furthermore, the League’s own mistakes in executing their strike deprived
them of the resources and support of their workers, their allies, and public opinion, and led to
their defeat. The defeat extended beyond the strike, to the ultimate collapse and dissolution of the
union. Thus, both ended with different circumstances. On the one hand, the Mechanics Union was
still in existence on the eve of the revolution of 1910 and still negotiating with the government to
pursue Mexicanization. But in the case of the League, the organization was almost disbanded,
except for a few local chapters that remained well organized but never returned to their strength.
By the eve of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, the railroad workers had been organizing
for at least a decade for the Mexicanization of the railroads and to secure better working

88

conditions. Thus, when the revolution was unleashed between 1910 and 1911, the railroad
workers were in conflict. On the one hand, the regime slowly but progressively implemented the
plan of Mexicanization, but on the other, there remained significant wage differences between
Mexican and some Americans within the National Railways. These demands and grievances were
appropriated by the opposition party against the Díaz government, and these demands were
combined with the calls for democracy from the middle classes and the calls for land from the
peasants. Since the workers saw their demands reflected in the program of the opposition, the
railroad workers found themselves swayed to the side of the revolutionaries. In their position as
the operators of Mexico’s most extensive industrial infrastructure, the railroad workers
increasingly became an important factor in the process of social change that was unleashed by the
revolution. In the democratic phase of the revolution, railroads became crucial for the
organization of an opposition to Díaz by Francisco I. Madero and his Anti-Reelectionist Party.
During the second phase of the revolution, both the workers and the railroads became key
participants in the conflict, and their position in a key sector of the national economy gave them a
position from which to intervene in the revolutionary process.
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Chapter 4: Francisco I. Madero: Iron Horse Democrat
Introduction
Throughout the third decade of the Porfirian regime, Mexican railroad workers rapidly
evolved their labor organizations from mutualist associations to industry-wide labor unions that
were disguised as mutualist organizations. Although officially unrecognized as labor unions by
the regime and by the American railroad companies, unions operated as representatives of
workers, and the government negotiated with the unions during the strikes of 1906, 1908, and
1909. Their activism and the evolving needs of the regime culminated in the process of
Mexicanization, a process that was slow in implementation but wholeheartedly supported by the
railroad workers. Relatively conservative, the railroad unions sought to work together with the
regime, and it seemed that their efforts were bearing fruit. As Yanes (2010) points out, by 1909,
the workers had made important and hard-earned gains in their workplace, so unlike the peasants,
miners, and textile workers, they had more to lose when the revolution came. This is important to
remember as we begin to analyze the participation of railroad workers in the revolution.
Nevertheless, despite these important gains, railroad workers were willing to participate in
political activities against the Porfirian regime, in some cases risking their jobs and in others,
risking their lives. Railroad workers are ever-present in the political movements that began to
challenge the regime, in particular, the campaign led by Francisco I. Madero, who challenged
Porfirio Díaz in Mexico’s general elections in 1910. Madero, a wealthy landowner of northern
Mexico, took advantage of the mobility provided by the railroads and the extensive network built
in the three decades of Díaz’s rule. From 1909–1910, Madero’s campaign relied on the Mexican
railroads to organize six campaign tours. Unable to accept a democratic challenge, the regime
suppressed Madero’s democratic movement. This repression detonated a revolution, and the
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railroads and railroad workers shaped the course of the revolution. Even though most railroad
workers did not participate openly, they became increasingly involved in supporting Madero’s
campaign. The railroads shaped the course of the revolution so decisively that through their
relationship to the infrastructures, railroad workers played an important role in moving the
revolution forward, often literally, up or down the railroad tracks.
Francisco I. Madero’s Democratic Challenge
The entry of Francisco I. Madero in Mexican politics is a testament to the deep
dissatisfaction of many social sectors with the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. Diaz’s thirty-year
dictatorship antagonized the peasantry, the working classes, the middle classes, and even the
Mexican bourgeoisie. In the north of the country, the Díaz regime came into conflict with local
caudillos because of their deeply rooted interests in business and politics. The process of
modernization detonated by the railroads had also brought wealth and prosperity to bourgeois
sectors, like the Madero family, opposed to the regime. The Madero clan owned cotton
plantations and haciendas in the Laguna region that borders the northern states of Coahuila and
Durango along the Nazas River. They were also business associates with other capitalists in soap
and dynamite factories in the region. Their vast fortune increased when they began selling rubber
extracted from the desert shrub guayule that grew abundantly in their lands and became direct
competitors to the Continental Rubber Co., a conglomerate backed by Guggenheim-Rockefeller
interests and the Belgian Crown.
The business interests of the Madero family were run by Francisco I. Madero, an
enlightened hacienda owner with a European and American education and progressive ideals. The
family’s commercial interests brought them in conflict with local and foreign capitalists allied to
the regime, and these competing interests were fought out in local politics. Madero organized his
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local followers in the Democratic Club “Benito Juárez” in 1904 to oppose regime strongmen.
With this club, Madero dabbled in political propaganda and journalism, writing for the club’s
newspaper, El Democrata. In his memoirs, Madero writes that the newspaper “caused quite a
sensation in Coahuila, since it spoke to citizens about their rights and invited them to the electoral
struggle” (Francisco I. Madero v. 1, 1985, 9; Salmerón 2006, 188–192). Through this early foray
into local politics, Madero developed a network of democratic clubs in the region; however, their
efforts were constantly frustrated by the regime and its allies.
Finally, in 1908, in the March issue of Pearson’s Magazine, Porfirio Díaz told the
journalist James Creelman that Mexico was ready for democracy and that he planned to step
down from the presidency after the elections of 1910. After the Creelman interview, Madero
threw himself into politics and in December of 1908, he began to send copies of his book, The
Presidential Succession of 1910: A National Democratic Party to his followers. In this book,
Madero outlined the criticisms of the current regime and took as his slogans the democratization
of the regime, the defense of the Constitution of 1857. It must be made clear that Madero did not
seek a revolution, rather political change that would then allow other social changes to take place.
Madero’s political program stood for the principles of “Freedom of Suffrage, No Re-election” and
began to receive widespread support from the middle classes and some ruling class families
opposed to the regime. Madero moved to Mexico City to head the work of the Anti-Reelectionist
Center of Mexico. On May 22, the Anti-Reelectionist Center of Mexico was founded and its
board of directors was staffed by lawyer Emilio Vázquez Gómez as president and Francisco I.
Madero as its vice-president. The board also included other notable figures, among them the
prestigious lawyer José Vasconcelos and the journalists Filomeno Mata and Félix F. Palavicini.
The Anti-Reelectionists set out to do propaganda work, to organize clubs across the country, to
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call for a National Assembly, and to elect candidates of the party for the general elections of
1910. One of the main components of their organizing efforts were the national campaign tours
by Madero and other proselytizers. These campaign tours helped rally the political opposition to
the side of the Anti-Reelectionists (Portilla 1995, 45–49; Salmerón 2006, 207–208).

Figure 10. Francisco I. Madero, standing in the center, accompanied by the Anti-Reelectionist
Women’s Club “Daughters of Cuauhtémoc.” Source: SECRETARIA DE CULTURA. -INAH.FOTOTECA NACIONAL.-MEX. SINAFO: Núm: 5966 (1910).
Reprodución Autorizada por el Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia
The campaign tours of Francisco I. Madero stand out as making the most extensive use of
the railroad for the public organization of a political campaign. According to Salmerón (2006),
one of the most remarkable aspects of the electoral campaigns of 1909–1910 is that politics had
never been carried out like this before, using the railroad to gather support directly, and in
particular drawing upon railroad workers to do so. While the radical Partido Liberal Mexicano
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had relied on this vast network of communication to disseminate its literature and ideas, their
work was mostly clandestine. In contrast, Madero’s work for the new Anti-Reelectionist Party
would be built on the basis of six public tours, where Madero would travel the railroads and
establish Anti-Reelectionist clubs at campaign stops in towns along the way. From June 1909 to
June 1910, Madero established or visited already established clubs for the new party. There is no
doubt that the mobility and reliability of the railroads helped Madero further his cause. Even the
smallest of railroad stations and platforms served as public podiums for Anti-Reelectionist
proselytism. His campaign tours, which will be described here in detail, allowed him to travel
through most of Mexico. A few states, such as Michoacán, Tepic, Morelos, and Chiapas, were not
touched by the campaign, and others, like Baja California and Tabasco, were not connected by
railroad (Portilla 1995, 53; Salmerón 2006, 209). Nevertheless, some of these were also visited by
propaganda teams operating on behalf of the Anti-Reelectionist Party. This new form of politics
emerged based on the material circumstances available, such as the steamship lines connecting the
states in the Gulf of Mexico but, more importantly, the well-established railroad network that
crossed most of the national territory. The accompanying telegraph network and the ever-present
liberal press also played an important role in helping to cohere and support Madero’s electoral
campaigns. The regime, accustomed to hierarchical forms of governance, counted on its usual
system of appointing strongmen to organize its electoral campaigns. The Madero campaign,
however, made extensive use of the railroad network’s capacities for mobility (touring the
country in a year) and fixity (using stops and train stations for propagandistic speeches), and thus
exposed Madero to thousands of Mexicans, making him the most recognizable political
challenger to the regime. Numerous local and national grievances from all social sectors
channeled their energy to his electoral campaign against the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz.
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The Electoral Campaign Picks Up Steam
Madero’s campaign tours took advantage of the extensive communications and
transportation infrastructures built during the Porfiriato, and during a year of incessant political
activity, Francisco I. Madero became a nationally recognized figure. During his first campaign
tour, his extensive use of the railroad and the steamship lines allowed him to meet diverse social
sectors in his travels. In his campaigns, Madero was accompanied by his wife, the typist in charge
of his correspondence, and by Félix F. Palavicini, the campaign’s orator. The young and eloquent
journalist Roque Estrada joined them as orator in the remaining four campaign tours. Here we
must recognize the irony that the railroads that had given so much prestige to the Porfirian regime
were the same ones used by Madero and his team of Anti-Reelectionist propagandists (Gorostiza
2010, 53-55).
Before Madero’s tours, his sympathizers had organized in liberal clubs across the country,
several of which helped to cohere local opposition to Díaz, and a few of which even had their own
newspapers. However, before Madero’s tours, the clubs were not organized at the national scale
around a national figure or a national program. By the end of Madero’s campaign, the AntiReelectionist Party had more than 100 clubs in 65 cities and 22 states. In Mexico City alone, there
were 200 clubs; in Puebla, 7, and in the city of Torreón, the Anti-Reelectionist Club had more
than 2,000 members. These clubs had three goals: to strengthen the Anti-Reelectionist cause,
propagandize their ideas, and select representative candidates. Thus, the success of the AntiReelectionist campaign was undeniable (Salmerón 2006, 209). Early in the campaign, however,
Madero’s challenge to the regime did not seem like a threat and, for the most part, he was ignored
by the authorities.
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Figure 11. Madero speaking from a train car. Source: SECRETARIA DE CULTURA. -INAH.FOTOTECA NACIONAL.-MEX. SINAFO: Núm: 32497 (1909).
Reprodución Autorizada por el Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia

Figure 12. Roque Estrada speaking to a crowd in Queretaro. Source: SECRETARIA DE
CULTURA. -INAH.- FOTOTECA NACIONAL.-MEX. SINAFO: Núm: 34354 (1909).
Reprodución Autorizada por el Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia
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The first tour12 was launched on June 18, and on his way to Veracruz from Mexico City,
Madero stopped in the railroad city of Orizaba, a city that had seen government repression in
1907 against textile workers. Although he did not establish a club on his first stop, by midNovember Madero spoke of “a magnificent political club with many members” in a letter
addressed to Octavio Bertrand (Madero v. 1, 1985, 487). In the port of Veracruz, a historic
League of Railroad Workers stronghold, he was received by 2000 people; a political reunion took
place in the Dehesa Theater, and through his efforts in Veracruz, a new club was founded. On
June 21, Madero arrived by steamship in the Yucatán Peninsula through the port of Progreso,
where he was met by celebrated journalist José María Pino Suárez and other supporters. The visit
to Yucatán came on the heels of a genocidal war by the regime against the Mayan peoples that
had rebelled against the slave-like conditions in the henequen haciendas, and his campaign
denounced these abuses, thus gaining popular support locally (Gorostiza 2010, 55).
Using the United Railroads of Yucatán, Madero traveled to the state capital, Merida,
where a crowd of 3,000 people welcomed him. Although the local chief of police had asked
Madero not to speak, the Anti-Reelectionists held a large rally at Santa Ana Park on the 26th,
where Madero, Palavicini, Pino Suárez, and Calixto R. Maldonado all gave speeches to the
crowd. During his stay in Merida, another Anti-Reelectionist club was founded. While in the
region, Madero also travelled on the railroad to the capital of the state of Campeche, where he
held another meeting at the Renacimiento Theater and where he founded a club despite
obstructionist activities by the authorities. The farewell meeting of this leg of his journey was
held in the port of Progreso at the Hidalgo Casino, where a new club, headed by José María Pino
Suárez, was founded. Madero left Yucatán on July 3, headed to the north, and arrived in the port
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See map “Campaign Tours of Francisco I. Madero” for reference.
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of Tampico, Tamaulipas, where he was unable to install a club because the local opposition was
already organized in favor of Monterrey governor General Bernardo Reyes, as successor of Díaz.
Nevertheless, this low point in the first tour would be trivial compared to the resounding success
obtained by his campaign in the industrial city of Monterrey, the capital of the state of Nuevo
Leon and home of Bernardo Reyes.
When Madero arrived at the train station, he was well received and gave a fiery speech to
3,000 people, where he outlined his opposition to Bernardo Reyes as a successor of Porfirio Díaz.
According to Madero, the meeting in Monterrey was the most transcendental for the campaign
since he spoke in the home territory of Bernardo Reyes, the most likely successor to Díaz at that
point in the campaigns. This was quite a coup, since Madero became aware of the unpopularity of
Reyes in his home territory and the chance he had to gain the support those dissatisfied with him
(Madero v. 1, 1985, 326–27; Portilla 1995, 439).
Madero returned to San Pedro, Coahuila, from July 12 to August 4 and occupied himself
with correspondence regarding his political activities. The first tour had been very successful, and
this encouraged him and his collaborators to continue working for their cause. Madero’s second
tour, from August 5–12, was devoted to organizing the Anti-Reelectionist clubs in his home
region where he attained immediate success due to his political history in the region. It is highly
likely that there too he moved on the trains that connected the hub of Torreón to Durango,
Saltillo, San Pedro de las Colonias, and Parras. Three clubs were founded, including one in
Torreón, with 2,000 members, and one in his hometown of San Pedro. In addition, a new club
was also founded in the industrial hub of Gómez Palacio, home to many railroad workers of the
Central and International Railroads (Salmerón 2006, 210). Madero was forced to postpone the
third tour due to health complications and instead boarded the train to the hot springs of Tehuacán
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in Puebla to seek hydrotherapy. During his stay in Tehucán, Madero established his base at the
Hotel Mexico throughout November (Portilla 1995, 445). While in Tehuacán, Madero and his
collaborators also launched their newspaper, The Constitutionalist, which helped disseminate the
party’s program and activities of local chapters. Liberal newspapers like El Diario del Hogar and
El Heraldo also joined in support of the Anti-Reelectionists and regularly published articles about
their campaign.
Soon after his recovery, Madero embarked on his third tour, which took him to the Pacific
and northern states of Mexico. Travelling the railroad, Madero held meetings in Queretaro,
Guadalajara, and Colima and established clubs in these cities from December 24–28. In
Guadalajara, as in previous occasions, local authorities attempted to stifle the Anti-Reelectionists,
and theater owners refused to rent their theaters to Madero. Nevertheless, in Guadalajara he spoke
to a crowd of 6,000 from the balcony of his hotel. Madero and Estrada embarked on a steamship
from the port of Manzanillo, Colima, to the port of Mazatlán, Sinaloa, and on January 2 held a
meeting for 2,000 people in the Atayde Circus, and another club was founded. As Madero made
his way north, local authorities continued to undermine his campaign; in some places they
succeeded, while in others they were unable to act, due to overwhelming popular support, as was
the case in Navojoa, Sonora, where Madero was received by a crowd of 200 people at the train
station at midnight. Despite the cold, a “delirious” meeting took place in the open from the
balcony of the train car. After the stop in Navojoa, Madero made his way to the northern border
where he crossed into Arizona from Sonora and took a train to Ciudad Juárez, in Chihuahua,
where he was received by Abraham González, another wealthy landowner, who accompanied him
to Chihuahua City (Estrada 2011, 154; Portilla 1995, 439–442).
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Figure 13. Campaign Tours of Francisco I. Madero, 1909–1910.
In Chihuahua, the authorities deployed the police to prohibit public meetings, but due to
the strong support of the middle class and the well-organized labor movement in the city that
sympathized with Anti-Reelectionists, Madero held a meeting at a smaller theater that was often
used by mutualist associations and labor unions. In fact, in Chihuahua, railroad workers lent
important union leaders to Anti-Reelectionism, Silvino Rodriguez and Cástulo Herrera among the
most well known. Rodriguez, a leader of the Mechanics Union, and Herrera, a seasoned member
of the Boilermaker’s Union, attained regional prominence in the campaign against the regime. As
Salmerón (2008) has written, Chihuahua was a hotbed of political organizing by mutualist
organizations of Protestant and Catholic inspiration that gave rise to strong mutualist
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organizations and the Worker’s Political Club. This fertile ground provided a supportive territory
for labor organizing among the region’s industrial workers who used the railroad to disseminate
subversive newspapers and propaganda against the regime.
Together with the upper classes and middle classes that held deep resentments against the
regime, Madero found a ready-made base of supporters for his Anti-Reelectionist Party. The wellknown newspaper El Correo de Chihuahua and its editor, Silvestre Terrazas, took up Madero’s
platforms and supported local opposition candidates. These important connections would become
invaluable later in the armed conflict against the regime (94–96). Madero’s third tour was a
resounding success, and it proved that Mexicans were ready for a new political alternative, even if
they had to defy the regime. The tour also cemented Madero’s alliances with important ruling
class sectors in Sonora and Chihuahua that had deep-seated resentments towards local political
bosses, foreign capitalists, and the regime’s close allies. In a letter to a close collaborator, Madero
wrote that he was “convinced that the political tours are the most efficient method for propaganda
and the only way we will be able to organize our party” (Madero v.1, 1985, 532). It is remarkable
that Madero recognized the tours as the most “efficient” method of propaganda and pointed to the
reliability of the railroad network that allowed him to take advantage of railroad mobility.
Indeed, a political campaign of this nature was a new way of doing politics, and it engaged
disgruntled social sectors in the political-electoral process. Madero’s campaign took advantage of
the vast railroad network and exploited its mobility to efficiently deploy the campaign and its
message to sectors that were not being engaged by Díaz and his Reelectionist Party.
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Figure 14. Crowd gathers outside the Colonia train station in Mexico City to hear Madero speak.
Source: SECRETARIA DE CULTURA. -INAH.- FOTOTECA NACIONAL.-MEX. SINAFO:
Núm: 33192 (1910). Reprodución Autorizada por el Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia
Madero is Stopped in His Tracks
After the success of the third tour, Madero returned to his native San Pedro and continued,
through active correspondence, to organize a fourth tour and to prepare the National Convention
of the Anti-Reelectionist Party to choose its candidates for the coming elections. Madero began
his fourth tour on March 20, in Durango City, where he was received by 4,000 people at the
Alameda park and founded a club that would anchor campaign work in that region. He moved
south along the central branch of the National Railways and stopped in Zacatecas, where he was
received by a multitude of 8,000 students, but the local authorities impeded his public meeting
and he was unable to found a club. He boarded a train and traveled south to Aguascalientes, an
important railroad hub and home to the repair shops of the National Railways. In that city, he was
102

received by a large crowd, to which both he and Roque Estrada delivered speeches. On March 26,
the city’s Anti-Reelectionist clubs organized a large meeting of 8000 people. In a letter to Emilio
Vázquez Gómez, Madero wrote about his recent successes, saying “We’ve held rallies in every
place we’ve had the liberty to hold them, which is the most palpable proof that the Mexican
people wish for a change away from the current government regime…” (Madero v. 2, 1985, 102).
Madero moved on from Aguascalientes to San Luis Potosí, where a meeting of 2000 people was
held and a club inaugurated, despite government repression. In the state of Guanajuato, Madero
held rallies in León and Guanajuato, founding clubs in both cities, and receiving large receptions
at train stations. After these tours, the regime could no longer ignore the success of Madero’s
democratic challenge and began to double down on repression. Thus, as Madero headed to
Mexico City to organize the National Convention, Roque Estrada was intercepted by the
government on his way to speak in Guadalajara and forcibly dispatched to Mexico City (Portilla
1995, 442–43). Again, the role of the railroad in the success of the campaign cannot be
underestimated since Madero was able to visit the most important cities in the center of the
country in the span of two weeks, a feat that would have taken two months without the railroad.
The campaign also travelled by night in Pullman cars and arrived the following day at their next
campaign stop, allowing for daytime rallies, meetings, and campaign activities. Furthermore, the
railroad stations served as important public places of agitation and political activity when the
authorities closed other venues to the campaign.
Once in Mexico City, Madero and Vázquez Gómez coordinated the different delegations
for the National Convention, which was held from 15–17 April 1910. The convention was
attended by delegates of the Anti-Reelectionist Party, the Nationalist Democratic Party, and other
independent groups that formed a coalition with the Anti-Reelectionist program. In total, 120
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delegates attended the convention, representing approximately 35,000 sympathizers of Madero
and his cause. The delegates voted to elect Francisco Vázquez Gómez as vice-presidential
candidate and Francisco I. Madero as presidential candidate for the party. With this new mandate,
Madero met with Porfirio Díaz to express his challenge to the dictator, who agreed to accept the
challenge. Nevertheless, the government continued to suppress Madero’s sympathizers,
persecuting propagandists and shutting down the party’s newspaper, El Anti-Reeleccionista. The
Anti-Reelectionists continued their campaign, and on April 20, Madero and Vázquez Gómez
presented their campaign platform, which called for a return to the laws outlined in the
Constitution of 1857, especially the principles of no-reelection and of free suffrage. Their
program clearly aligned with the demands of the liberal movement of the previous decade and
called for freedom of the press, public education, and higher wages and improved working
conditions for workers. Specifically, Madero sped up the Mexicanization of the railroads, because
he promised to hire Mexicans to top posts and to establish technical schools for railroad workers
(Gorostiza 2010, 57; Portilla 1995, 58).
Once elected as the presidential candidate of the Anti-Reelectionists, Madero began to
campaign, in earnest, as the main challenger of Porfirio Díaz in the upcoming elections. Thus,
Madero and his collaborators in the capital launched the fifth campaign tour with renewed vigor,
and on Sunday, 1 May 1910, they held a massive demonstration in support of the AntiReelectionist Party and its candidates, Madero and Vázquez Gómez. The campaign began in
downtown Mexico City, traversed through San Francisco Street and Reforma Avenue, the main
thoroughfares, and ended outside the Madero’s home in the Juárez neighborhood. The
demonstration not only brought together the clubs in the capital but also drew significant support
from the city’s inhabitants. Different reports mention 7–8,000 people. The American Ambassador
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to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, reported that 50,000 people attended the demonstrations. The
numbers and unbounded enthusiasm of Madero’s demonstration stood in sharp contrast with the
regime’s sober parade of May 5. The May 1 demonstration gave Anti-Reelectionists optimism
and presaged a good fifth tour (Portilla 1995, 54).
The fifth tour focused on consolidating the Anti-Reelectionists in the central region, and
Madero and Roque Estrada visited the cities of Guadalajara, Puebla, Jalapa, Veracruz, and
Orizaba. In Puebla, Madero was received by an overflowing crowd of 25–30,000 people as his
committee travelled from the train station to the city center. In Jalapa, Madero was also received
by large crowds in the city’s main square. On his way back to Mexico City from Veracruz,
Madero’s campaign made numerous stops in small train stations in Atoyaca, Córdoba, Fortín, and
others, where Madero and Estrada gave impromptu speeches from train cars to growing crowds.
Speeches like these became more common and allowed Madero to reach populations isolated
from the main cities, effectively exposing him to the plight of the peasantry and exposing them to
his democratic campaign. The last stop in Orizaba closed the fifth tour with a reception of 20,000
people at the train station and a meeting and parade of 15–20,000 people (Portilla 1995, 443–
444). Madero’s campaign had finally freed itself from the government’s sabotage, and the size of
the crowds was so large that they blocked police intervention. The regime had clearly
underestimated the thirst of the population for a political challenger, and it could no longer ignore
the threat posed by Madero.
Encouraged by the effusive receptions in the fifth tour, Madero and Estrada embarked on a
sixth tour in the lead-up to the first round of the presidential elections. On 4 June 1910, Madero
left from Mexico City’s Buenavista station towards San Luis Potosí and along the way made stops
at towns and railroad stations from the railroad car’s balcony, where his committee was
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enthusiastically received by local inhabitants. When Madero arrived in San Luis Potosí, he was
welcomed by a multitude, and Roque Estrada gave a fiery speech from the train car, stating, “Let
our oppressors be warned: the Mexican people are willing to die to defend their rights: And it’s
not that I am trying to incite the national territory to a revolution: it’s that they are not afraid of
the sacrifice” (Portilla 1995, 55). It is remarkable that at this point Madero’s committee could
make campaign stops at different train stations, and at the same time it makes sense that they
relied on the railroad’s itinerary, which allowed them to stop at small train stations. Thus, the
government was unable to intervene or sabotage the efforts of the Anti-Reelectionists because
doing so would have also interfered with railroad traffic.
From San Luis Potosí, Madero continued by train to Saltillo, capital of the state of
Coahuila, and was received by a crowd of 1,000 people that accompanied him from the train
station to his hotel. A public rally was organized in front of the hotel, and Madero and Roque
Estrada gave speeches to the crowd, asking for their support in the upcoming elections. Although
the local police tried to stop the rally, the crowd was too large and the people accompanied
Madero and Estrada to the train station (Portilla 1995, 444). Madero’s challenge to the regime had
been tolerated for too long, and the Díaz administration decided to stop the campaign tours.
Madero and Roque Estrada arrived in the industrial city of Monterrey on June 6, but the situation
was already tense and the police blocked access to the train station and dispersed the crowd
welcoming Madero. The authorities also suspended the electric trolleys of the city, and rural
police were deployed to patrol the city on horseback. Despite heavy police presence, Roque
Estrada tried to give a speech on June 7, but the authorities tried to arrest him on charges of
inciting a rebellion during his speech in San Luis Potosí. Once again, Estrada escaped, but his
arrest was imminent.
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As Madero and Estrada prepared to depart from Monterrey to Ciudad Victoria on the night
train, they took different paths on their way to the station to avoid the police. However, Madero
was intercepted at the station, and the police carried out a thorough search of the train to look for
Estrada, but he was hiding in a safe-house. Since Madero refused to tell the authorities the
whereabouts of Estrada, the police arrested Madero on charges of protecting Estrada. Upon
hearing of Madero’s arrest, Estrada turned himself into the police the following day. After their
imprisonment in Monterrey, Madero and Estrada were transferred to San Luis Potosí on June 21
to face trumped-up charges of inciting a rebellion and insulting a public official (Estrada 2011,
239–44; Portilla 1995, 55–60).
The regime hoped that by imprisoning Madero and Estrada, their challenge would fade
away. However, by this point, the Anti-Reelectionist struggle had spread far beyond Madero and
Roque Estrada’s campaign tours. For example, the campaign reached a place as isolated as Santa
Rosalía in Baja California, a company town of a French enterprise. After a long trip by boat, a
small committee representing the Anti-Reelectionists arrived in Santa Rosalía and announced it
would hold a public rally. Despite the mayor’s attempts to discourage attendance to the rally, and
in open defiance to the mining company’s orders, workers and inhabitants showed up to the rally
to receive the committee. Romero Gil (2011) writes that the Anti-Reelectionist cause was
especially well received by the railroad workers and that they hung painted banners from the
locomotives in favor of Madero. As Gorostiza (2010) has argued, few railroad workers dared to
express a dissenting political opinion in public for fear of retaliation. Therefore, it was remarkable
that workers in Santa Rosalía defied the local authorities and the company management by
publicly siding with Madero.
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Enraged by these daring actions, the company and the authorities persecuted the railroad
workers who dared to show their support, and one of them was fired and removed from the
company-town on a steamship bound for Guaymas, Sonora (36). Despite this repression, local
activists continued to circulate newspapers and reports from the opposition against the regime;
nevertheless, the tide had turned for the Anti-Reelectionists. During the month of June and in
some places before then, the government launched a persecution of Anti-Reelectionist clubs,
closing independent newspapers and arresting Madero’s supporters en masse. Liberals and any
newspapers favorable to Madero were shut down, and a week before the elections, thousands of
Madero’s supporters were imprisoned, many of whom were either deported to Yucatán or drafted
into the military. According to Portilla (1995), upwards of five thousand Anti-Reelectionists were
imprisoned (60).
The government’s repression foreclosed the democratic means by which the AntiReelectionists sought to challenge the regime in the national elections and thus gave way to the
revolution of 1910. Nevertheless, the impact of the tours on the population should not be
underestimated since a political campaign on this scale had never been carried out before.
Historians agree that Madero’s campaign tours allowed him to reach populations isolated from the
main urban areas and to expose them to the democratic challenge underway (Portilla 1995;
Salmerón 2006). The railroads allowed Madero to knit together a network of clubs at the local and
national scale, essentially allowing his campaign to jump scales from the local and the regional to
the national. This happened because the campaigns used reliable railroad itineraries to carry out
propaganda work, as well as the train stations and car balconies as places of agitation.
Furthermore, the open challenge by Madero, Estrada, and others against the dictatorship was well
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received by many social sectors that appreciated their bravery and their democratic challenge to
the regime—something that was unthinkable at the time.
Madero’s challenge didn’t just focus on the regime but also aimed to challenge political
bosses at all levels, including municipal offices. This strategy gained him a large following at the
national, state, and municipal scales (Portilla 1995, 55). On June 26, the primary elections were
held and all sorts of abuses were committed across the country: some places denied ballots, others
turned away individuals, and many votes were fraudulent. The regime and its supporters were at
peace knowing that the challenge had been averted, but Madero and his supporters thought
otherwise since he interpreted that his imprisonment had caused widespread indignation. The
American Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, also calculated that the government had overstepped
its power, and, in an attempt to shut out Madero, had committed a grave error and turned him into
martyr, which gave him more sympathizers (Portilla 1995, 62).
Madero’s Escape and the Plan of San Luis
As important as the railroad was for the Anti-Reelectionist’s electoral campaigns, it
became even more important as Madero’s movement shifted to clandestine operations to prepare
for an armed uprising. Despite the opposition, Díaz had obtained a seventh term in the presidency,
and the upcoming centennial celebrations of Mexican independence preoccupied the victorious
dictator. Francisco I. Madero, for his part, kept an active correspondence from prison and
coordinated newspaper articles, demonstrations, and matters relating to the party’s business.
Besides coordinating Anti-Reelectionist protests, Madero also directed his collaborators to
exhaust all legal avenues to recall the elections, but the authorities denied every petition and
lawsuit. Having run out of legal options, Madero’s democratic campaign would take its next step:
a revolution. Before Madero’s arrest, many Anti-Reelectionists were convinced that the
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government’s intransigence would lead to an armed rebellion, Madero among them. To anticipate
this outcome, Madero’s supporters began to prepare for an armed insurrection as early as the
National Convention in April (Madero v. 2, 1985, 275; Portilla 1995, 73).
In the state of Sonora, the governor José María Maytorena, an early supporter of Madero
and president of a local Anti-Reelectionist club, had hired the train conductor Paulino Fontes to
smuggle weapons and ammunition from the United States. In an interview conducted in 1961 by
historians for the Oral History Project from the National Institute of Anthropology and History,
Paulino Fontes said that in early 1910 he would travel to American border towns north of Sonora
with groups of women, most of them from the middle class and well dressed, that would carry
bags of ammunition under their dresses, tied to their legs or tied to their waist. Then they would
travel back across the border and store the weapons in Fontes’ house, and on the night shift he
would then transport them by train to the governor’s palace in Guaymas (PHO/1/12). In fact, gun
smuggling in Sonora is not the exception but the rule. Liberals and Anti-Reelectionists devised all
sorts of schemes to obtain weapons. In Texas, they formed “cooperative clubs,” ostensibly for
hunting, to which supporters could subscribe to obtain a gun and munitions. American armories
along the border were convinced of the coming insurrection since gun sales spiked in the Texas
towns, of Eagle Pass, San Antonio, El Paso, Brownsville and Laredo. Mexican authorities on the
U.S. border began to report about the tension in the air, and the Díaz regime asked the American
Ambassador to prohibit the importation and sales of weapons in Texas, Louisiana, and California.
The Americans were convinced that guns were being smuggled across the border at night, and by
October, “the tension in the air was electric” (Portilla 1995, 75–77).
While preparations were taking place in the north, Francisco I. Madero, Roque Estrada,
and their collaborators managed to devise a plan of insurrection despite heavy police surveillance.
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After the centennial celebrations, Madero was given probationary freedom from the State
Penitentiary of San Luis Potosí and was put under house arrest at the hotel “El Fiel Pastor” in that
city. While he was in San Luis Potosí, with help from the Mascorro family, Madero prepared his
escape to San Antonio, Texas. Jerónimo Mascorro was a chief security guard of the railroads, and
his wife, Petra Cancino de Mascorro, posed as a washerwoman to deliver news and letters to
Madero’s hotel room in the laundry. Together with their sons, Jesús and David, who also worked
on the railroad as brakemen, the Mascorros directed a group of railroad workers to prepare
Madero’s escape. On the night of October 5, Madero disguised himself as a railroad worker with
denim pants, a ripped shirt, dirty shoes, a hat (guaripa), and a red handkerchief wrapped around
his neck. From the safe-house Madero and Julio Peña, both dressed as railroad workers, left San
Luis Potosí on horseback to the Peñasco station. Once at Peñasco, the Mascorro brothers loaded
large cumbersome bulk packages on the express train to Laredo, Texas, to allow Madero and Peña
enough time to board. Once they loaded the bulk packages, the Mascorros also boarded the train
as passengers (but were actually security guards for Madero), and the messenger of the express
train, Paulino Murillo, opened the door for Madero to board the express train. Thus, Madero
escaped from San Luis Potosí and crossed the border on the evening of October 5 on the railroad
(Alderete 1956, 24–25).
Once in San Antonio, Madero and his conspirators redacted the Plan of San Luis, a
manifesto calling the Mexican people to arms. The plan denounced the violation of national
sovereignty by the Díaz regime, which had repeatedly violated the rule of law established by the
liberal Constitution of 1857 and the principle of no re-election. Furthermore, the electoral results
of June and July were declared null and void, and the Plan refused to recognize the government
brought to power by these elections. The plan called on Mexicans to revolt against the
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government on November 20 at 6pm (Salmerón 2006, 214). Aware of the mounting grievances of
the peasantry, the plan also denounced the confiscation of communal lands, indigenous lands, and
those lands that had been obtained through fraudulent means by the Ministry of Development and
the land surveying companies, and called for them to be returned to their rightful owners.
According to Portilla (1995), this demand was transcendental and expanded beyond the AntiReelectionist’s April program but was of strategic significance in a country where 90% of the
population was composed of peasants (81).
In effect, the Plan of San Luis closes the electoral chapter of the Mexican Revolution and
moves to the armed phase of the revolt—a phase that is known as the Maderista revolution,
named after its leader, Madero. As has already been mentioned, preparations were underway
along the border, and many of the guns smuggled soon reached the central states, including San
Luis Potosí, Puebla, and Mexico City. Although the plan was not supposed to be broadly
distributed until a week before the revolt, it became an open secret, and the authorities began
breaking into the homes of known Madero supporters. Some Maderistas managed to escape;
others, like Aquiles Serdán and his collaborators, were forced to revolt against the regime on
November 18, when the police had infiltrated their safe-houses. The three-hour shooting in
Puebla, and the capture and execution of Serdán, became national news and gave the signal that
the Mexican Revolution had begun (Ávila and Salmerón 2015, 74). In other localities, like in San
Luis Potosí, Madero’s conspirators did wait until November 20, but they were unable to cut
power to the city, which was the signal to begin the uprising. When they resorted to Plan B and
attempted to blow up the walls of the state penitentiary, the police caught on to them and
dispersed the rebels (Alderete 1956, 26). Madero was expecting a spectacular armed uprising
across the country that would topple the regime within a month, but this did not take place. As in
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Puebla and San Luis, many localities saw their insurrectionary plans foiled by the authorities, and
the rebels had been dispersed, jailed, or executed.
The Democratic Revolution and the Railroads
The spectacular and simultaneous uprising that Madero had called for on November 20
did not go as planned. As has been discussed, the government actively persecuted Madero’s
supporters and diffused uprisings in many parts of the country, especially in the central states.
Furthermore, Madero expected an urban revolution led by the middle classes—especially his
collaborators in the Anti-Reelectionist clubs. However, the organizational capacity of the clubs
was not sufficient for an armed revolt, and thus the revolutionary leadership had to go through a
period of transitional adjustment when the networks that had been formed for the propagandistic
and electoral struggle had to readapt to the realities of an armed struggle. The consequences of
this readjustment were several, among them, that many Anti-Reelectionists were not prepared for
the armed struggle and thus ceded their role to others more capable of leading insurrection.
Furthermore, although Madero directed the uprising from San Antonio, designating local leaders
as chiefs of the rebellion, these assignments didn’t always go according to plan because other
leaders emerged organically from the masses once the revolution was underway. In the north of
the country, for example, Madero’s call for a democratic revolution to defend suffrage and call for
new elections merged with long-running land disputes and democratic grievances. Thus, the
political revolution that Madero wanted quickly turned into a social revolution (Ávila and
Salmerón 2015, 75).
Most of the uprisings planned by the Maderistas for November 20 failed, except in
Chihuahua, due to the strong collaboration and organizational capacities between different social
sectors. In the state of Chihuahua, Abraham González was named as the chief of the Revolution
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by Madero, and he led to cross-class alliance against the regime led by local rebels he had
appointed, among them railroad leader Cástulo Herrera in Chihuahua City, Pascual Orozco, a gun
slinging protestant in the Guerrero region, and Doroteo Arango, a figure living on the margins of
legality, commonly known as Francisco “Pancho” Villa, in the town of San Andrés. Of the 40 or
so uprisings experienced on the 20th, half of these took place in towns, cities, and haciendas of
Chihuahua, especially in the western region of the state, where Orozco sieged Ciudad Guerrero, a
regional hub for the towns of the western sierra. This region was also well connected to the main
railroad trunk from Ciudad Juarez to Chihuahua City by two railroads: the Northwest Railroad,
which connected Ciudad Juarez and Casas Grandes, and the Kansas City, Mexico, and Orient
Railroad, which connected Chihuahua City to Ciudad Guerrero. The connection between Casas
Grandes and Ciudad Guerrero was still under construction when the revolution came, and
communication between these two points had to be done on horseback or on foot through a
forested mountain range.
In response to Orozco’s siege of Ciudad Guerrero, the federal army sent a military train on
the Kansas City, Mexico, and Orient Railroad from Chihuahua City. However, the train was
intercepted in a surprise attack at the San Ándres station by the forces of Pancho Villa and
Cástulo Herrera. In the attack, the rebels killed lieutenant colonel Yépez, and, unable to defend its
position, the military had to retreat. Without reinforcements from Chihuahua City, Ciudad
Guerrero succumbed to the siege by Orozco at the beginning of December, and he invited Pancho
Villa and other rebel leaders roaming the region to join him there and to restock on guns and
munitions. Once in Ciudad Guerrero, Orozco was democratically elected as the leader of the
rebellion in western Chihuahua. Meanwhile, Cástulo Herrera, the railroad labor militant, would
go to San Antonio to find Madero to return to lead the revolution. Thus, Pancho Villa took over
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Cástulo Herrera’s forces since his prestige had fallen as Villa’s rose, when the latter bravely
confronted the military in the field (Salmerón 2006, 220). The fall of Ciudad Guerrero and
consecutive victories over military gave a boost of confidence to the rebels, who now held an
important city in the sierra.
As uprisings in other parts of the country were quickly put out, the government’s attention
turned to western Chihuahua, and throughout December, the government sent in reinforcements
to Chihuahua City through the National Railways from Torreón, Cuencamé, Querétaro, Durango,
Guadalajara, and Mexico City, concentrating over 10,000 soldiers (one sixth of the entire army).
Once in Chihuahua City, the military sent troops to recover Ciudad Guerrero. However, the
government did not trust railroad workers, because they sympathized with the revolutionaries,
who were often extended family members or acquaintances of the rebels (Gorostiza 2010, 67). As
the work of Hernandez and Rincon (1992) shows, the army had reason to mistrust railroad
workers, especially telegraph workers, who were intercepting army correspondence and sending it
to revolutionaries. Such is the case of Eva Flores Blanco, a telegraph worker born in northern
Mexico and a supporter of Madero’s electoral campaign in the region. She and her sister were
among the first telegraphists to deliver secret messages to Madero while in exile in San Antonio.
Once the armed rebellion got underway, Flores Blanco operated as a spy for the Maderistas,
constantly informing revolutionaries of the movement of the federal army (35). Therefore, the
revolutionary army did not use the Kansas City, Mexico, and Orient Railroad. To retake Ciudad
Guerrero, the army was deployed over land during a tortuous two-week advance to recover cities
and towns south of the railroad.
As the Díaz regime closed in on the revolutionaries, the battle for vital railroad
infrastructure intensified in western Chihuahua. Early on, the federal government, under the
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leadership of General Juan N. Navarro, surprised the revolutionaries along the way and recovered
the towns of San Andrés and Pedernales, along with their railroad stations. This offensive ran into
a rebel ambush in the station of Malpaso, a narrow canyon, but was able to overcome the attack
thanks to cavalry reinforcements from Chihuahua City. In addition to the difficulties faced in the
battlefield, the army also faced problems in moving the railroads during the height of the
confrontations, as railroad workers in the region refused to move military trains since they had
been threatened by the rebels not to cooperate. It wasn’t until mid-December when a bulletproof
locomotive was sent to inspect the track for explosives and to repair it that the railroad workers
returned to work. Once the federal army had secured the railroad tracks, they used the Kansas
City, Mexico, and Orient Railroad to move troops west to Ciudad Guerrero, which they easily
recovered in early January after it had been abandoned by the rebels (Gorostiza 2010, 69;
Salmerón 2006, 224).
While the government’s attention was centered on Chihuahua, other groups began to
instigate their own uprisings in areas far from the railroad and the army’s reach. As the
confrontations between the army and the rebels centered in western Chihuahua, sympathizers of
the Partido Liberal Mexicano, led by the Flores Magón brothers, began to enter the country from
the U.S. border via Ciudad Juárez. The Flores Magón brothers and their collaborators in the
Socialist Party of the United States and the Industrial Workers of the World had followed
developments in Mexico closely. By 1910 the PLM had been deeply radicalized along anarchosyndicalist lines, after having previously organized two armed uprisings in 1906 and 1908 that
had failed to spark the revolution. Thus, although they disagreed with Madero’s leadership and
the political limitations of his revolution, they also decided to participate in the uprising to
overthrow the Díaz government and began to amass weapons in the lead up to the call to arms.
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The Magonista incursion into Mexico was led by Práxedis Guerrero, a passionate young journalist
and poet who edited the underground newspaper Puntos Rojos. Guerrero had been a close
comrade of the Flores Magón brothers and was considered the second most important leader after
Ricardo Flores Magón. Madero’s call to arms had caused a split within the PLM leadership,
exiled in Los Angeles, and its base, active along the border states. Guerrero and others were
impatient to leave the propaganda struggle and to enter the armed struggle, and Guerrero broke
ranks and organized a group of 20 revolutionaries to participate in Mexico. Unable to convince
Guerrero to remain in the United States, the leadership of the PLM designated Guerrero as the
chief of all PLM forces in Mexico (Lomnitz 2014, 265). Guerrero and his comrades crossed the
U.S.-Mexico border on December 9 and on the 22nd they held up a train on the Northwest
Railroad in Sapelló. They commandeered the train south towards Casas Grandes and destroyed
the tracks behind them to slow down any reinforcements that might come from Ciudad Juárez.
Once in Corralitos they demanded that the federal army give up Casas Grandes, which they
refused to do. Unable to take Casas Grandes, which was defended by more than 100 army troops,
the Magonistas abandoned the railroad and ambushed the town of Janos. Despite resistance by the
local mayor and the volunteers he had recruited, the Magonistas took the town on the night of
December 29. The following day, the army sent troops from Casas Grandes to recover Janos,
which the revolutionaries tried to defend in a shoot-out, but when their leader, Práxedis Guerrero,
was killed in the battle, the rebels fled. Without a military and political leadership, these
Magonistas would eventually merge with the Maderista chief José de la Luz Blanco and would go
on to fight the revolution on the side of Madero (Sánchez 2011, 64). This limited but tragic
participation of the Magonistas in Chihuahua deeply affected the party, and forced the Los
Angeles junta to enter Mexican territory through Mexicali and Tijuana in Baja California.
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Meanwhile, back in Chihuahua, the main theater of operations centered along the tracks of
the Kansas City, Mexico, and Orient Railroad—a strategically important line connecting rebel
territories to the capital. According to Portilla (1995), once Villa and Orozco had been dispersed
from Ciudad Guerrero, they participated in limited engagements against the government that
consisted of low scale guerrilla warfare and hit-and-run operations, and as soon as they saw a
perceived defeat, the rebels would escape (Portilla 1995, 92). With full use of the Kansas City,
Mexico, and Orient Railroad, the federal army focused on pacifying southwestern Chihuahua,
where skirmishes and shoot-outs took place in the towns of Parral and Batopilas. Throughout this
period, the railroad served as a conveyor belt of troops from Chihuahua City to Ciudad Guerrero
and as far south as Sanchez station. Besides the southwest of Chihuahua, other rebellions flared
up around Casas Grandes and Ojinaga, but out of the twenty confrontations that took place in the
state during January, fifteen of these took place in the southwest part of Chihuahua (Portilla 1995,
138). Orozco took advantage of the government’s concentration in the southwest part of the state
and moved on horseback to take the border crossing of Ciudad Juárez. At the end of January,
Orozco and his forces captured a passenger train in the Moctezuma station on the central trunk of
the National Railways. Orozco used this train to move his forces north and took the time to
destroy the railroad tracks behind him to slow down army reinforcements from Chihuahua City.
As soon as army General Juan N. Navarro learned of Orozco’s plans to attack Ciudad Juárez he
returned to Chihuahua City and hastily boarded a train with 1,000 soldiers to fight Orozco in the
north. At the same time, Navarro directed lieutenant colonel Manuel G. Pueblita over a telegraph
to destroy the tracks south of Ciudad Juárez before Orozco could launch a surprise attack.
Pueblita followed suit and on February 1 his forces met Orozco’s vanguard at Tierra Blanca,
south of Juárez. Orozco’s forces immediately attacked, and Pueblita had to retreat to Ciudad
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Juárez. After this confrontation, Orozco moved to the Northwest Railroad to destroy the tracks
there and to gather more forces before he could move on to attack Ciudad Juárez. Once at Bauche
station Orozco was intercepted by Coronel Rábago coming north from Casas Grandes. As Rábago
was arriving at Bauche station, one of his locomotives derailed, and as they unloaded their cavalry
Orozco’s forces attacked Rábago, but the rebels were quickly repelled by the army’s automatic
machine gun. In a defensive maneuver Rábago was able to retreat to Juárez with minimal losses
from the battle at Bauche station and for their part, the revolutionaries gave up on the assault on
Juárez since they did not have enough weapons and munitions and had not received orders from
Abraham Gonzalez, Madero’s chief in Chihuahua. Orozco used this opportunity to give his troops
a break and allow them to return to their homes in western Chihuahua until further notice
(Sánchez 2011,71–73). For his part, Navarro had successfully rebuilt the railroad tracks and
telegraph network that had been destroyed by Orozco’s forces on the main trunk of the National
Railways. The federal army also took on the tortuous task of repairing the railroad tracks and 20
bridges that Orozco had destroyed along the Northwest Railroad during his retreat (Gorostiza
2010, 72).
Madero had made several attempts to cross into the national territory to take command of
the revolution, but his forces had been pushed back into the United States at the battles in
Ojinaga. Nevertheless, Madero was no longer safe in the United States, where the American
government was accusing him of violating its neutrality laws with Mexico while he was in its
territory. The Díaz regime also requested that President Taft cooperate with his government, and
Taft agreed, sending military forces to the U.S. border to stop the contraband of large shipments
of firearms into Mexico.
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Finally, during the army’s pursuit of Orozco west of Ciudad Juárez, Madero and his
collaborators crossed the border into Mexico on February 14 to the east of Ciudad Juárez. At first
Madero and his forces captured a passenger train in Villa Ahumada, south of Ciudad Juárez, on
the central trunk of the National Railway, and moved south. They decided to abandon the train
tracks since the military could move swiftly on these and instead decided to launch an attack on
Casas Grandes, the only city in control of the army in northwestern Chihuahua. This was the first
trial of fire of Madero leading forces into battle; however, Madero’s 600 men were soundly
defeated and put to the chase by 500 army soldiers guarding Casas Grandes.
During the retreat, Madero was also shot in the arm, but his forces were narrowly saved
from a massacre by Orozco’s forces, which arrived just in time to help defend Madero’s retreat.
Salmerón (2006) asserts that despite his defeat, Madero gained the respect of the revolutionaries
of Chihuahua for leading his troops into battle at Casas Grandes (226). Furthermore, Madero’s
crossing into Mexico gave revolutionaries across Mexico another reason to redouble their efforts
to continue the revolution. After retreating into the Guerrero region, Madero’s forces set up a
general headquarters at the Hacienda of Bustillos, an estate requisitioned by the Revolution in
Chihuahua. While at Bustillos, Madero introduced a military discipline into the rebel lines and
managed to convince revolutionary leaders to unite around his leadership, despite his little
experience in the battlefield. The revolutionaries accepted his leadership because he was the only
figure with a national profile and because he had made the call for the revolt in the first place. At
Bustillos Madero also became acquainted with Francisco “Pancho” Villa, whom Orozco exalted
for his bravery and his second in command of the revolutionary forces. These two figures, Orozco
and Villa, will become important figures in the subsequent phases of the revolution (Ávila and
Salmerón 2014, 79; Salmerón 2006, 227).
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Figure 15. Railroad track obstructed by the rebels. Source: SECRETARIA DE CULTURA. INAH.- FOTOTECA NACIONAL.-MEX. SINAFO: Núm: 33195 (1912). Reprodución
Autorizada por el Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia
The Siege of Ciudad Juárez
During their time in Bustillos, the Maderista troops regrouped and prepared for an attack
on Ciudad Juárez. Mexico’s northernmost city along the central trunk of the National Railways
was also an important customs station where weapons could be procured from the United States.
Furthermore, if captured, it allowed Madero’s government easy access to American territory on
the border from where he could negotiate recognition by the United States. Besides military and
political considerations, logistically, Juárez was well connected with rebel held territories in
Chihuahua to the southwest of the city, especially the towns along the Northwestern Railroads
which could provide food, troops, and an escape route to Madera for the rebels (Portilla 1995,
101). Madero also instructed Benjamín Aranda and Rafael Rembao to repurpose the shops of the
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Northwest Railroad, established in the mill town of Madera, to cast military cannons for the
revolutionaries. Three cannons were delivered to the revolutionaries, and they were baptized
“Margarita,” “Effective Suffrage,” and “No Reelection.” These cannons, though impressive, were
also quite defective. Madero’s forces left Bustillos on April 7 using the Northwest Railroad. They
planned on attacking Casas Grandes, but the city fell peacefully since the federal army had
retreated to the Chihuahua city the day before (Sánchez 2011, 99–100).
As Madero’s forces moved north, a small but consequential rupture took place with a
small group of revolutionaries north of Casas Grandes. The Magonistas of Galeana, who were
flying a red socialist flag, had confiscated food and clothing from local shops and had given it to
the poor of nearby towns. Such actions were not approved by Madero and when confronted, the
Magonistas held a meeting and wrote a letter to Madero in which they informed him that the
alliance between the PLM Liberals and the Anti-Reelectionists had been broken, and they
demanded to be allowed to carry out the revolution separately. Madero considered these actions
insubordination and commanded Francisco Villa to arrest them. According to Salmerón (2006),
Orozco had refused to arrest and disarm the Magonistas, since two of their leaders had previously
fought alongside Orozco. Villa, however, carried out the orders, but men close to Orozco escorted
the Magonistas to prison in Ciudad Guerrero. Some escaped on the way there, and others escaped
once in prison (227). Although this action seemed inconsequential at the time, these Magonistas
would continue to pose a problem for Madero in the future.
After the Magonista incident, the Maderistas moved north to Ciudad Juárez on the
Northwest Railroad. Seventeen kilometers west of Ciudad Juárez, Madero’s vanguard exchanged
fire with the federal army at Bauche station, but, seeing the continuous arrival of rebel
reinforcements, the federal army boarded a train and retreated to Ciudad Juárez. On April 16,
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Madero’s forces arrived and set up camp at the Flores ranch, northwest of Ciudad Juárez and
south of the Rio Grande (Río Bravo). From the camp at Flores, Madero sent a letter to Juan N.
Navarro, general in charge of the defense of the city, and asked him to peacefully turn over the
city to the revolution. Navarro refused and the Maderistas exchanged fire for a couple of days as
they surrounded the city. For its part, the United States deployed 20,000 troops to the border of
Ciudad Juárez and El Paso, ostensibly to avoid a spillover of the revolution to the United States,
but mostly to protect American interests at the border if need be. Taft also told Navarro and
Madero that if the firing reached the American side, the American army would intervene to avoid
military conflict. Therefore, with little room for maneuver and advised from Mexico City,
Navarro negotiated an armistice with Madero and both camps agreed to cease the hostilities
between them in the regions of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua City, Casas Grandes, and Miñaca—the
regions bordering the central trunk of the National Railways and the Northwest Railroad. The
negotiations stalled at first—the regime offered Madero only the vice-president’s post—but
through more negotiations, the armistice was extended into early May. The regime lost the
capacity to negotiate day by day, not just in Ciudad Juárez, which was effectively under siege, but
also because across the country the revolution initiated by Madero had spread.
While it was in Chihuahua where the revolution was strongest and most intensively
involved the railroads, Madero’s revolt was not contained to that area. It spread to the Laguna,
Durango, Sonora, Sinaloa, Baja California, Puebla, and Morelos right after Madero entered the
country in mid-February. As Portilla (1995) has extensively documented, we can see a clear
increase in military confrontations, uprisings, shoot-outs, and attacks on the military from
February to May. For example, in November of 1910 there were 39 armed conflicts in seven
states, and half of these happened in western Chihuahua. In December there were 44 conflicts in
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nine states and in January 1911, 52 actions in seven states. But in February, we see a sharp
increase in revolutionary activity, with 77 actions in sixteen states; in March, 145 armed actions
in April; and 199 conflicts in May. Indeed, while the strongholds of the revolution had been in
northern states, by February 1910 the revolution had become a national uprising. For example, in
the agro-industrial region of the Laguna, the cotton-picking season that had been exceptionally
good after two years of drought finally came to an end in January, and so by February these
workers collaborated with the miners and ranchers of Durango to confront army troops through a
regional guerrilla warfare. All along, the government troops that arrived in the railroad hub of
Torreón coming from Mexico City were quickly sent north to put out the rebellion in Chihuahua.
In Sonora, the forces under the Anti-Reelectionist leaders Benjamín Hill and José María
Maytorena had also grown rapidly, and the small skirmishes of the beginning of the year had
evolved to a statewide rebellion by the end of March. These growing revolts in the north, and the
increasingly successful rebellions in Oaxaca, Veracruz, and the environs of Mexico City, placed
great restrictions on the ability of the federal government to deploy troops to Chihuahua to stop
the revolution (Portilla 1995, 96–105).
Besides the revolutionary activities in the north, another consequential uprising took place
in the small state of Morelos south of Mexico City. The valleys of Morelos had been turned to
sugarcane plantations during the colonial period and since the sixteenth century, indigenous
communities had resented the dispossession of communal lands by the Spanish. Throughout the
nineteenth century the communities resisted dispossession by the haciendas. Finally, with the
introduction of the railroads and the integration of Morelos into the international sugar market,
hacienda landlords intensified their efforts to disposes peasants from their ancestral lands.
Emiliano Zapata emerged as a local leader in the town of Anenecuilco and surrounding
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communities. His people occupied and cultivated lands expropriated from the landlords. When
Madero’s call for a national uprising emerged in the Plan of San Luis, Zapata and other rural
leaders joined the revolution because of its calls for land redistribution for the peasants and
launched an agrarian rebellion throughout Morelos and neighboring states from February to
March 1911. By early May, the peasant armies roaming the countryside controlled the entire state
of Morelos, except the capital, Cuernavaca, where the army had concentrated its forces. Zapata’s
southern rebellion and the threat it posed to the defenses south of Mexico City grealy constrained
the government’s ability to supply troops to the north and instead forced it to defend its rear. The
ability with which revolutionaries were able to take the advantage in many parts of the territory is
related to their ability to navigate their local geographies, whether in the sierras of Chihuahua or
the river valleys of Morelos. Furthermore, from the beginning of the confrontations, we see the
federal army’s dependence on the railroad and their focus on maintaining control of capital cities
and railroad hubs. As the rebellion grew, the federal army retreated more and more to its
strongholds in the different state capitals and only defended strategic transportation railroad hubs
like Torreón or ports like Veracruz so as to maintain capacity for mobility. However, in doing so
it gave the revolutionaries free reign to roam and recruit new adherents in the countryside so that
by May 1911, the government’s room for maneuver was completely compromised. It also bears
repeating that the urban and strategic revolution that Madero had hoped for failed everywhere and
instead, what we see are scenarios like those that developed in Chihuahua: rebellions led by rural
groups and contained, ruling class sectors, the intelligentsia, and to a lesser degree, the urban
working class. These cross-class alliances included peasants with and without land,
sharecroppers, agricultural peons, indigenous groups, ranchers, muleteers, artisans, and industrial
workers in textiles, mining, and railroads. But in addition to these, Madero’s revolution also
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included middle class sectors, such as teachers, journalists, lawyers, merchants, and local elites
historically displaced by the Porfirian regime (Ávila and Salmerón 2014, 85–86).
So by the time Madero’s forces had laid siege to Ciudad Juárez in early May, the
negotiating position of Porfirio Díaz was greatly reduced. However, Madero refused to engage
General Navarro in battle to take Juárez by force and instead adhered to the armistice. This
situation was unbearable for an army that saw victory close at hand, and Villa and Orozco’s men
grew impatient in the rebel camps three weeks into the siege. Madero refused to listen to his
generals, so they came up with a plan to finally take over Juárez. On the morning of May 8, a
small group of soldiers dressed in radiantly colored shirts advanced close to enemy lines to taunt
the army’s soldiers; falling for the provocation, the federal soldiers began to fire on the rebel
lines. The rebels fired back and more army soldiers joined in the defense, and by day’s end shots
were being fired all along the lines of battle. Meanwhile, Villa and Orozco were on the Texas
side, enjoying ice cream surrounded by numerous witnesses, feigning complete ignorance.
Madero called on Villa and Orozco to order their men to stop the fighting, but they convinced
Madero that it was too late to pull back. The fighting lasted two days and Navarro surrendered on
May 10 (Salmerón 2006, 231–230). Thus, the fighting came to an end in Ciudad Juárez, but
Madero’s collaborators used the national rebellion to their advantage and forced the government
to concede to its main demands: the dismissal of Díaz from the presidency and Ramon Corral
from the vice-presidency. Madero’s democratic revolution became a social revolution over a
seven-month period that took over or destroyed key railroads and completely overwhelmed the
military’s capacity for response. Historians have also observed that the federal army’s dependence
on the railroad isolated them to the network and urban centers, giving revolutionaries free range
to control the countryside (Portilla 1995; Gilly 2005; Knight 2010). Thus, the army’s presumed
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strength became a weakness. This contradiction highlights the fact that the railroad can come with
great advantages—such as speed and mobility. At the same time, it points to the limitations that
come with overreliance on this infrastructure. Therefore, as the army was concerned with
controlling and repairing the railroad, revolutionaries were given free rein to agitate and recruit
peasants in towns and villages inaccessible to the railroad. The Díaz regime could have been
completely defeated in the field of battle were it not for the political agreement reached by Díaz
and Madero (Portilla 1995, 90).
Both Díaz and Madero had enough reasons to end the fighting. For example, Díaz knew
that if he continued the fighting it would destroy his overwhelmed and under-confident military.
Furthermore, Taft’s deployment of American troops to the border also made evident the lack of
confidence on the part of the Americans for Díaz to succeed. Last, Díaz and his ministers were
aware that the regime had no social support, and this was expressed by mass demonstrations that
took place in Mexico City outside the national palace throughout the month of May. For his part,
Madero was eager to negotiate a peaceful transition because the revolution he had called was
threatening to surpass his leadership. Furthermore, he was also afraid that the revolution would
unleash the class violence simmering under the surface and that had already been seen in places
like Torreón, where a mob massacred members of the Chinese community and set fire to
numerous businesses. Uncontrolled scenes like these could alarm the Americans enough to cause
them to invade Mexico to protect American investments. Last, and more important, Madero did
not identify with the calls for social justice emanating from the ranks of the revolution and instead
believed that political changes would bring about the social change needed to improve the
conditions of the oppressed. Thus, when Díaz agreed to step down and to call for new elections,

127

Madero declared the fighting over, since the revolution had ostensibly achieved the aims outlined
in the Plan of San Luis.
On 25 May 1910, both sides signed the Ciudad Juárez Accords, which was recognized by
the existing congress. Among other things, the accords stipulated that hostilities would cease and
that the revolutionaries would put down their arms in due time. Despite these important
concessions, the treaty maintained the legislative branch, most senators, and the military, intact.
Concessions like these caused a split within the Anti-Reelectionist ranks, and even Pancho Villa
warned Madero of the dangers posed by the military. Madero did not listen to these warnings
from allies or critics and preferred a peaceful transition to power (Salmerón 2006, 236–239).
For Madero, the treaty with the government was satisfactory because it did not
compromise the economic advances made by the regime in a costly war. In fact, one of the first
points that was carried out in the accords was the repair of the railroad tracks in all of the regions
touched by the revolution to achieve a return to normalcy. Never mind that the demands of the
revolutionaries themselves had not been achieved; Madero had achieved what he believed to be
most important: a peaceful political transition. To celebrate the victory of the revolution, Madero
left Ciudad Juárez in early June and embarked on a week-long victory tour from the north to
Mexico City on the railroad. Madero’s special convoy stopped in every town, and Madero was
received by large crowds, even some federal army soldiers. Crowds would wait on the roofs of
train stations and on top of trains and train cars to listen to Madero. In Celaya, Guanajuato, three
trains of supporters joined Madero’s victory tour to Mexico City to celebrate his victory over the
regime. It was a nation unrestrained. In his account of his involvement in this action, Victorio de
Anda mentions the glamour at the train station of Lagos de Moreno, Jalisco. Fifteen years old at
the time, de Anda says that it made him very emotional to see Madero and all the trains arriving
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in Lagos and staying for an hour of speeches, received by a multitude (PHO/1/46). Madero’s
arrival in Mexico City was equally celebratory, and 200,000 people participated in his victory
parade from Buenavista Station to the national palace in the Plaza of the Constitution. Just like
Madero had relied on the railroad to carry out his political campaign and to launch his challenge
to the dictatorship, the railroad also figured prominently during the revolution. Furthermore, his
democratic revolution would culminate on a victory tour on the railroad as well (Gorostiza 2010,
79).
Conclusion
The importance of the railroads to the democratic revolution is undeniable since they
figure prominently in the strategy of the Anti-Reelectionist movement as well as the armed phase
of the revolution, especially along the Northwest Railroad and the Kansas City, Mexico, and
Orient Railroad in Chihuahua. The capacities for mobility and fixity and the national network also
allowed the revolutionaries to contend with the regime at the local, regional, and national scale,
effectively jumping scales and down-scaling as the conditions of the struggle varied. Although
railroad workers have been considered an “elusive” social group during the Mexican Revolution
(Knight 1984; Gorostiza 2010; Yanes 2010), a re-examination of the oral histories of the National
Institute of Anthropology and History, railroad worker histories in Ferronales (1956), Madero’s
letters (1985), Estrada’s accounts (2011), Salmeron’s (2006) and Portilla’s (1995) work all reveal
different degrees of involvement. To be sure, railroad workers do not appear as the most vocal
supporters of Madero since they were victims of retaliation, as we have seen in the case of Santa
Eulalia. Nevertheless, the role of railroad labor was present with important union leaders like
Silvino Rodriguez of the Mechanic’s Union and Cástulo Herrera of the Boilermaker’s Union as
founding members of Chihuahua City’s Political Club. These workers connected Madero directly

129

to their struggles for Mexicanization of the railroad, and they eventually fused with the opposition
to create an Anti-Reelectionist Club. The role of the Mascorro family of railroad workers is also
important and highlights how railroad workers had an outsized presence at key junctures of the
revolutionary events. Based on the actions of these union leaders and those of the railroad
telegraphist Eva Flores Blanco, we can see that railroad workers were active in their participation
during the electoral campaign and, in some cases, also during the armed phase of Madero’s
democratic revolution. Nevertheless, the shift towards armed struggle also saw the rise and fall of
rebel leaders. As was the case with other men appointed by Madero, a previously indispensable
union leader like Herrera proved incapable of leading in the field of battle, and the others, like
Villa and Orozco, emerged from the ranks of the popular classes.
Madero’s use of the railroads and the extensive railroad network built up during the
Porfiriato stands out for its innovative approach to political campaigning—at that time, a tactic
virtually unknown in Mexico since the regime had come of age with the railroads and Díaz’s
indisputable position as president had never forced him to use the railroads for a political
campaign. Certainly, the railroads were used for very repressive political purposes, like the
deployment of troops to put down uprisings or revolts, but as Salmerón (2006) argues, it was a
different way of doing politics—one directly linked to the railroad and its expansive national
network. Madero exploited the railroad mobilities available to him for the establishment of AntiReelectionist Clubs and his political campaigns—the railroad’s mobility, reliability and
infrastructures were indispensable. Once Madero’s democratic movement called for an uprising,
the relationship to the railroads by different actors became more complicated and seemed to
depend on its ability to offer an advantage or a disadvantage. For example, the federal army’s
heavy reliance on railroad mobility allowed the revolutionaries to undermine them by destroying
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railroad tracks and bridges. Thus, General Juan N. Navarro had to use extra resources to repair the
tracks since his soldiers and their artillery could not be deployed on horseback. Both parties
destroyed the tracks when it was to their benefit and repaired them when they needed the railroad
as well. For example, as Madero’s forces moved in on Ciudad Juárez through the Northwest
Railroad, the revolutionaries exploited railroad mobilities for their benefit. Nevertheless, it is
important to highlight here that in guerrilla warfare and in the mountainous terrains of western
Chihuahua, the rebels had many more advantages, including what I would like to call an
intermodal advantage, because they could use different forms of transportation for mobility, such
as horses, but they could also travel on foot. This intermodal advantage, combined with their
knowledge of the terrain, gave them superiority in a diverse field of battle.
Thus, we can establish that the railroads impacted the armed phase of the democratic
revolution in many ways, but the deployment of troops and armaments seemed to be the main
form of usage. Besides this, the destruction of tracks and bridges also figured prominently in this
phase. As we saw with Madero’s forces, once a specific territory was under rebel control, the use
of the railroad became more widespread and exploited—but when it wasn’t, the track was
destroyed to sabotage the enemy. During this phase, the role of railroad labor and the
contributions of labor geographies also fell in line with these main forms of use. However, as we
will see in the following chapter, the use of the railroads will become even more expansive in the
subsequent phase of the revolution, and the participation of railroad workers also becomes more
pronounced and dynamic, producing revolutionary labor geographies.
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Chapter 5: Rails to Revolution
Madero’s Failed Transition to Power
With the triumph of Madero’s democratic revolution, new prospects opened after three
decades of the Porfirian dictatorship. However, Madero’s negotiated transition alienated the most
radical—and in some cases, his most powerful—followers. Furthermore, Madero’s decision to
maintain the federal army and the institutions of the regime was a terrible miscalculation for
which he was heavily criticized. Since the social contradictions that brought about the conflicts
that led to the revolution were not resolved in the first phase, these resurfaced in the second phase
of the revolution, known as the Constitutionalist Revolution. As in the first phase, the railroads
and railroad workers were also involved in the revolutionary process; this time, however, railroad
workers enthusiastically supported the rebels and moved the railroads in the service of the
revolution. When these industrialized workers joined forces with the radical peasants and urban
middle classes, they began to shape an embryonic national project that reached its zenith in the
revolutionary governments in Chihuahua and in the southern commune of Morelos.
Soon after the signing of the Ciudad Juárez Accords, the new interim government was
installed. Seeking a peaceful transition, the regime and Madero’s collaborators agreed that
Francisco León de la Barra, the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Mexican Ambassador to
the United States under Díaz, should lead the interim government. The interim government was
responsible for three tasks: pacifying the nation, disarming the revolutionary troops, and
organizing a new round of national elections. The disarming of the revolutionaries was the most
complicated matter, but the Maderista leaders managed to convince their men to exchange their
weapons for a financial compensation. Most men turned in their weapons, but another 10,000
remained armed (Ávila and Salmerón 2014, 91). Other revolutionaries were reluctant to disarm
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their men since the new government failed to deliver on the third point of the Plan of San Luis,
which promised to return the land to the communities that had been dispossessed under the
regime. Such was the case of Pascual Orozco, who had hoped to run for the governorship of the
state of Chihuahua to enact reforms, but he was quickly sidelined by Madero, who had chosen his
longtime supporter Abraham González as governor. Madero’s new Constitutional Progressive
Party swept the elections, but Madero’s party program did not address demands for land
redistribution or demands for better working conditions for industrial workers (Ávila and
Salmerón 2014, 90–100).
Besides a new government, the revolution had also brought with it new ideas about social
change and had empowered popular sectors to take matters into their own hands. For example, in
1911 workers from all professions went on strike and demanded better working conditions, higher
wages, and the reduction of the 16-hour day to a 10-hour day. Therefore, the Madero
administration created the Department of Labor as a mediator between the conflicts of labor and
capital. In fact, along with the creation of the Department of Labor, union organizing saw
increased activity under Madero’s more tolerant government, and new labor associations were
born. Able to organize openly, the union movement began to organize industry-wide labor
confederations whose strength could be leveraged against the bosses (Leal 1988, 115–18).
Mexican railroad workers had welcomed the government’s nationalization of several
railroads and their unification under the National Railways of Mexico, but they were impatient
and expected Madero to deliver results quickly, since the Díaz government had dragged out
Mexicanization for four years with minimal results. This nationalization also stipulated the
Mexicanization of the National Railways, beginning with changing written materials and
communications from English to Spanish, but these changes were slow. Seeking strength in unity,
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in early 1910 railroad workers formed an industry-wide union, the Confederation of Railroad
Societies, to pressure the government to speed up Mexicanization. However, as the Díaz regime
turned its attention to the elections of 1910, their demands to speed up the process were largely
ignored by the government (Parlee 1984, 471). For his part, Madero’s Anti-Reelectionist
movement had taken up the cause of the railroad workers, and he had vowed to speed up
Mexicanization if elected President. Railroad workers began to make important advances and in
August 1911, the Alliance of Mexican Railroad Workers became the officially recognized union
of office workers in negotiations with the National Railways (Rodea 1944, 131). Two weeks after
being sworn in as president, Madero received a delegation of railroad workers. At this meeting,
workers discussed the advances made towards Mexicanization; Madero expressed his support for
their cause and stated that “the problem should be resolved with prudence but with energy,
without sacrificing the rights of workers” (Gorostiza 2010, 131).
For their part, American railroad workers were not content with the Mexicanization, and
in February 1912, the American Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Order of Railway
Conductors sent a petition to the management of the National Railways demanding that they be
recognized as the official representatives of the American workers and that the company establish
exams, train orders, and instructions in English and Spanish. When management refused to meet
their demands, the American train engineers and conductors went on strike in mid-April. For their
part, Mexican conductors and engineers were waiting for this opportunity, training for years at
clandestine technical schools, and when the strike came, the National Railways asked the
Mexican unions for support. Taking advantage of this opportunity to speed up Mexicanization,
they stepped in and replaced the American conductors and engineers without interruption in
service along the network. Defeated, the members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
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and the Order of Railway Conductors closed their chapters in Mexico and abandoned the country.
By 1913 only 400 U.S. citizens, mostly in management, worked for the National Railways (Parlee
1984, 473). Increasingly confident, labor unions began making more demands on the railroad
companies, and after the American Brotherhoods had been defeated in the strike of 1912, the
Mechanic’s Union began to make demands on the National Railways. The mechanics demanded
an 8-hour day, a joint committee to plan schedules, fixed salaries, a one-hour break, holidays, and
clear entry requirements for different posts. The company refused to agree to these demands and,
in response, the mechanics went on strike with the support of boiler- makers, painters, and
carpenters. By the end of 1912, 20,000 railroad workers were on strike and the National Railways
were on the defensive. Taking advantage of the situation, the Mutualist Society of Railroad
Telegraphists workers also threatened to go on strike, and, unable to replace these workers, the
company caved in. By the end of January 1913, the National Railways agreed to all the demands
of striking mechanics and telegraphists, giving rise to Mexico’s first collective contracts (Leal
1988, 144–51).
Madero had managed to bring labor unions into the fold, but he faced a bigger challenge
with disgruntled peasant leaders. The disarming and disbanding of the revolutionaries proved to
be a thorny issue, and the Agrarian Commission created by the Madero government fell far too
short of the hopes raised by the Plan de San Luis, which had promised land redistribution to those
unjustly dispossessed by the haciendas. Under Emiliano Zapata, a radical peasant leader in
Morelos, the movement for land redistribution found a new leader and a new program. Zapata and
his followers issued the Plan of Ayala, which called Madero a traitor to the revolution and called
on revolutionaries to overthrow him and to finish the revolution that Madero had started. The Plan
de Ayala also identified Pascual Orozco as a true agrarian leader and proposed him as the leader
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of the insurrection. Orozco was reluctant to become involved in a rebellion against Madero;
however, he received support from other disgruntled groups like the PLM, as well as the wealthy
Terrazas-Creel clan, which sought to destabilize Madero’s new government by financing
Orozco’s rebellion (Ávila and Salmerón 2014, 181–85).
Orozco’s rebellion achieved initial success, and it became a real danger to the stability of
Madero’s government. Faced with this new threat, Madero relied on the military and sent the
effective but ruthless General Victoriano Huerta to suppress the uprising. Besides Huerta, forces
loyal to Madero also joined the government, including Francisco “Pancho” Villa, who had retired
to private life after the signing of the Ciudad Juárez Accords. Villa’s guerrilla tactics were
effective but he soon gained the enmity of Huerta, and after disobeying orders in the field, Huerta
decided to send Villa to the firing squad. However, Madero’s brothers saved Villa from the firing
squad and instead he was sent to prison in Mexico City (Salmerón 2006, 282). Besides Pancho
Villa, Eugenio Aguirre Benavides also joined the fighting against Orozco. The Benavides and the
Madero families had extensive business ties in the Laguna region; they had been staunch
supporters of Madero’s Anti-Reelectionist party and had also fought alongside him in the
revolution. Under Madero’s new government, Eugenio Aguirre Benavides had become mayor of
the railroad hub of Torreón in the fall of 1911, and with the support of Rafael M. Rivera, Santiago
Ramírez, and León J. Rodríguez—all railroad workers—he organized the Battalion of Railroad
Volunteers. The ranks of the Railroad Volunteers grew rapidly as Orozco’s supporters in the
region produced scarcity and insecurity in Torreón, and the battalion faced off against the rebels
in numerous battles. However, with the arrival of Huerta, the battalion became fully incorporated
into his army as an infantry brigade and in charge of logistical deployments of artillery and
munitions (Leal 1988, 152–53). The experience gained by the Railroad Battalion would become
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invaluable in future years and would gain railroad workers a place in the revolutionary movement.
Huerta’s vicious campaign against Orozco’s rebels had managed to isolate them in the north, and
soon infighting within Orozco’s ranks undermined his military capacity. Furthermore, the
American government prohibited weapons sales at the border, and this action further undermined
Orozco’s rebellion and as his movement began to collapse and by May 1912, Orozco retreated to
the mountains to regroup (Ávila and Salmerón 2014, 108–10). With the support of the federal
army and the American government, Madero was able to put down peasant rebellions and to
regain control of the territory.
Apostles of Democracy
A year after coming to power, Madero’s government seemed to be in a secure place,
having overcome important obstacles. Nevertheless, Madero’s peace had been obtained by relying
heavily on the army, and this was a weakness that was beginning to expose an unstable
government. Under these circumstances, the army became a relevant force in the nation’s politics,
something it had never been under Díaz, and aware of its newfound power, the higher ranks in the
army began plot against Madero (Ávila and Salmerón 2014, 108–10). By late 1912, rumors of
conspiracies became widespread and they reached those close to Madero, including the rebel
General Pancho Villa, who had been sent to prison in Mexico City. In December 1912, Villa was
in the Military Prison of Tlatelolco, and the rumors of Madero’s impending doom precipitated his
escape from Tlatelolco on December 26. Villa eventually reached El Paso, Texas, and from there
he wrote to Abraham González, reporting for duty and to inform him of the rumors about a coup
against Madero. González was aware of these rumors and he knew he might need to raise a new
rebellion if something happened, so he sent money to Villa and instructed him to stay put in El
Paso until further notice.
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The plot against Madero turned out to be true, and on 9 February 1913, the high-ranking
General Manuel Mondragón orchestrated a prison break for Porfirian Generals Bernardo Reyes
and Félix Díaz. Mongradón’s plot had been in motion for some months now, and other highranking generals critical of the regime were invited to participate, including Victoriano Huerta.
Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson negotiated with Huerta and his allies, and he
began to orchestrate diplomatic pressure against Madero. On February 18, Francisco I. Madero
and José María Pino Suárez, the vice-president, were both detained and sent to Lecumberri prison
on Huerta’s orders. While in prison, they were promised that if they resigned their posts, their
lives and those of their families would be spared and they would be exiled in Habana, Cuba. Soon
after they signed their resignations, Madero and Pino Suárez were shot and their bodies dumped
in the outskirts of Mexico City on February 22. During this chaotic period known as the “Decena
Tragica,” Huerta secured the support of the army, the conservative Congress, and the American
Embassy. Stunned and paralyzed, the nation mourned Madero and Pino Suárez as “Apostles of
Democracy,” and they became important symbols in the ongoing struggle for democratic rights
and social justice in the next wave of the Mexican Revolution (Ávila and Salmerón 2014, 115–
18).
Soon after coming to power, Huerta began to staff his cabinet with close allies from
different political currents that had been hostile to Madero’s liberal reformist government,
including supporters of Félix Díaz and Bernardo Reyes, as well as Catholics and Porfirian
politicians. Huerta was also aware of the military and logistical importance of the railroads and
recruited renowned railroad leaders with the promise of implementing a speedy Mexicanization
process. Figures such as José de Echegaray, Fedrico Rendón, Teodoro Larrey, and others joined
the Huerta government and occupied top posts in the railroads (Yanez Rizo, 2010). The entry of
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the unions into Huerta’s government also coincides with the formation of the Confederation of
Railroad Unions in May 1913, a period which Leal (1988, 151) defines as the most organized for
railroad labor until then. Consequently, this alliance with the counterrevolution undermined an
organized intervention by railroad unions in the ranks of the revolution. This helps explain, in
part, the absence of an organized railroad labor movement in the revolution, and thus my
emphasis on small groups that did participate in the fighting as opposed to labor unions. Last,
Huerta legitimized his regime by gaining the support of Pascual Orozco and his peasant army.
Effectively, Orozco had joined the counterrevolution and thus gained the enmity of former allies.
Besides seeking allies to legitimize his government, Huerta also got rid of his most powerful
enemies and immediately imprisoned Abraham González, governor of Chihuahua and the heir to
Madero’s political legacy. By early March, Huerta had full support of the army and the
conservatives and the recognition and financial support of foreign powers (Ávila and Salmerón
2014, 121–25).
However, those loyal to Madero and the revolution organized their forces against Huerta’s
coup d’état. Right away, the newfound sense of democracy and progress for labor unions that had
been ushered in by Madero’s government began to close under the dictatorship. The coup also
brought with it new plans for rebellion. Besides the Zapatistas, which continued to fight for land
reform in the south under the Plan of Ayala, the governor of the northern state of Coahuila,
Venustiano Carranza, declared himself in rebellion and launched the Plan of Guadalupe on 16
March 1913. In the Plan of Guadalupe, Carranza refused to recognize the usurper Huerta, arguing
that he was violating the Constitution and the democratic process, and he called on others to
support his Constitutionalist Revolution against the new regime. With the call for the
Constitutionalist Revolution, new adherents from Sonora, Chihuahua, the Laguna Region, and
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Coahuila joined Carranza in their fight against Huerta and supported him as the Supreme Leader
of the Constitutionalist Army. Like Madero’s Democratic Revolution, the Constitutionalist
Revolution was led by a moderate and sought to restore the rule of law. However, it also
unleashed more radical forces in the north composed of small landowners, peasants, industrial
workers, and radicalized middle classes loyal to Madero’s democratic project but wishing to take
the social revolution further.
Revolution in the North
As soon as the uprisings against Huerta were declared, railroad workers were among the
first to know. Railroad telegraphists, especially, were the ones to find out about uprisings, troop
movements, and political shifts taking place under Huerta’s government. Their position at key
intersections of information networks between Mexico City and the north allowed them to play an
important role as informants throughout the Constitutionalist phase of the revolution, just as they
had done during Madero’s revolution. Aware of the importance of railroad workers for the
mobility of armaments and personnel, Carranza held a meeting in Monclova, Coahuila, in which
he informed workers that the revolution needed their services to move military trains and that he
needed volunteers to do so, since at the moment, the coffers of the revolution could not pay for
their services. Moved by their loyalty to the slain Francisco I. Madero, railroad workers joined
Carranza in the rebellion in large numbers. The maderista supporter Donanciano Martínez was the
first to accept Carranza’s invitation, and he was joined by five more train conductors. These
forces were also joined by several mechanics who had deserted the federal army’s military trains.
The support of railroad workers proved invaluable to Carranza, and he quickly formed the
Constitutionalist Railroads, headed by José Dominguez as administrator.13
13

Besides José Dominguez, the following men also joined the Constitutionalist Railroads: Silvano Pruneda as
assistant; Francisco G. De la Cerda as chief dispatcher; Ángel Peña, Secundino Sáenz, and Antonio Pruneda as chief
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However, not all railroad workers joined Carranza; others sought out old rebel leaders. As
Adán Uro García attests, he, a conductor, and three brakemen left to Ciudad Juárez, where they
joined Francisco Villa’s Northern Division (PHO/1/41). The Constitutionalist Railroads allowed
Carranza a great deal of maneuvering in the state of Coahuila, and the railroad connected him to
the border town of Piedras Negras, across from Eagle Pass, Texas, which was an important point
of contact with American diplomats and, even more important, guns and munitions. But despite
his prestige and mobility in the region, Carranza managed to muster only 400 rebels under his
direct orders. Furthermore, the well-defended federal army garrisons of Torreón, Monterrey, and
San Luis Potosí made it difficult for Carranza to hold any important cities, and his stronghold at
Monclova was vulnerable to attacks from these well-connected cities.
A series of uprisings in the western reaches of the Laguna region in March and April of
1913 allowed Carranza to stave off the full brunt of the federal army. Eugenio Aguirre Benavides,
mayor of Torreón under Madero and former head of the Battalion of Railroad Volunteers,
managed to muster a large force of former maderistas—including Raúl Madero, brother of the
slain president—from the cities of the Laguna. Together with smaller groups from Tlahualilo,
Lerdo and Gómez Palacio, Aguirre Benavides, and Raúl Madero conducted guerrilla warfare
against the federal army throughout the spring and summer of 1913. Besides these guerrillas,
other popular leaders like Rosalío Hernandez Cabral, Trinidad Rodríguez, Manuel Chao, and
Maclovio Herrera joined the fighting and continuously harassed the federal army and its supply
lines in Coahuila, Chihuahua, and the Laguna (Salmerón 2006, 303–10).
In addition to these forces, numerous contingents in the state of Durango declared
themselves in open rebellion against Huerta’s government. Among these were popular agrarian

telegraphists; Margarito Barrera as chief machinist; Federico Rodríguez as rail chief; and as patio chiefs Margarito
Herrera in Piedras Negras, Cruz Cantero in Sabinas, and Jesús Rodríguez in Monclova (Gorostiza 2010, 134–38).
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leaders like the “Lion of Durango,” Tomás Urbina, as well as Calixto Contreras, Domingo
Arrieta, Severino Ceniceros, Orestes Pereyra, and Martín Triana. These men and their forces
occupied small territories in their localities, which extended to a third of the territory of the state
of Durango by the end of April. Nevertheless, these haphazardly organized forces managed to
become a veritable army when they organized under the discipline and leadership of Tomás
Urbina. By early June, these forces had managed to isolate the capital city of Durango from the
army garrison at Torreón by occupying the railroads and, once isolated, they prepared for an
offensive against that state capital. It was during the siege of Durango that a small group of
railroad workers stole a locomotive and escaped the city to join rebel ranks. Among these railroad
workers was Rodolfo Fierro, until then relatively unknown, but who would become one of the
most famous—and feared—men of the Mexican Revolution. With a well-planned attack and a
large force that outnumbered the federal army 2:1, the forces of Urbina managed to capture the
city of Durango in twenty-four hours. Once in power, the agrarian leaders named an interim
governor, they forced loans on the oligarchy to finance the revolution, and they armed and trained
all volunteers who wished to join the revolutionaries. Besides these measures, they also extended
a law of agrarian land reform and began to redistribute land to peasants, a policy that went against
the wishes of legalist and conservative elements like Carranza, but who couldn’t oppose it by any
means (Salmerón 2006, 323–29).
In an interview about his experiences at the time, the young railroad worker Gilberto Nava
Presa, fifteen years old at the time, and his friends enlisted with the revolutionary forces in the
ranks of Calixto Contreras and under the orders of General Natividad Reza. By early July, these
newly reinvigorated forces extended their territory to the western reaches of the Laguna region
near Torreón. Gilberto Nava Presa recalls leaving Durango on a military train to fight near
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Pedriceña, where the machinist in the locomotive told him “Well, here we are, we have nothing
left but to take the heat. There’s going to be a big battle here and you’re coming as my fireman.”
Nava Presa remembers he could barely carry his heavy rifle but accepted anyway (PHO/1/26).
The battles in Pedriseña lasted for three days, and victory allowed the revolutionaries of Durango
to be within reach of Torreón. However, they decided to wait for Carranza and his forces before
launching an attack on the city. Upon the arrival of Carranza, he attempted to bring the forces of
Contreras, Pereyra, and Urbina under his command—a total of 4,000 men. However, the plebeian
elements at his disposal and the quarrels between rebel leaders undermined Carranza’s abilities
and authority to organize his forces with military discipline. Thus, during the week-long
confrontations, the rebel forces fought halfheartedly, and some deserted from the field of battle
altogether. Unable to command these forces and unwilling to accept Carranza’s leadership, they
all parted ways and vowed to continue the fighting on their own terms (Salmerón 2006, 331). The
failure to command these forces in battle underscored the lack of authority that Carranza
exercised with popular elements of the revolution. After the embarrassing episode in Torreón,
Carranza travelled on train to Durango and then through the sierras to Hermosillo, Sonora, where
a group of generals eagerly awaited the Supreme Leader of the Revolution.
As the revolution began in fits and starts, it is clear that railroad workers began to be
attracted to different leaders of the Constitutionalist Revolution. For example, several joined
Carranza, a wealthy landowner with official recognition as the Governor of Coahuila and the man
who issued the call against Huerta. Other railroad workers, like Rodolfo Fierro, Nava Presa, and
their comrades, joined plebeian leaders seeking radical reforms. Therefore, just like the revolution
developed a radical and a conservative wing, railroad workers were also divided along these fault
lines and looked to these two camps for political and military leadership. In this context, railroad
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in small numbers began to join the revolutionary forces in small groups and to operate the
railroads in the service of the revolution.

Figure 16. Rodolfo Fierro posing on horseback. Source: SECRETARIA DE CULTURA. -INAH.FOTOTECA NACIONAL.-MEX. SINAFO: Núm: 15316 (ca.1915). Reprodución Autorizada por
el Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia
The Return of Pancho Villa and the Birth of the Northern Division
One of the lessons from Madero’s democratic revolution is that the shift from a
propagandist-electoral strategy to an insurrectionary movement forced new leaders to emerge.
The shift from the electoral struggle to the armed struggle also brought needs for mobility in the
vast northern deserts. These demands inevitably turned the railroad into a critical infrastructure to
sabotage or control. The new call to arms issued by Carranza also led to new alliances and the rise
of new leaders. Railroad workers had pledged to join the side of the revolution, and they rallied
around influential figures that arose from the new conditions of struggle. Venustiano Carranza,
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the First Chief of the Revolution, managed to ignite a rebellion in the northern state of Coahuila
and to join his rebellion with that of other rebels from the Laguna and the state of Durango.
Unlike the states of Coahuila, the Laguna, and Sonora, the state of Chihuahua had lost its leader
in Abraham González after he was murdered by Huerta’s soldiers. The forces that had been loyal
to Madero deeply resented this attack by Huerta and declared themselves in revolt against his
dictatorship. Nevertheless, these forces were mercilessly persecuted by the federal army and
forces loyal to Pascual Orozco, who had aligned himself with Huerta after a series of negotiations.
Thus, without a clear political or military leader—effectively, a leadership vacuum—the rebels in
Chihuahua focused on local campaigns. This leadership vacuum would be filled by Francisco
“Pancho” Villa, whom we had last seen in El Paso awaiting orders from Abraham González.
When Madero was murdered, Villa reactivated his contacts from Chihuahua and met with them at
the bar of the Emporium Club in El Paso, Texas. Although Villa held meetings at bars and
cantinas, he was a teetotaler all his life, and he much preferred ice cream, milkshakes, and peanut
brittle. During the Mexican Revolution, El Paso became a meeting place for revolutionary
leaders, reporters, exiles, and spies, and the Emporium was only one of many clubs, hotels, and
casinos that saw plots and dealings. Villa also reconnected with his contacts in Chihuahua using
homing pigeons, which he kept in his hotel room.
The night of March 8, Villa and eight companions entered the Mexican territory under the
cover of darkness, crossing the Rio Grade. They had with them nine rifles, nine rented horses, 500
cartridges per man, two pounds of coffee, two pounds of sugar, and one pound of salt (Katz 1998,
205–06). As Villa entered western Chihuahua, old allies began joining his ranks, and when he
arrived in San Andrés, his old soldiers from the first uprising joined him once again. Besides
soldiers, other generals also joined him, and by mid-April he had occupied the small town of
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Santa Isabel. By mid-May, he had amassed several hundred capable riders, familiar with guns and
with the terrain. As previously mentioned, throughout the summer of 1913, the federal army was
busy fighting against Carranza and the rebels of the Laguna and Durango. Besides army garrisons
in Chihuahua City and El Paso, most of Chihuahua was under the command of the rural police,
whose leader, Orozco, had been in Mexico City conducting negotiations with Huerta and who
would not return until Villa and the revolutionaries posed a serious threat. Villa and his men
sustained a battle with Orozco’s men in Casas Grandes and easily overcame them. After Casas
Grandes, Villa settled in La Ascension and there he was joined by Juan N. Medina, an army
colonel who had deserted Huerta and who put himself at the service of Villa. Medina helped Villa
re-organize his forces along military lines, with regiments, chains of command, and rudimentary
military formations. While at La Ascension, Villa also received rebels from Sonora who had left
that front upset with Carranza and his new general, Álvaro Obregón. As Villa’s notoriety
increased, he also received two envoys from Carranza who asked him to recognize the Plan of
Guadalupe and Carranza as leader of the revolution; Villa agreed but with two conditions: that
military operations in Chihuahua would not be subordinate to those in Sonora and that he would
not have a military chief above him (Salmerón 2006, 319–20).
Though tenuous, the agreement worked and Carranza accepted the conditions;
nevertheless, both men represented different wings of the revolution and would constantly be at
odds. As the actions by Carranza demonstrated, he was interested in administering a formally
military and legalist revolution, whereas Pancho Villa’s actions sought to deepen the social
revolution that Madero had aborted. For example, unlike other rebel leaders, Villa did not issue a
manifesto; instead, he undertook what the historian Friederich Katz (1998) referred to as “an
original political campaign”:
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A few days after his arrival in Mexico, he occupied one of the largest Terrazas
haciendas in Chihuahua, the estate of El Carmen. Its administrator was particularly
unpopular among the estate’s peons. Not only did he claim for himself the right to
sleep with the peon’s wives the first night after their marriage, but he was also
notorious for having recalcitrant peons lashed to stakes outside the main building of
the hacienda. Debt peonage, largely abolished in other parts of Chihuahua, still existed
on this estate, and the debts of parents were transmitted to their children. Villa publicly
executed both the administrator and an aide, opened up the granaries of the hacienda,
and distributed large amounts of food to the peons. He made a speech to the assembled
estate laborers, telling them not to tolerate similar treatment in the future and to elect a
representative who would oversee the distribution of food from hacienda provisos. He
carried out similar acts of retribution and redistribution on the estates of San Lorenzo
and Las Animas at Saucito, where the increasingly familiar cry of “Viva Villa!” was
accompanied by “May God shield and protect you!” (210)
Villa’s increasing popularity in Chihuahua gained him new adherents and widespread
support with the population. This support translated into boots on the ground and by August, Villa
was ready to enter the field of battle in earnest. The first real test to Villa’s army came with the retaking of San Andrés, which was now defended by General Félix Terrazas and 980 army soldiers,
who faced off against Villa’s 1,025 peasant rebels. At the battle of San Andrés, the federal army
had entrenched itself in the little town and built up defenses with two cannons. The rebels decided
to isolate the town and directed their attack on the telegraph and the railroad tracks, which
prevented the army from receiving reinforcements and supplies. Once isolated, the attack was
launched against the artillery, and once lost, the federal army retreated in chaos—of the 900
soldiers under Terrazas, only 50 made it back to Chihuahua City. Villa’s victory at San Andrés
raised the morale of Villa’s army and his profile as a capable general. Equally important, it
provided him with the loot of seven military trains, two cannons, 421 rifles, and 20,000
cartridges. But Villa didn’t rest on his laurels, and aware of an incoming army battalion to avenge
Terrazas, he decided to leave San Andrés and to seek out old allies, whom he found in Ciudad
Camargo, a small city on the central railroad south of Chihuahua City. Camargo was occupied by
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Maclovio Herrera, and there Villa was received by jubilant crowds. He convinced Herrera to join
a new attack on Torreón, until then the undefeated bastion of the federal army and a key node in
the railroad network to all cardinal points. From Camargo, Villa and Herrera moved to Jiménez,
also on the central railroad, and there they joined Tomás Urbina and other revolutionaries who
had dispersed since Carranza’s failed attack on Torreón a few months before. Villa and his new
adherents moved further south on the railroads to Bermejillo and took over the hacienda of La
Loma. There, he summoned the generals of Durango and the Laguna to devise a new plan to
attack the army base at Torreón (Salmerón 2006, 345–47).
On September 29, Villa, Tomás Urbina, and Maclovio Herrera arrived at La Loma and
were joined there by Orestes Pereyra, Calixto Contreras, and Severino Ceniceros, from Durango,
and Eugenio Aguirre Benavides, Raúl Madero, Sixto Ugaldo, and their men, from the Laguna. At
the Laguna, the rebels discussed possible captains to lead the attack on Torreón. Tomás Urbina,
Pancho Villa, and Calixto Contreras emerged as clear leaders, but after much discussion and
vacillation, Contreras declared himself incapable of leading the struggle forward and
recommended that they all choose Villa for his organizational capacity, his abilities in the field,
and his indisputable bravery. All others present agreed unanimously to hand Villa the leadership
of their new army and thus, on 29 September 1913, was born the Northern Division—the most
formidable revolutionary army in Mexican history (Salmerón 2006, 347). With the birth of the
Northern Division, Huerta’s federal army now had four unified movements organizing against
him. By the end of September, Carranza had managed to lead the Northwestern Division based in
Sonora, and his followers led the Northeastern Division, in Coahuila and Nuevo León. The
Northern Division, led by Villa, and the Southern Liberation Army, led by Emiliano Zapata from
his base in Morelos, represented the most radical, redistributive wing of the Constitutionalist
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phase of the revolution and their program—really their praxis—corresponded to the demands of
the popular classes. Thus, after the meeting at the hacienda of La Loma, the Northern Division
represented more than the amalgam of local caudillos or regional demands; it represented a whole
new social project in embryo, which started to establish a new social order as it began to claim
territory—often literally—in northern Mexico.
With the newly formed Northern Division under his command, Villa planned the attack on
Torreón and divided into brigades. The forces of the northern division descended upon the
outskirts of the city, where the vanguard of Villa’s rebels confronted federal army outposts,
including at the train station of Avilés, where the federal army was soundly defeated and where
the railroad workers joined the side of the rebels and sabotaged the locomotives of the federal
army before it could make its retreat to Gómez Palacio, an industrial suburb of Torreón. On
September 30, the suburbs of Lerdo and Gómez Palacio fell to the brigades led by Villa and
Herrera. By day’s end, the army had withdrawn deep into Torreón, and wishing to avoid the
inevitable, General Eutiquio Munguía retreated toward Matamoros, in the early hours of the
morning, guarded in the rear by Bejamín Argumedo, a general of Orozco. With Torreón under his
control, Villa gained the respect of his men and those that had been loyal to Madero, among them
several members of the Madero family that now fought in Villa’s ranks. Furthermore, unlike
Carranza’s failed attempt to take Torreón, Villa had taken the strongest federal stronghold in the
Laguna, a city considered the pride of Porfirio Díaz’s regime for its productivity, rapid urban
growth, and industrialization. Villa’s takeover avoided looting and immediately resorted to
enforced loans on the local aristocracy to fund the revolution. He also designated Eusebio Calzada
as his railroad superintendent, aided by Julio and Natividad Reza Pérez, and Rodolfo Fierro,
whom he made responsible for organizing the military railroads for Villa’s next campaign. Villa
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reorganized his men and supplied the Northern Division at a feverish pace before moving north.
Though an important node in the railroad network, Torreón was vulnerable since the federal army
had bases in the north, east, and south of that city. Villa did not wait for a confrontation and
instead moved to Chihuahua, where he planned to take over the capital of that state, Chihuahua
City, and where he directed his troops on October 2 (Salmerón 2006, 348–51; Garciadiego 2013,
142).
Revolutionary Chihuahua
After taking Torreón successfully, Pancho Villa and the Northern Division left the Laguna
and moved north to Chihuahua, which contained several revolutionary strongholds and where
Villa enjoyed great popularity. He gathered his forces in Ciudad Camargo, on the central railroad,
where he was joined by Carranza’s man on the ground, Manuel Chao, and moved on to the
outskirts of Chihuahua City, establishing a rebel camp in Ávalos, six kilometers south of the
capital. The city was well defended by 6,500 men, 4,000 of whom belonged to the forces of
Pascual Orozco. On November 6, Villa began the attack on the city with heavy artillery firing on
enemy positions and followed these with a large frontal attack on the city. However, the defenses
of the federal army resisted the attack, and these advances were met and pushed back by equally
determined forces at every turn. Seeing the futility of his attack, Villa decided to stop the frontal
attacks on the following day and made a strategic change; instead of taking Chihuahua, the
Northern Division would take Ciudad Juárez. Thus, Villa ordered General Manuel Chao to retreat
with the trains, artillery, infantry, and women to the safe heaven of Parral, while he would move
north. The plan was carried out, and on the evening of November 12, Chao moved south sounding
locomotive whistles as loudly as possible to throw off the federal army. Meanwhile, Villa and his
men moved north by horse at full speed, reaching the station of El Sauz by the evening of the
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following day. Luckily for them, a train loaded with carbon was arriving at the station. The
conductor and the telegraphist were unaware of Villa’s presence and the rebels ambushed the train
and captured it at the station (Salmerón 2006, 357–60).
What followed is one of the great exploits of Villa known as “Villa’s Trojan Train”; Villa
ordered several brigades to destroy the rails south towards Chihuahua and to remain with the
artillery at the nearby hacienda of El Sauz, while he and a group of 2,000 unloaded the coal train
and embarked on the cargo cars. Victorio de Anda, a Madero supporter who joined Calixto
Contreras to fight in Torreón, was among the men who were charged with unloading the coal and
joining Villa on the Trojan Train. The revolutionaries then forced the telegraphist to message
Ciudad Juárez, reporting that the carbon train had been derailed and could not move south due to
destroyed track. The dispatcher in Ciudad Juárez ordered the conductor to resolve the problem as
best as he could and to return to Ciudad Juárez, reporting the whereabouts of the train at every
stop as it moved north. The revolutionaries moved north, doing as they were told and then cutting
the telegraph wires as they moved south, and past midnight in the early morning of November 15,
the train reached Ciudad Juárez and pulled into the station, which became the base of the attack.
Caught off guard, in the casinos and saloons of the city, the federal army garrison of 600 guarding
Ciudad Juárez was easily overcome by the surprise attack. De Anda and his group took the city by
surprise, surrounding the four army barracks. After two hours of fighting, the federal army forces
surrendered, although many escaped north to the American side in El Paso, while forces loyal to
Orozco managed to get on their horses and escaped south to Chihuahua City. Besides being an
important victory, Villa’s control of Ciudad Juárez allowed him to tax gambling houses, resources
that he used to form a commercial agency in charge of procuring armaments and munitions for his
forces in El Paso and other U.S. cities (Salmerón 2006, 360–61; PHO/1/46).
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This feat earned Villa fame across Mexico and across the border, where the American
government had deployed a sizable number of soldiers and had warned the revolutionaries that it
would intervene if the fighting spilled over the border. Villa could not risk losing Ciudad Juárez
to an American intervention since it was the main entry point of guns and munitions for the
Northern Division. Thus, he resolved to confront the federal army’s offensive near the train
station of Tierra Blanca, in the desert south of Ciudad Juárez. Villa chose the location based on its
geographic terrain and took up positions in the northern reaches, choosing the firm ground and the
availability of water. He left the dry, sandy terrain for his enemies, who arrived on the night of
November 22 and had no choice but to set up camp in the area Villa had chosen for them.
The Villistas had the upper hand throughout the confrontation, thanks to steady supply
lines supported by trains from nearby Ciudad Juárez. Nevertheless, the harsh desert weather
affected both camps. Awake since five in the morning and waiting for orders, the railroad worker
turned rebel fighter, Victorio de Anda, wrapped himself in a thick blanket to stave off the freezing
temperatures. A photograph of the camps at Tierra Blanca gives us an idea of the place and its
conditions, and in it we also see Pancho Villa (wearing a white hat and a blanket with white stars,
near the tracks on the bottom right) and his men around. In this bustling scene, we also see men
on foot, on horses, and a railroad locomotive.
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Figure 17. Villa can be seen in the bottom right corner wearing a white hat and a blanket with
white patterns speaking to a group of men. “Francisco Villa and his men” at Tierra Blanca,
Chihuahua. 1913. Unknown photographer. From Miguel Ángel Berumén, Mexico: Fotografía y
Revolución (2009).
As the battle raged on, de Anda experienced hunger and thirst in the desert sun, made
worse by the attacks that had to be carried out crawling through desert shrub. Few advances were
made by either side. On the second day of the battle, in an act of desperation, the government
forces unloaded the artillery from their trains and prepared to attack the Villista lines. But while
Salazar’s troops prepared the artillery, they became stuck in the sandy terrain, and Villa and his
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soldiers saw an opportunity to launch a swift cavalry attack that swept through enemy lines. De
Anda witnessed the attack by Maclovio Herrera, who “mounted an offensive with his whole
brigade of 500 men and launched himself into battle like a cyclone, a grand offensive to vanquish
or perish.” The panic-stricken army soldiers scurried back to their trains, and as the army began to
retreat, Rodolfo Fierro engaged in one of those legendary moments of the revolution, when he
jumped on his horse and galloped at full speed behind a government train. In Pancho Villa’s
memoir, he recalls that “in a rain of bullets Fierro leaped from his horse to the train and climbing
from one car to another reached the brake cylinder, released the air, and stopped the train. A
beautiful feat!” (Guzman 1975, 122). Villa’s army surrounded the escaping trains and, as de Anda
recalls, they slaughtered the army “like sheep.” The victory at Tierra Blanca decisively boosted
the morale of Villa’s troops, and this important victory allowed Villa to consolidate his power in
the north. In addition to three captured trains, Villa also amassed ten cannons, including two large
ones, “El Roro” and “El Chavalito,” which, combined with “El Niño” that had been captured in
the battle of Torreón, meant that Villa had considerable firepower in his possession. The battle at
Tierra Blanca earned Villa the trust of his generals and made him the undisputed leader of the
revolution since he was more famous and far more popular than Carranza (Salmerón 2006, 362–
64; Aguirre Benavides 1965, 73–74; PHO/1/46).
After Villa’s victories in Ciudad Juárez and Tierra Blanca, the federal army’s garrison in
Chihuahua City felt vulnerable, and they retreated to Ojinaga, abandoning the state capital. The
forces of Manuel Chao and Pereyra immediately set up camp along the railroad tracks outside the
city and waited for Villa’s return to the capital. On December 8, Villa’s Northern Division
travelled south on the railroads and made a triumphal entrance into Chihuahua City, where he was
received by enthusiastic multitudes. That same day, Villa became the governor and immediately
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got to work to improve the economic and living conditions of the people of the state of
Chihuahua. Chihuahua had been in an uninterrupted state of war for five years, since Madero’s
democratic revolution, and Villa knew that he had to make concrete reforms to appease the rebels
that had taken up arms. To carry out his revolutionary project, Villa invited the politicians who
had been in office with Abraham González, the maderista governor murdered by Huerta. The
state’s politicians had been exiled in El Paso and, hearing of Villa’s exploits, returned to join him.
One of the men among these figures was Silvestre Terrazas, a well-known journalist and partisan
of Madero who became a loyal supporter of Villa’s cause. Together with Chao and Terrazas, Villa
enacted a set of reforms that quickly gained him the trust of the popular classes as well as the
middle classes. Four days after coming to power, Villa issued the “Decree of the Confiscation of
Properties of the Enemies of the Revolution,” which confiscated the properties of members of the
local bourgeoisie, naming the families of Terrazas and sons, Creel, Falomir, the María Sánchez
family, the Cuilty brothers, the Luján brothers, Francisco Molinar, “and all of their family
members and their accomplices that joined them in their dirty dealings and fraudulent associations
that in previous times was called politics” (Ávila and Salmerón 2014, 210). The expropriation
allowed Villa to sell large herds of cattle to exchange for weapons and munitions in the United
States and to procure artillery and other materiel for his troops. He also reduced the price of meat
to 15 cents a kilo and provided daily food rations for the unemployed. Numerous railroad workers
who participated as soldiers or train workers during this period attested to the selling of cattle,
among them Victorio de Anda and Manuel Mendoza Domínguez, who claimed that Villa had a
group of hacienda administrators and emissaries that worked in El Paso selling expropriated cattle
by the thousands (PHO/1/46; PHO/1/155). One of Villa’s most controversial measures was the
confiscation and expulsion of the Spaniards of Chihuahua. Villa reasoned that since the colonial
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period, they had supported the most reactionary forces that had oppressed Mexicans and that they
had, until recently, supported Huerta as well and therefore were no longer welcome in the state of
Chihuahua.
During his time as governor, Villa also repaired the railroads and named Eusebio Calzada
administrator of railroads and telegraphs for the Villista-dominated regions. In addition, Villa
named Rodolfo Fierro the superintendent of the railroads. With these measures, railroad traffic
became regularly scheduled between Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua City, and Jiménez, all along the
central railroad, the spinal cord of the state of Chihuahua. Guillermo Fernández Flores, a railroad
worker, labor activist, and supporter of Madero who had joined the Northern Division also
witnessed the changes in Chihuahua. He saw an improvement in their salaries since both Villa
and Carranza “had achieved their military objectives thanks to the help that we gave them…the
movement of troops for the combats was based on the movement of trains and those of us who
moved the trains were important factors” (PHO-Z/1/122). Besides the railroads, the Northern
Division also seized the “Rio Florido” textile factory and repurposed it to make uniforms and
boots for his troops. Villa and his advisors also created the Bank of the State of Chihuahua and
backed its assets with those they repossessed from the Mining Bank of Chihuahua and the
500,000 pesos in silver they had found hidden in one of the walls of the bank. Together with the
assets of the haciendas and the Mining Bank, the new State Bank issued its own currency with the
face of Madero on one side and that of Abraham González on the other.
Besides important reforms, Villa also delivered to the mass of peasants that had joined his
army and he immediately began to engage in land redistribution and promised every member of
his army a parcel of land which would be supported by an agricultural bank and an agricultural
school to teach farmers the best way to grow their crops. In keeping with the democratic
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principles of Madero but imbuing them with a popular spirit, the state also granted autonomy to
its municipalities and political representation based on social sector or union membership, a
measure inspired by social Catholicism of people like Silvestre Terrazas. As Villa prepared
himself for future battles, he created the Sanitary Brigade—the only one in the Revolution—
which consisted of hospital trains for his soldiers, staffed by doctors, nurses, and railroad workers.
José Nonaka, a Japanese immigrant to Mexico, became part of Villa’s Sanitary Brigade, and he
remembers that Villa cared for his soldiers and spent resources on medicine and hospital facilities
for them (PHO/1/57). Seeing the tremendous success of Pancho Villa in Chihuahua, numerous
followers of the slain Madero also flocked to his side and supported his revolutionary
government. One of these men was General Felipe Ángeles, a cultured man of principles, the
former rector of the military college, and a staunch supporter of Madero. He was also highly
regarded for his command of military artillery, and since Villa needed an artilleryman for his next
battle to re-take Torreón, Ángeles became immediately useful for the Northern Division (Ávila
and Salmerón 2014, 209–17; Salmerón 2006, 384–407).
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Figure 18. Men of General Lucio Blanco resting. Source: SECRETARIA DE CULTURA. INAH.- FOTOTECA NACIONAL.-MEX. SINAFO: Núm: 6086 (ca. 1914). Reprodución
Autorizada por el Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia

Figure 19. Soldaderas cooking on the roof of a train car. Source: SECRETARIA DE CULTURA.
-INAH.- FOTOTECA NACIONAL.-MEX. SINAFO: Núm: 6388 (ca. 1914). Reprodución
Autorizada por el Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia.
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Figure 20. Soldiers and a woman washing in a railroad yard. Source: SECRETATIA DE
CULTURA.-INAH.-FOTOTECA NACIONAL.-MEX SINAFO: Núm: 6251 (1914).
Reproducción Autorizada por el Instituto Nacional de Antropología e historia

Figure 21. Twisted rails, 1912, by Hugo Brehme. From Miguel Ángel Berumén,
Mexico: Fotografía y Revolución (2009).
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Figure 22. Campaigns of the Northern Division 1913–1914.
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Rails to Revolution
During Villa’s time as governor of Chihuahua, the Northern Division became the most
well organized and best equipped of the military divisions of the Constitutionalist Army. During
the three months it was based in Chihuahua, the Northern Division used the railroad that
connected to Ciudad Juárez and El Paso as a conveyor belt, bringing arms and munitions south
and sending cattle and agricultural goods north. Relying on the entire agricultural and industrial
base of the state of Chihuahua to support its revolutionary efforts, the Northern Division began to
move south in an offensive against Huerta’s armies that had re-taken the Laguna region. In short,
the capacity of mobility achieved by the Northern Division during this period is directly tied to
the expropriation of the ruling classes of Chihuahua. With the support of the state, the railroad
and the railroad workers, the Northern Division could jump scales from the local to the regional,
and the national arena by relying on vast infrastructures and resources in the state of Chihuahua
and the Laguna region. Nevertheless, the scalar tensions would reassert themselves once the
Northern Division tried to advance south outside of its regional base in the north (Herod 2003;
McFarland 2014; Savage 2006 Smith 1992).
In mid-March, the trains began departing south from Chihuahua, transporting 20,000
soldiers, their horses, the artillery, three cannons, women, children, and the press, among them the
American journalist John Reed. Reed was sent on assignment for Metropolitan Magazine and he
arrived in Chihuahua just in time to take part in Villa’s march south to Torreón. In his reports
Reed painted some of the most eloquent portraits of life on the railroad during these heady days.
From his writings, we can glimpse some of the most picturesque descriptions by any observer of
the daily life of the thousands of men and women who lived on the trains as the Northern Division
moved to the front.
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John Reed wrote of his travels on the first leg of the trip south, and notes at length the
movement on the railroads:
I went south from Chihuahua on a troop train bound for the advance near Escalon. Attached to
the five freight cars, filled with horses and carrying soldiers on top, was a coach in which I
was allowed to ride with two hundred noisy pacificos, male and female. It was gruesomely
suggestive: car windows smashed, mirrors, lamps and plush seats torn out, and bullet holes
after the manner of a frieze. The time of our departure was not fixed, and no one knew when
the train would arrive. The railroad had just been repaired. In places where there had once
been bridges we plunged into arroyos and snorted up the farther bank on a rickety new-laid
track that bent and cracked under us. All day long the roadside was lined with immense
distorted steel rails, torn up with a chain and a backing engine by the thorough Orozco last
year. There was a rumor that Castillo’s bandits were planning to blow us up with dynamite
sometime during the afternoon…
Peons with straw sombreros and beautifully faded serapes, Indians in blue working clothes
and cowhide sandals, and squat-faced women with black shawls around their heads, and
squalling babies—packed the seats, aisle and platforms, singing, eating, spitting, chattering…
farther to the rear two men sat across the aisle from each other, each with a white sack
containing something that moved and clucked. As soon as the train started these bags were
opened to disgorge two large roosters, who wandered up and down the aisles eating crumbs
and cigarette butts. The two owners immediately raised their voices. “Cockfight, señores! Five
pesos on this valiant and handsome rooster. Five pesos, señores!” The males at once deserted
their seats and rushed clamoring toward the center of the car. Not one of them appeared to
lack the necessary five dollars. In ten minutes the two promoters were kneeling in the middle
of the aisle, throwing their birds. And, as we rattled along, swaying from side to side,
swooping down into the gullies and laboring up the other bank, a whirling mass of feathers
and flashing steel rolled up and down the aisle. That over, a one-legged youth stood up and
played “Whistling Rufus” on a tin flute. Someone had a leather bottle of tequila, of which we
all took a swig. From the rear of the car came shouts of “Vamonos a bailar! Come on and
dance!” And in a moment five couples, all men, of course, were madly two-stepping. A blind
old peasant was assisted to climb upon his seat, where he quaveringly recited a long ballad
about the heroic exploits of the great General Maclovio Herrera. Everybody was silently
attentive and showered pennies into the old man’s sombrero. Occasionally there floated back
to us the singing of the soldiers on the box-cars in front and the sound of their shots as they
caught sight of a coyote galloping through the mesquite. Then everybody in our cars would
make a rush for the windows, pulling at their revolvers, and shoot fast and furiously.
All the long afternoon we ambled slowly south, the western rays of the sun burning as they
struck our faces. Every hour or so we stopped at some station, shot to pieces by one army or
the other during the three years of Revolution; there the train would be besieged by vendors of
cigarettes, pine-nuts, bottles of milk, camotes, and tamales rolled in corn-husks. Old women,
gossiping, descended from the train, built themselves a little fire and boiled coffee. Squatting
there, smoking their cornhusk cigarettes, they told one another interminable love stories (Reed
2011, 149–51).
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Reed was one of the few American journalists on the ground during the Mexican
Revolution, and the only American to accompany the advance guard of the Northern Division on
its way to the front. His writings depicting life on the railroad are lifelike, as are those where he
relates life off the railroad, on the side of the trains waiting in the desert for the repair car to fix
the destroyed rails and bridges. As the Northern Division moved south to Torreón, it approached
Bermejillo, the railroad intersection with Mapimí and Tlahualilo. At Yermo the mass of soldiers
began to prepare their horses. Again, Reed’s observations allow us to picture ourselves in the
middle of the commotion:
At Yermo there is nothing but leagues and leagues of sandy desert, sparsely covered with
scrubby mesquite and dwarf cactus, stretching away on the west to jagged, tawny
mountains, and on the east to a quivering skyline of plain. A battered water tank, with too
little dirty alkali water, and demolished railway station shot to pieces by Orozco’s cannon
two years before, and a switch track compose the town. There is no water to speak of for
forty miles. There is no grass for animals. For three months in the spring bitter, parching
winds drive the yellow dust across it. Along the single track in the middle of the desert lay
ten enormous trains, pillars of fire by night and of black smoke by day, stretching back
northward farther than the eye could reach. Around them, in the chaparral, camped nine
thousand men without shelter, each man’s horse tied to the mesquite beside him, where he
hung his one serape and red strips of drying meat. From the fifty cars horses and mules
were being unloaded…
Late in the afternoon the Brigade Zaragoza rode away southeast over the desert, and
another night came down. The wind rose steadily in the darkness, growing colder and
colder. Looking up at the sky, which had been ablaze with polished stars, I saw that all
was dark with cloud. Through the roaring whirls of dust a thousand thin lines of sparks
from the fires streamed southward. The coaling of the engines’ fire boxes made sudden
glares along the miles of trains. At first we thought we heard the sound of big guns in the
distance. But all at once, unexpectedly, the sky split dazzlingly open from horizon to
horizon, thunder fell like a blow, and the rain came level and thick as a flood. For a
moment the human hum of the army was silenced. All the fires disappeared at once. And
then came a vast shout of anger and laughter and discomfiture from the soldiers out on the
plain, and the most amazing wail of misery from the women that I have ever heard. The
two sounds only lasted a minute. The men wrapped themselves in their serapes and sank
down in the shelter of the chaparral; and the hundreds of women and children exposed to
the cold and the rain on the flat-cars and the tops of the box-cars silently and with an
Indian stoicism settled down to wait for dawn. In General Maclovio Herrera’s car ahead
was drunken laughter and singing to a guitar…” (Reed 2011, 171–78)
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Rich and dazzling, Reed’s descriptions also convey some of the human suffering and the
hardship of those involved in the revolution, especially women14. Elena Poniatowska (1999)
remarks that women, especially those that went to the front, “…ended up with the worse of the
Revolution” (13). Most women who participated in the revolution did so as soldaderas, a word of
Aragonese origin that describes a soldier’s wages, their “soldada,” which they used to hire a
female servant who would cook for them and accompany them to battle. Poniatowska writes that
this occupation was one way of making a living and supporting children and that though most
were attached to a man, they were also free to work for someone else. Most soldaderas, however,
followed the troops, selling beef jerky and making tortillas and food for their soldiers. Some
participated in prostitution and many also joined the men fighting at the front, although, for the
most part, the generals regarded soldaderas as a nuisance that came with the war. Besides
Zapatistas, most generals, including Pancho Villa, rarely took special considerations for their
wellbeing and comfort (17). The role played by women in the social reproduction of the
revolution is also understudied. It is evident, however, that while railroad mobility often meant
time-space compression to the revolutionaries, for many women it also meant time-space
expansion and fixity since they usually stayed behind to guard the encampments, to procure food,
to feed the hungry and tend the wounded (Katz 2001; Jung and Anderson 2016).
Poniatowska writes that the locomotive “is the great heroine of the Mexican Revolution.
She too is a soldadera who moves with confidence, huffing and puffing, arriving late, true, but
only because she’s overloaded. She lets off steam and comes to a stop at the platform so that the
men can penetrate her again with their rifles held up straight. There the troops get on and sit on

14

See PHO/1/94 Medina, Severino.
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top of her. She bears everything. That’s why the enemy forces want to blow her up to the sky”
(26). Though an allegorical comparison, the role of the locomotives, like that of women, has been
overlooked in the historiography of the Mexican Revolution, and the contributions of women to
the social reproduction of the revolution are mostly absent from standard histories. This absence
completely ignores their contributions as informants, fighters, spies, nurses, scouts—and of
course, cooks—a key support network for operations in the field. From Reed’s writings, it is
obvious that their role in food preparation was key; even if it was just coffee and tortillas, women
were also indispensable and in his accounts, this is evident. While the troops moved, the
soldaderas also moved with them, and while the troops fought, the women set up camp, defended
the camp, and waited for their soldiers, who would arrive hungry or in need of nursing. These
actions don’t often make the pages of history, but no doubt are indispensable to its making.
As the Northern Division arrived in the northern reaches of the Laguna region in midMarch 1914, skirmishes between the advanced guard of the rebels and the federal army gave way
to what would be the largest and bloodiest military confrontation of the Mexican Revolution: the
second battle of Torreón. By late March, when Villa’s forces were on the offensive south, the
federal army had turned the Laguna region into a militarized base, with three defensive perimeters
in its northern approach where the Villistas would arrive. The defensive strategy consisted of
three defensive perimeters, built with trenches along the irrigation canals and with makeshift
fortresses in the surrounding hills, stocked with machine guns and light artillery. The cities of
Lerdo and Gómez Palacio were turned into militarized zones, and these were used to defend
Torreón, the command center of two brigades of the federal army. In this battle, the Villistas had
the upper hand with 12,000 to 14,000 rebels to the army’s 7,000 soldiers, who, nevertheless, had
19 cannons, 35 machine guns, and good defenses. The strongest defenses of the federal army
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were the surrounding hills overlooking Torreón, with the hill of La Pila being the most fortified
and strategically important (Salmerón 2006, 417–18).
Villa’s strategy consisted of fighting for different positions, and Villa’s forces were
divided into two columns, one following the railroad tracks near Gómez Palacio to take the
neighboring city of Lerdo in the southwest. Meanwhile, the other advance, led by Eugenio
Aguirre Benavides, moved in a southeastern direction to take the agricultural colony of
Tlahualilo. This plan was carried out over three days of fighting, until Aguirre Benavides,
Maclovio Herrera, and Pancho Villa captured their objectives. It was during this attack in which
so much was on the line that there occurred an incident between the forces of the Northern
Division and the railroad crews working for them. During these battles, Villa’s advance was
slightly held back because the train carrying water and provisions was thirty minutes late. Mad
with fury, Villa took out his rage on Rodolfo Fierro, who remained quiet during the scolding, but
when the train finally arrived, Fierro boarded the train and shot the machinist before he could
explain his delay. This was only the latest injustice that railroad crews had been subjected to, and
the friction between the railroad workers and the Northern Division had been growing since
Fierro had shot a railroad worker several weeks prior when he accidentally bumped into a drunk
Fierro on the streets of Chihuahua. Due to these actions on the part of Fierro, and the importance
of the railroad workers for the Northern Division, Villa demoted Fierro as superintendent of
railroads but still kept him as one of his closest guards (Gorostiza 2010, 194).
The fighting for the Laguna continued and by March 23, the Villistas took positions near
Gómez Palacio and launched two costly frontal attacks on the hill of La Pila. These attacks were
repelled by the federal army, and Villa’s forces had to retreat to their positions. On the night of
March 26, Villa attempted to take Gómez Palacio with a night attack on the railroad roundhouse,
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but when the Villistas stormed the railroad yards they realized the army had retreated to Torreón.
With Gómez Palacio under their control, the Northern Division transferred its command center to
that city and as the rebels took positions, a soldier of the Zaragoza Brigade found a map of the
fortifications of Torreón and gave it to Raúl Madero, who shared it with the generals. According
to the interview of railroad worker Gilberto Nava Presa, a locomotive was used as a weapon
against the artillery defenses of Torreón, referred to as a “maquina loca” (literally, a crazy
machine), which became a widespread tactic along the military front. In the case recounted by
Nava Presa, a machinist named Marines had caused a deadly accident days prior, and as
punishment he was forced to lead the attack on Torreón. Nava Presa recalls that they ordered him
to lead a train full of rocks and dynamite into the city defense, and if he refused the worker would
be shot. In the interview, Nava Presa described the harrowing experience:
…we boarded the train in the morning. I remember that we stoked the locomotive with
wood, and many sparks flew up like an inferno and we were sitting on a cannon and we
had a car loaded with dynamite, and a brakeman, myself as fireman and the machinist
Marines and as soon as we left the station and the federal army saw the smoke of the
machine, they began to bombard us intensely, and Marines and I kept on feeding the fire. I
mean, I was young then, I was strong, and we stoked the fire and the locomotive was
moving, until we came to a switch, and after the rail switch there was the track that led to
the main track which led directly to the artillery and Marines got off the train to make the
switch without ordering the brakeman to do it, and he disconnected the regulators, and the
dynamite car kept going, the cannons were raining fire on us and I thought to myself, if
they hit the machine with a cannon or anyone of us, that’s going to be it for us. The coal
car looked more like a strainer because it had been shot up so much, and the locomotive
was spilling water and we almost ran out of water… the train arrived at its destination and
it exploded, and that was the signal for all the troops to attack Torreón. (PHO/1/26)
Nevertheless, despite the toil of these intrepid workers, the federal army resisted the attack
and the rebels were forced to retreat. For five days, the Northern Division sieged Torreón,
attempting numerous strategies to take positions in the city that lay across the Nazas River.
Advancing inch by inch, the rebels began to take positions in nearby houses, penetrating the last
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defensive perimeter. Meanwhile, the army made its last push and carried out a heavy
bombardment against the rebels, simulating the beginning of a counterattack, but this was a
maneuver to create chaos and burn off its shells as it made its retreat to San Pedro de las Colonias
in the east along the tracks of the International Railroad. Thus, the Northern Division entered
Torreón triumphantly on April 3, received by jubilant crowds. This had been the costliest battle
yet, and both sides experienced large casualties. The Villistas had lost 2,000 men and 2,000 others
had been injured. Between deaths, injuries, desertions, and prisoners, the federal army had lost
more than 6,000 men. Villa’s generals did not allow the federal army to reorganize its forces, and
they followed them to nearby San Pedro, hometown of the slain Madero and home of the Madero
family’s estates. The fighting was drawn out over ten days, until finally, on 13 April 1914, the
federal army retreated in tatters to the city of Saltillo. The second battle of Torreón and the final
defeat of two military brigades in San Pedro de las Colonias gave a mortal wound to the federal
army. Meanwhile, the Northern Division’s control of the Laguna also gave it control of a vast
industrial and agricultural region (Salmerón 2006, 423–33). Salmerón writes that the conquest of
the Laguna turned Pancho Villa into a national leader; he controlled more men and resources than
any other revolutionary chief, and the power of his army and his prestige as a caudillo had no
parallel in the rebel ranks. “Villa administered his resources directly, without the intervention of
the First Chief and that was more than what Carranza could tolerate” (435).
The Villa and Carranza Split
After the victories of the Northern Division in the Laguna, the federal army concentrated
most of its forces on Zacatecas, a city along the main railroad and the key passage to Mexico
City. Carranza understood that Villa’s soaring prestige and autonomy posed a challenge to his
authority as First Chief, so he travelled from Sonora to Chihuahua City to establish his command
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center. As soon as Carranza arrived in Chihuahua he attempted to limit land re-distributions and
to take control of the haciendas, the State Bank, and the railroads. Although he was unable to
fully consolidate power in that state, he ended Villa’s free distribution of meat for the poor. Villa
travelled north to meet the First Chief and during a meeting held on April 19, their differences in
policy and project became evident. For example, during the American intervention and
occupation of the port of Veracruz, Carranza denounced Wilson’s interventionism as a violation
of national sovereignty. Aware of his dependence on American weapons and access to El Paso,
Villa wrote to Wilson stating that Carranza’s declarations were a personal position and that the
conflict was between Wilson and Huerta, not Mexico and the United States. Carranza felt
discredited and undermined, incensed; he scolded Villa and prohibited him from making public
comments on this and other matters.
Besides a personal rivalry, however, what was coming to the surface was a struggle for
power—a struggle that many of Carranza’s generals sought to avoid since they knew that Villa’s
Northern Division was the most powerful and best equipped of the rebel armies. This power
struggle would also translate to a fight for control of the railroads and for influence over railroad
workers. Thus, Carranza decided to place obstacles in front of the Northern Division and to
undermine Pancho Villa. For example, although the city of Zacatecas was the next obvious
military objective, Carranza ordered Villa to divert his forces to take Saltillo (Ávila 2014, 147–
50). Although Villa was opposed to this command he acquiesced, but not without fighting with
Carranza for resources. Paulino Fontes, a railroad worker from Sonora loyal to Carranza,
remembers that the Villa-Carranza split began to have a negative impact on the morale of the
revolutionary forces, especially railroad workers who were being turned against each other by the
intrigues of Carranza. Carranza ordered Fontes to prepare the military trains to attack Saltillo, but
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Villa’s superintendents reorganized the trains, thinking they were going to take Zacatecas. The
incident infuriated Carranza, who felt undermined, and he scolded Villa’s railroad superintendent,
Eusebio Calzada, demanding that he reorganize the trains for their departure to Saltillo
immediately. Fontes recounts:
Carranza, scolding and rushing, ordered the conductor to organize the trains, screaming
“and hurry up!”—to which the superintendent replied defiantly; “well these are not beans,
these are not enchiladas!” Incensed, Carranza replied “don’t answer me like that, don’t be
rude, I am the chief and you have to respect me”—the superintendent then replied, “Well,
I don’t work for you, I work for my general Villa”—“Well I am going to have you shot so
you behave properly” and so Carranza ordered the arrest of the superintendent and the two
patio chiefs and ordered a colonel to send those individuals to the firing squad
(PHO/1/12).
After this fit of rage, Fontes intervened on behalf of Calzada and the patio chiefs, begging
Carranza not to execute them, telling the First Chief that if he did so, the railroad workers would
turn against the revolution, and that since the revolution was just getting underway they needed to
have the railroad workers on their side—otherwise they would desert the rebels and join the
enemy. Finally, after much pleading, Carranza ordered the superintendent and the patio chiefs to
remain under arrest and be sent to jail in Saltillo (PHO/1/12). This incident divided railroad
workers, and they became aware that they had to choose sides between Carranza and the
Constitutionalist armies and Pancho Villa and the Northern Division.
Ignoring Carranza’s machinations, Villa proceeded to take Saltillo, and after a ten-day
offensive, Villa entered triumphant on May 20. Villa then hurried back to Torreón to prepare the
offensive on Zacatecas, but when he arrived he learned that Carranza had already ordered the
attack. Villa understood that he had been sent to Saltillo as a diversion so that Carranza could take
control of Zacatecas and thus cut off Villa’s advance south to Mexico City. Unfortunately for
Carranza, the attack on Zacatecas failed, and he ordered Villa to send reinforcements. Enraged,
and aware of the schemes to undermine the Northern Division, Villa and his generals held a
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heated exchange over telegraph with the First Chief. Over the three-day exchange, Villa and his
generals accused the First Chief of scheming against them and of undermining their forces. They
refused to send reinforcements to Zacatecas, and instead, in an act of open insubordination, the
Villista generals told Carranza they would march south to take Zacatecas under the orders of
Villa. This last telegram was signed by all the generals of the Northern Division. And with that
telegraphic exchange, the dispute for power between the Northern Division and Carranza was out
in the open (Ávila 2014, 151–56).
On June 15, the Northern Division rode south to take Zacatecas with 17 trains and 38
cannons. The colonial mining city, located in the middle of a deep valley and surrounded by hills
and mountains, was where Huerta’s army made its last stand. The federal army’s defensive
positions consisted of fortified parapets with machine guns and cannons on the main hills, El
Grillo and La Bufa. Villa’s attack began on 23 April 1914, and to take the hills he surrounded the
city, while Felipe Ángeles, with the artillery, protected the ground troops with fusillades over
enemy positions. The fighting for the city lasted a day, and once the Villistas took the hills of El
Grillo and La Bufa, they dominated the entire valley of Zacatecas. As the federal army attempted
to make its escape, they were ambushed by the Northern Division and massacred. After the battle
of Zacatecas, the Northern Division defeated the federal army and their allies, the forces of
Pascual Orozco. This victory was the death blow of Huerta’s regime; after this defeat, the morale
of the federal army sank and thousands deserted. Victorious, the Constitutionalist armies
advanced practically unopposed over the rest of the territory. After his victory in Zacatecas, Villa
was ready to move south to take Aguascalientes and then Mexico City, but Carranza cut off
Villa’s coal supplies, and this made his march south impossible, since the Northern Division had
reached such a large scale that it could not keep its power without the railroads. In addition, the
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American weapons embargo in El Paso began to affect Villa’s forces, and a shortage of munitions
made his advance impossible. Aware of his limitations, Villa returned to Torreón and then
retreated to his base in Chihuahua. Meanwhile, Carranza’s loyal generals, Alvaro Obregón and
Lucio Blanco, marched on to Mexico City, and on 12 August 12 1914, Eduardo Iturbide, mayor
of Mexico City, handed over the capital to Alvaro Obregón. By this time, the defeated dictator
Victoriano Huerta had already escaped on a steamship bound for Europe. Carranza’s sabotage of
Villista railroads and logistics had paid off, and he outmaneuvered Villa and his generals to
become the official winner of the Constitutionalist Revolution (Ávila 2014, 156–62).
With Huerta defeated, a new struggle for power began, with Venustiano Carranza and
Alvaro Obregón on one side and Francisco Villa and Emiliano Zapata on the other. Wishing to
avoid a civil war between these camps, generals, politicians, and intellectuals from both bands
met in the neutral city of Aguascalientes on October 10 to inaugurate the Convention of
Aguascalientes. There, 155 military generals, governors, and representatives met to discuss a
transition program to pacify the nation and to represent the demands of the revolution. Over a
four-week period, the Convention of Aguascalientes made several pronouncements, and it
incorporated the labor demands of the Plan of Ayala, which included important reforms that had
been fought for by railroad workers. Under its decree of socio-economic reforms, the convention
established a minimum wage and a state monopoly over telecommunications, electricity, water,
and transportation. The convention decreed that the maximum workday would consist of nine
hours, and conceived of the state as the arbiter of relations between capital and labor, with the
goal of establishing a fair salary for workers and the interests of capital. It also decreed that men
and women should be properly trained to receive skilled jobs and that workers should have one
day of rest. The assembly of the convention recognized Carranza’s contributions to the revolution
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but declared that instead of giving him the presidency, an interim government should call for free
and democratic elections. Indignant, Carranza rebelled against the convention and withdrew from
its agreements. His rejection of the convention thus paved the way for civil war, a prospect that
the convention tried to avoid but that was inevitable due to the irreconcilable national projects
represented by Carranza and those represented by Villa, Zapata, and their generals (Ávila and
Salmerón 2014, 225–34; Ávila 2014, 307).
Conclusion
The involvement of railroad workers in the Mexican Revolution began as cautious support
for Madero’s political campaign to challenge the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz and increased as
Madero’s national profile and his network of political clubs reached national prominence. Then,
when the Democratic Revolution got underway, railroad workers became more involved in the
course of revolutionary events but mostly in those territories where the revolution had deepest
social roots and more radical aims. Therefore, although limited, the interventions by railroad
workers mattered greatly based on their location within the social division of labor, giving them a
key position in the transportation industry to have a direct impact on the course of events. Thus,
with Madero’s overthrow, the gains they had made became immediately threatened as the
dictatorship of Victoriano Huerta set out to militarize Mexican society, especially through the
military draft that affected industrial workers. Furthermore, the strong social support for Madero’s
democratic movement also won Huerta the enmity of broad social layers. Taking advantage of
Madero’s tenuous hold on power, the military coup that overthrew him also unleashed the most
radical forces of the revolution that had been temporarily suppressed and thus, a new chapter of
social struggle was inaugurated.
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Railroad workers participated openly in the Constitutionalist Phase of the Mexican
Revolution and enthusiastically aided revolutionaries like Carranza and Pancho Villa to move the
railroads for the cause of the revolution, mostly without pay and often at the risk of their lives.
Others were coerced into the revolutionary cause, but in areas under the control of the
revolutionaries, like Villa’s Chihuahua, the railroads and the railroad workers were actively
integrated into the revolution, taking advantage of their possession of railroad infrastructures for
logistical support during battle. As many recounted in their oral histories, the railroads were key
in a period before automobiles and highways existed; the revolutionaries knew this and therefore
had special deference for railroad workers on the front—though not without bitter
disappointments. Railroad workers participated willingly in the revolution and took advantage of
their knowledge of the railroads to repair the tracks, refurbish the machines, and, when necessary,
to use the locomotives as “maquinas locas”—crazy machines—which they loaded with dynamite
and unleashed on enemy lines. Thus, the revolution changed the railroad and the railroad changed
the revolution; this dialectical relationship played out between these social processes with railroad
workers at the center of the action. The participation of the railroad workers and other industrial
sectors was reflected in the inclusion of progressive labor demands in the Convention of
Aguascalientes when they were added to those of the Plan of Ayala. Nevertheless, these gains
were undermined with the rupture between Villa and Carranza. As the theater of military
operations expanded into a civil war, the use of railroads became more widespread, and the
hardships faced by railroad workers also became more pronounced. In that phase of the
revolution, railroad workers shifted allegiances because Carranza and Obregón appealed to the
demands of the industrial working class, including the railroads. The Villa and Zapata alliance did
not actively integrate the railroad workers and the industrial working class in their plans. Once the
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radical currents of the revolution were defeated, many of those workers went into exile in the
United States. Others were coopted or recruited into the Constitutionalist Railways, operated
under the conservative Carranza and later, Álvaro Obregón. Those who shifted allegiances and
supported the new government continued to press for their demands and saw these finally
included in the new Mexican Constitution of 1917.
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion
Introduction
This dissertation began as a study of the participation of railroad labor in the Mexican
Revolution and the impact of railroad infrastructures on the conflict. Since research on this
specific subject has been sparse, I first had to find out some very basic information, such as who
the railroad workers were that participated in the Mexican Revolution, where they came from, and
why they decided to participate. In the process of answering these questions, I delved into the
labor history of Mexican railroad workers and learned that they had developed their labor
associations in response and opposition to the presence of American workers who occupied the
best-paid jobs within the industry. Within a twenty-year span, the organizational forms of
Mexican workers transitioned from mutualist associations to craft unions—modeled on the
American brotherhoods—to industry-wide unions. Along the way, they founded newspapers,
union chapters, meeting halls, and political associations that allowed them to organize and make
demands from the American-owned railroad companies and later from the nationalized National
Railways of Mexico. However, several findings of this work also point to the complex and
contradictory role of railroad labor once the Mexican Revolution got underway.
As Yanes (2010) points out, railroad workers were not the most enthusiastic supporters of
the revolution, since they had so much to lose, especially after a decade’s worth of battles for
Mexicanization. Despite this consideration, many railroad workers actively supported Francisco I.
Madero and his democratic challenge to the regime, especially because he endorsed their labor
demands and promised to speed up Mexicanization. Furthermore, railroad workers were not only
concerned with labor issues, and many supported Madero based on his democratic platform and
challenge to the regime at the local and national level. Thus, we see examples of support for
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Madero among railroad workers during his campaign and during his escape from San Luis Potosí,
when he calls for an armed rebellion. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that railroad unions did not
endorse or support Madero openly during his campaign and once the rebellion against Díaz was
launched. As Yanes (2010), Knight (1984), and Gorostiza (2010) have argued, railroad unions
tended to be more conservative and instead adopted the slogan “Peace and Work.” Despite the
lack of formal endorsement from unions, railroad workers participated in the revolution as
individuals and in groups, especially in areas where the revolution was the most fierce, as is the
case in Chihuahua and the north in general. After Huerta’s coup d’état, the moral, political, and
military prowess of the revolutionary forces pulled many social sectors into the revolution, and it
is in this phase of the revolution that railroad workers became much more involved and centrally
important to the revolutionary armies. It is worth repeating that Huerta’s co-optation of railroad
union leaders into his government contributed to the lack of union-wide involvement in the
revolution, and consequentially, most participants in the uprising joined in small groups.
One of the most important conclusions from this study is that even though workers did not
participate on a union-wide scale, the small groups of workers who did participate were crucial to
the operations of the railroad during the revolution and contributed directly to the success of the
revolutionary armies. This is quite remarkable, since it shows that a small group of wellorganized workers in the service of a revolution can have a significant impact on the course of
events. This is because their knowledge of the operation and maintenance of the railroads allowed
them to make key contributions to the revolutionary process that none of the other social sectors
involved could have made. Of course, as this study shows, railroad workers did not always agree
with the leaders of the revolution, and the violent excesses of Villista generals like Rodolfo Fierro
strained relationships with railroad workers. Another important finding is that the involvement of
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railroad workers was also susceptible to the political shifts of the conflict, and they, like other
revolutionary forces, were also divided by major ruptures within the Constitutionalist leadership,
especially after the split of Villa and Carranza. Although the Convention of Aguascalientes aimed
to reconcile the social projects represented by these revolutionary leaders, the incompatible
political visions they represented prevented a reconciliation and instead opened a new period in
the revolution marked by civil war. In that new period, the contributions of railroad workers
would play an even more decisive role in the course of events and the Mexican Revolution.
Summary of Findings
The railroad workers who participated in the revolution originated from the working class
and artisanal sectors. These workers were incorporated into the railroad labor force in a variety of
different ways and along different branches of the railroad infrastructure. This produced a highlystratified workforce that was divided by both pay and occupation. Moreover, workers within the
industry were also divided by the presence of American employees who occupied the upper
echelons of railroad labor and administration. This aspect contributed to the formation of Mexican
unions along nationalist lines. As is to be expected, workers faced entrenched opposition to their
demands for better working conditions and higher pay from management, bosses, and the
authorities. Nevertheless, they took advantage of the press, telegraphs, and railroads themselves to
build networks of craft unions, mutualist associations, and industry-wide unions in the Mexican
railroad industry. The embrace of nationalist politics led Mexican railroad workers to support
plans for Mexicanization, but these nationalist politics became a handicap to organizing
opposition to Díaz’s government once the railroads were nationalized. Nevertheless, the period of
labor organizing from 1900 to 1909 gave workers important concessions, and their grievances
also won support from the urban middle-classes and the enlightened bourgeoisie. Thus, when
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Madero launched his call for arms in the Plan of San Luis, railroad workers were reluctant to
participate openly because of the important gains they had made in a decade of struggle. Besides
these unifying trends, railroad workers had very diverse experiences, and their involvement in
labor and political organizations varied widely. Nevertheless, many were involved in some type
of political or labor association prior to the revolution. Furthermore, most of those whom I
identified in primary sources were influenced by progressive or radical publications during the
Porfiriato.
These findings can be corroborated with the testimonies from the oral history project—
Archivo de la Palabra (PHO)—of the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH) as
summarized in Appendices A through C. For example, in Appendix A we learn that most
participants were in their late teens or early twenties when they joined that revolution. From this
data, we can also see that most come from a working-class background and have received some
form of schooling, elementary at least, since literacy and mathematics were required for many
railroad positions. A survey of Appendix B shows us that most of the participants interviewed
also belonged to or participated in some form of political organizing prior to the revolution. It is
especially notable that most of these individuals identified themselves with the liberal movement
and Madero’s Anti-Reelectionist clubs, and at least half of them begin their revolutionary
participation as adherents of Madero. However, very few participants, less than half, seem to have
participated in some form of labor activism. Perhaps this is due to the limitations of the PHO
itself, as will be discussed below, but it is still a remarkable difference. Nevertheless, what is clear
from these interviews is that these workers participated extensively in the revolution, some
entering in the early phase with Madero, and others joining after Madero’s death. This is
evidenced by the fact that most of them achieved a military rank within their battalions.
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As railroad operators, railroad workers had a special relationship to this infrastructure, and
this contributed to their widespread participation in the revolution. Many of these workers
witnessed history in the making, especially those travelling with Francisco I. Madero on his
campaign tours. Indeed, Madero influenced them directly, and many statements from the oral
histories reveal a deep affinity for Madero, especially among young workers. The role of the
Mascorros is also deeply illustrative of this relationship between workers and the means of
production. The Mascorros were a family of railroad workers, and their knowledge of timetables,
railroad stops, and political connections allowed Madero to escape to San Antonio, Texas. Unlike
mechanics, workers who moved the railroad had an explicit advantage of mobility and their
knowledge of the vast railroad network. Because of their occupation, these individuals were in a
privileged position to help Madero escape. There are also other examples that demonstrate the
advantages of railroad workers. For example, railroad workers helped with the distribution of
clandestine newspapers along the railroad network. This same mobility allowed railroad workers
to play a key role in gun smuggling from the U.S. into Mexico in preparation for the revolution.
More important, however, was the role railroad workers played operating the locomotives and the
trains that moved the rebel armies in the north along the towns and cities that saw military
confrontations. Workers risked their lives, providing logistical support and delivering munitions
and supplies to the front lines. Others participated in more harrowing actions and drove
“maquinas locas”—locomotives full of dynamite—straight into enemy lines. In effect, their
relationship to these infrastructures allowed railroad workers to tap into the railroad mobilities
and to contribute their labor geographies to the revolution.
While the railroads afforded revolutionaries many advantages, they also came with
important limitations. As an extensive transportation infrastructure at the service of capital
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accumulation, the railroad is a product of the dialectic between mobility and fixity, and, therefore,
this dialectic also played out during the revolution. In many ways, railroad workers were able to
exploit the dialectic of mobility and fixity to their advantage with much more success than the
government. The government became dependent on the mobility of the railroads to deploy its
army from different garrisons located in urban centers. In response, revolutionaries destroyed
railroad tracks, bridges, and water infrastructure to sabotage the military’s capacity for
deployment. Since revolutionaries were riding on horseback or conducting guerrilla attacks on
foot, they had an intermodal advantage over the military, which relied on one mode of
transportation: the railroad. Furthermore, with tracks destroyed, the army lost the advantages of
the railroad and had to dedicate resources to rebuild it. Once revolutionaries controlled an
extensive area, they often repaired the railroad as one of their first tasks, as we see with Villa in
Chihuahua, and these cases are illustrative of the revolutionaries’ use of the railroad’s mobilities.
In other cases, like Villa’s “Trojan Train” to Ciudad Juárez or the “maquinas locas,” the mobility
of locomotives was used as part of a military attack—one that relied on their destructive capacity.
The different uses of the railroads during the revolutionary events demonstrate its elasticity and
multiple functions. Nevertheless, when the rebels appropriate the railroads, they also inherit its
disadvantages, among them their limitations to run on a designated track, as well as their reliance
on coal for fuel. Thus, after the split between Carranza and Villa, Villa is stopped “in his tracks”
because Carranza cuts off the coal supplies to the Northern Division.15
Primary and secondary sources support my findings and confirm that the railroads and
railroad workers played a very important role in shaping the geographies of the Mexican
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By 1905 petroleum—or diesel—locomotives were being introduced in Mexico, but until 1920, most locomotives
burned coal. In some cases, some railroad workers adapted locomotives to burn firewood, but these locomotives were
not as efficient. See Sosa Pavón, PHO/1/48.
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Revolution. Important patterns emerge along the railroad network. For example, the different
branches of the League were founded along the railroad and important railroad hubs. Similarly,
Madero’s campaign tours all relied on the railroads, and the clubs that were founded mostly
corresponded to cities that had a railroad station. Aware of the role of the railroad station in public
life, Madero agitated and distributed propaganda from railroad cars and train platforms, turning
these into political platforms. Of course, this whole process was facilitated by railroad workers
who fixed the locomotives, dispatched the trains, sent the telegrams, repaired destroyed tracks,
and even fought alongside revolutionaries on the military front. Due to their relationship to the
means of transportation, railroad workers faced numerous hardships, and they often had to carry
armies to battle, even against their will. This was the case in areas that were not under the
influence of revolutionary governments, where many workers had to move trains for the federal
army, just as they did for Madero. However, it is telling that even though railroad workers only
composed a relatively small group within the overall scale of the revolution, their relationship to
the means of production allowed them to play a disproportionately large role in the conflict and to
shift the course of the revolution to a greater degree than workers from other industrial sectors.
Implications of Findings
INAH’s PHO archives contain invaluable resources that can further our understanding of
the role of railroads and railroad workers in the revolution, and thus point to the possibility of
finding more anecdotes like the ones included in this work. While this research focused on key
interviews of men who had worked on the railroads, the PHO archive is far from exhausted, and it
is highly likely that it contains more references to the use of the railroad and the role of railroad
workers in the conflict. For example, the PHO contains interviews of railroad workers who were
active with the Zapatistas in the south and my work only focused on the north. Therefore,
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historians of railroad labor and the Mexican Revolution should reconsider the PHO as a key
resource. Similarly, the newspaper El Ferrocarrilero offers great insights into the life of railroad
workers and their hardships. Like the PHO, it should also be reconsidered as a key source by
researchers who wish to learn about the organization of the League and the history of railroad
labor.
Based on the contents of these archives, I have also produced several maps using
geographic information systems (GIS) that are the first of their kind to appear in geographic
research on the Mexican Revolution. Furthermore, since the publication of the historical atlas La
Revolución Mexicana: Atlas Historico (1986), only a few sources (Portilla 1995; Salmerón 2006;
Gorostiza 2010; Garciadiego 2013) have incorporated maps into their analysis of the revolution.
For example, the map on the locals of the League is entirely new, and such a map has not been
created before in Spanish or English literature. The map of Campaigns of the Northern Division is
also original, and although the map on Madero’s campaign tours is based on maps in Portilla
(1995), both maps are available in English for the first time. These maps reveal the extensive use
of railroads in the history and geography of the Mexican Revolution.
It is indisputable that railroads in general played an important role as an infrastructure of
mobility and that the Mexican railroad specifically was an essential infrastructure that was key to
the course of the revolutionary process. This finding serves as an important correction to the
conclusions advanced by Knight (1984), when he argued that the role of the working class
“…was largely reflexive; it responded to events rather than initiating them” (51). I argue that
railroad workers didn’t just respond to events but openly participated in them and made important
contributions at key junctures of the struggle. Thus, it is necessary to understand the railroad in
order to understand the Mexican Revolution, and these findings therefore make important
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contributions to the historiography of the Mexican Revolution, partly filling in the “substantial
hole in the historical scholarship of Mexico, the American west, transportation history, and border
studies” that Lewis (2007) noted. Future research could shed light on the role of railroads and
railroad labor during the third phase of the revolution, which is the civil war, and the fourth phase,
which is the power struggle between Carranza and Obregón.
In addition to the contributions to Mexican historiography, these findings represent
important contributions to the labor history and the labor geographies of the Mexican Revolution
by studying railroad labor before and during the conflict. The work of Bringas and Mascareño
(1988), Parlee (1984), Shabot (1982), and Miller (1974) served as a foundation for my research
on the League, but besides Parlee, they don’t engage directly with the newspaper of the League,
El Ferrocarrilero. In this sense, my work makes original contributions by analyzing the
development of the League and its influence on the labor movement. My research revealed that
the League faced many challenges in cohering an industry-wide union and that their organizing
efforts were cut short after their defeat in the strike of 1908. This labor union also experiences
scalar tensions and corroborates with the spatial challenges faced by labor in scale jumping
(Smith 1992; Herod, 2003; Savage, 2006; McFarland, 2014). My research on the involvement of
railroad workers during the revolution also makes important contributions to our understanding of
the role of labor during the revolution, and I contend that although labor unions did not intervene
as an organized force, the role of small groups and individual railroad workers cannot be
underestimated. For example, the role of railroads and railroad labor is crucial in the scale
jumping from the local to the regional as the Northern Division launched its military campaigns
from 1913–14. Thus, my research corroborates the findings of existing works (Leal and
Villaseñor 1988; Salmerón 2006) but also goes beyond the analyses presented by Gorostiza
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(2010), Guajardo (2010), and Yanes (1910), since I also deploy concepts from mobilities,
transportation geography, and critical geography.
One of the most important findings of this research is how much Mexican railroad
infrastructures are directly tied to social change. From the outset, my work sought to engage
transportation geography with critical geography and mobilities literature (Shaw and Sidaway
2011). It also took up the call from Keeling (2007) to explain why transportation is fundamental
to society and to engage with railroads since these have become “the stepchild of transport
research” (222). Throughout this work, I have sought to engage transportation with social,
political, and economic processes that situate the railroad within its socio-spatial context. For
example, Madero’s campaign tours illustrate the deeply political and contested nature of the
railroad and its train stations. Thus, I can conclude that this work improves the state of the
literature in the field and that it confirms my argument that transportation is deeply imbricated in
the process of social change.
Besides the theoretical contributions to transportation geography, my research makes a
novel use of political-economic and mobilities frameworks to understand my research questions.
Revolutionaries took advantage of the mobilities and fixities of railroad infrastructures to advance
the revolution in various ways. For example, labor organizers like Casasola, politicians like
Madero, and revolutionaries of the Northern Division exploited the capacity of time-space
compression. When it was more suitable, different forces also sought to interrupt the mobilities
afforded by the railroad by cutting telegraph lines, destroying bridges, and sabotaging the rails to
impede the mobility of federal troops. Railroad workers also had an enormous capacity to help the
Northern Division jump scales from the local to the regional; at the same time, the railroads were
themselves limited, since their supplies of coal were limited. Thus, there are always scalar
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tensions between local, regional, and national processes, like a revolution. While the railroads
bring the capacity for time-space compression, they also relegate others to fixity through timespace expansion, especially soldaderas or others unable to access mobility. Last, although we
only see a glimpse of the possibilities for social change, we can conclude that the Mexican
Revolution transformed the railroad from a means of capital accumulation to a means of social
liberation by linking it with the demands and actions of railroad workers and the revolution.
Evaluation of the Study
Although this work was able to take advantage of an extensive bibliography and several
archives to advance its contributions, important limitations in the field, in the quality of the
sources and their availability, inevitably influenced these contributions. Throughout a two-year
period, I gathered and analyzed information from a variety of archives in Mexico City,
Aguascalientes, Torreón, and Puebla. Nevertheless, several key sources of information remained
missing. For example, very few secondary sources focused on the role of railroad workers in the
hub of Aguascalientes in the period of labor strikes (1906-1909), and even fewer recorded their
activities during the revolution. Medrano de Luna’s La Morena y Sus Chorreados: Los
Ferrocarriles en Aguascalientes (2006) is a notable exception. In the book, Luna recounts the
importance of Aguascalientes in October and November of 1914, when the convention between
Villistas, Zapatistas and Carrancistas was taking place. Vito Alessio Robles, chronicler of the
convention, writes that hundreds of cars roamed the paved streets of this provincial capital.
All cars had their tops down and on them rode military men with Texan sombreros.
The railroad station was congested with military convoys and all important caudillos
brought sleeper cars for their general staff and their security guards. All the city’s
hotels were full of guests and joy prevailed everywhere. Outside and in the courtyards
of hotels one could hear musicians playing “La Valentina,” “La Cucharacha,” “La
Adelita” and “Jesusita of Chihuahua” out of tune at all hours; joined by enthusiastic
howling choirs.” (Sergio Ortiz Hernán cited in Medrano de Luna 2006, 17–18)
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Besides hosting the Sovereign Convention, Aguascalientes also housed the most important
railroad workshops in the country and the largest concentration of mechanics, assistants,
carpenters, boilermakers, and a significant number of administrators. Therefore, I was surprised to
find very little material during my field visit. Since the National Railways of Mexico were
privatized in the mid-1990s, Aguascalientes lost much of its railroads and, with it, much of its
archives. Therefore, the mechanics and shop workers of Aguascalientes are largely missing from
my research. Although their work in the Mexican Mechanics Union is highlighted by El
Ferrocarrilero, their traces are lost during the revolution except for the strike of 1912. This might
be related to the relative stationary occupation of workers who labored in railroad yards and shops
and who, unlike conductors, had an occupation fixed in place. These complex repair
infrastructures were not common at every station, and only few cities hosted workshops.
During the railroad privatization of the 1990s, many materials were lost, but thanks to the
work of the National Institute of Anthropology and History, Mexican archivists, researchers, and
librarians carried out a rescue operation to recover materials of historical significance to Mexico’s
railroad heritage. These sources are housed in the CEDIF, in Puebla, Mexico, and this research
institution provided important support for my work. Nevertheless, few of their primary sources
dealt with the period of the revolution. In other research sites, like Torreón, I was able to collect
interesting sources relevant to the city’s urban and economic history at the Historical Research
Center of the Universidad Iberoamericana de La Laguna. Like Chihuahua, the Laguna Region and
its largest city, Torreón, are considered the cradles of the Mexican Revolution in the north.
Torreón was an important railroad hub, and many railroad workers were active in the city, so I
had hoped to find documents of the Aguirre Benavides administration that came to power after
Madero’s revolution and that organized the Battalion of Railroad Volunteers. However, the local
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municipal archive had lost data from 1890–1920 to neglect. As with the railroad workers from
Aguascalientes, there is an absence of testimonies, demographics, and documents from railroad
workers from Torreón and other Laguna cities, many of which participated in Aguirre Benavides’
Battalion of Railroad Volunteers.
I made up for these deficiencies by relying on secondary sources and triangulating them
with memoirs, testimonies, oral histories, and the important records of the labor newspaper El
Ferrocarrilero. This newspaper was published from 1904 to 1906, despite being censored by the
authorities at the behest of railroad companies. El Ferrocarrilero offered an important glimpse
into the organizational period of the Gran Liga Mexicana de Empleados del Ferrocarril (the
Great Mexican League of Railroad Employees) under the leadership of Félix C. Vera and Manuel
Moreno Casasola. Unfortunately, my research was unable to track down these two key figures of
the railroad labor movement after they lost the strike of 1908 and the collapse of the League. All
traces of Moreno Casasola were lost in 1906 when he abruptly resigned as the field organizer and
secretary of the League. Similarly, Vera’s trajectory is unclear in the years after El Ferrocarrilero
is shut down by government censors, but it seems that he emigrates to the United States to escape
a third prison term under Díaz. A few years later, his writings appear in the opposition press
leading up to 1910, and a document from the Secretariat of Defense recognizes his participation
in Madero’s democratic revolution of 1910–11 but without providing details of his activities in
that conflict (Alvarez Palacios, 1973). His role in the revolution is then lost, and he resurfaces as a
journalist in Guadalajara in 1918.
The newspaper El Ferrocarrilero and the League are important anchors of my work in the
period of labor organizing that preceded the revolution. Nevertheless, despite its rich contents, El
Ferrocarrilero has many limitations, especially geographic. For example, the newspaper is based
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in Mexico City and has more extensive coverage of labor conflicts in Mexico City, Veracruz, and
Puebla—states with railroad hubs in the capital. The branches of the League in these states were
some of the most active, especially in contrast to the branches in cities like Aguascalientes and
San Luis Potosí. In Aguascalientes and Chihuahua, the League also found itself competing for
members with the Mechanics Union, and its first branch in the north was not in the industrial city
of Chihuahua, but instead a secondary one like Jiménez, where it established its first chapter in
Chihuahua state.
These geographic limitations also impact my study, especially since the labor activities of the
Mechanic’s Union in an important city like Chihuahua are mostly missing. Furthermore, since the
League was disbanded through government repression, it had very little effect on the events of the
revolutionary period; other organizations, like the Mechanic’s Union, the Alliance of Mexican
Railroad Workers, and the Mutualist Society of Railroad Telegraphists took the lead in labor
disputes. The shifts in labor leadership and organization from 1909–1914 also complicate my
research, and the entry of several unions into the government of the dictator Victoriano Huerta
also impedes the participation of unions in the revolution. Consequently, the relationship between
these unions and the revolution remains limited in my work. Future studies will have to explore
the archives of the local newspaper, El Correo de Chihuahua, which is likely to contain reports
on the activities of the Mexican Mechanic’s Union in Chihuahua City. Archives for the other
unions remain to be located, but special importance should be placed on those who joined the
government and sided with the reactionary government of Victoriano Huerta to provide a holistic
understanding of railroad unions during this period.
Throughout this work, I sought to emphasize the role of individual railroad workers and
their contributions to the labor geographies of the Mexican Revolution. Overall, I believe this
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attempt has been successful at producing an overview of the activities of railroad workers before
and during the revolution. Nevertheless, the oral histories I relied on have important deficiencies,
especially when it comes to highlighting the importance of railroad infrastructures during the
revolution. These deficiencies occur as a result of several factors, the first of which is the obvious
utility the machines had for all groups involved; therefore, the railroads and the activity of
railroad workers were often taken for granted. Furthermore, the oral histories that I relied on for
my work are not specifically tailored to a study on the role of railroads since the questions used
by interviewers did not seek to bring out this aspect in the interviews with participants. The
interviews of the Oral History Project (PHO) housed in the National Institute of Anthropology
and History also have other shortcomings. Pedro Salmerón (2006) notes these and writes that the
interviewers often lacked in-depth knowledge of the subject, the world, and complexity before
and during the revolution. This is evidenced by the types of questions asked. Salmerón also notes
that interviewers often interrupted the veterans of the revolution as they were about to expand on
interesting anecdotes. It is also the case that interviewers themselves influenced the course of the
interviews in other ways, since in some cases they expressed personal opinions that influenced the
point of view of the interviewee (30). Much of this is understandable, since oral history was a still
developing form of historiography in 1972, when the PHO began to take shape.
Furthermore, the government’s official history still weighed heavily on the history of the
revolution, and it wasn’t until after the 1970s that a “revisionist” wave of studies began to offer a
more complex and bottom-up perspective to the revolution. For example, Adolfo Gilly’s La
revolución interrrumpida, a landmark work of radical interpretation that became a must-read for
historians, was not published until 1971. In the case of the railroad workers, it is evident that
interviewers were not familiar with the history of the labor movement during the Porfiriato, and
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only a few testimonies reveal a direct connection between the labor organizing of 1904–1909 and
the revolutionary movements after 1910. Despite these limitations, both the breadth and content
of the interviews allowed me to reconstruct important episodes of railroad and railroad worker
participation in both phases of the Mexican Revolution.
Unable to follow the career of journalists like Vera and Moreno Casasola throughout the
revolution, I had to limit their participation to the period of the development of the railroad
worker’s labor movement and, therefore, Chapter 4, on Madero’s democratic revolution,
emphasizes the participation of different railroad workers under different conditions. This is
similar to Chapter 5, on the Northern Division, although here there is more continuity between
Madero’s supporters under Villa, Zapata, and Carranza. The tables of Appendix B and C attest to
these broken threads in the narrative. Very few of the oral histories of the PHO were given by the
workers who participated in the labor movement, in Madero’s democratic revolution, and in the
constitutionalist revolution against Huerta. To overcome these limitations, I followed a
chronological retelling of the revolution through the main turning points in the historical narrative
where railroads and railroad workers clearly made a difference. These include episodes in the
formation of labor unions like the Great League and the activities of the Mexican Mechanics
Union, as well as the extensive use of railroad infrastructures whose mobility facilitates Madero’s
electoral campaign. Of course, some of the most important activities of railroad workers are often
clandestine, such as helping Madero and Roque Estrada escape from San Luis Potosi, or spying
on the federal army by station chiefs and telegraphists. Thus, I can highlight the participation of
these forces in the process of social change unleashed by the revolution by relying on a
chronological retelling of the Mexican Revolution through the lens of labor geographies and the
reliance on machine ensembles.
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Conclusions and Future Research
In this project, I set out to understand the impact of railroads and railroad workers on the
geographies of the Mexican Revolution. Through a mixed methods approach that involved
extensive archival research, I am able to shed light on this exhilarating period of Mexican history.
Early on, I laid out the historical and political context that fostered the development of a vast
railroad network and the rise of a labor movement that aimed to organize workers in this new
industry. Then I traced the political movements that centered on democratic change in Mexico
while also emphasizing the role of the railroad and railroad workers during Madero’s democratic
campaign and during the democratic revolution. Then, as the revolution reached broader social
layers, we saw railroads and railroad workers play an increasingly active role. This process
culminated in the Convention of Aguascalientes, where the delegates of the Convention supported
the historic demands of the railroad movement for increased wages, better working conditions,
and a shorter workday. This progress was interrupted by the split between the reformist and
radical camps of the revolution that led to the civil war of 1915.
Nevertheless, the dearth of research on the subject leaves open many avenues for future
research, and new questions emerged in the process. For example, the role of organized railroad
unions remains a mystery, and other than their inclusion in Huerta’s dictatorship, very few
sources consider these railroad workers. Relatedly, although I focused exclusively on the role of
railroads and railroad workers in the Northern Division, future studies on the relationship of
railroad workers to the Northwestern and Northeastern Divisions would help complement a
broader panorama of railroad labor’s involvement. An equally important study on the relationship
of the Zapatistas to railroads and railroad workers remains missing. The geographies of the
southern revolution and its emphasis on the demands of the peasantry shaped this relationship in
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different ways than in the north. Therefore, as radical counterpart of the Northern Division, the
role of railroad workers in the ranks of the Zapatista armies should be studied.
The last and most important question that remains open is that of what happens to the
railroads and the alliances between the revolutionaries and the railroad workers during the civil
war of 1915. This question was beyond the scope of this study because of its political complexity
and extent into new geographical regions, but research in this direction could help answer why
Francisco Villa and Emiliano Zapata ended up losing the revolution to conservative currents
represented by Carranza. My hypothesis is that unlike Carranza and Obregón, the revolutions led
by Villa and Zapata had a regional strategy that was not able to jump to the national scale. In
contrast, Carranza and Obregón had a national perspective, and they actively courted railroad
workers and their unions to help them jump from the regional to the national scale. This is
something that Villa and Zapata failed to do and that many historians have not accounted for in
the defeat of the radical currents. Researching that question could also offer important lessons to
the revolutionary struggles of the future.

193

Appendix A: Biographical Information
PHO Code

Name

Year16

Locality

Schooling

Social Class

Occupation

PHO/1/3
PHO/1/12
PHO/1/26
PHO/1/33
PHO/1/41
PHO/1/43
PHO/1/46
PHO/1/48
PHO/1/49
PHO/1/55
PHO/1/57
PHO/1/77
PHO/1/79
PHO/1/80
PHO/1/81
PHO/1/94
PHO/1/98
PHO/1/103
PHO/1/108
PHO/1/124

Arturo Pérez Flores
Paulino Fontes
Gilberto Nava Presa
J. Jesús Arias Sánchez
Adan Uro García
Adalberto López Jara
Victorio de Anda
Manuel Sosa Pavón
Justino López Estrada
Jesús Herrera Calderon
José Nonaka
Francisco Díaz Pacheco
Félix Delgado Luna
Eduardo Andalón Félix
José Martínez Rodríguez
Severino Medina
Silvestre Cadena Jaramillo
Rafael Mora Valdés
Jesús Hurtado Ramírez
Francisco Muñoz Pedroza

1899
1883
1897
1896
1894
1900
1896
1888
1888
1896
1888
1887
1896
1881
1892
c.1885
1897
1885
1889
1892

Guanajuato
Sonora
Durango
Jalisco
Nuevo Leon
Mexico City
Lagos, Jalisco
Puebla
Morelos
Chihuahua
Ciudad Juarez
Chihuahua
Zacatecas
Sonora
Monterrey
Tamaulipas
Durango
Zacatecas
Zacatecas
Jal/Aguascalientes

Secondary
Primary
Primary
Primary
Primary
n/a
Primary
Primary
Technical
Primary
Primary
Primary
None
Primary
Secondary
n/a
Primary
Secondary
n/a
Primary

Working class
Urban middle class
Working class
Working class
Working Class
n/a
Small land owners
Working class
Urban middle class
Working class
Working class
Working class
Working class
Working class
Urban middle class
n/a
Peasant
Urban middle class
Working class
Working class

Labor union secretary
Railroad brakeman, conductor
Railroad workshop assistant
Railroad station chief, train dispatcher
Hat maker, RR messenger/telegraphist
n/a
Farmer/Rancher
Railroad conductor, telegraphist
Railroad warehouse inspector
Railroad telegraphist, Chihuahua NW RR
Hospital assistant, nurse, doctor
RR construction, station chief, telegraphist
Trolleys of Torreón, Durango-Torreón RR
Miner
Railroad workshops, boilermaker
n/a
Ranch hand, railroad worker
Railroad station chief, telegraphist
Miner, railroad assistant in El Paso
Railroad workshop assistant

PHO/1/131
PHO/1/155
PHO/1/156
PHO/1/163

José Luna Lara
Manuel Mendoza Domínguez
Pablo Cano Martínez
Andrés Araujo

1892
1898
1895
1896

Sonora/Veracruz
Ciudad Jiménez
Ciudad Camargo
Tamaulipas

Primary
Secondary
Primary
Primary

Working class
Small land owners
Peasant
Working class

Railroad workshop chief, mechanic
Student
Farmer, printer
Blacksmith, railroad carpenter

PHO-Z/1/122

Guillermo Fernández Flores

1892

Orizaba, Veracruz

Secondary

Working class

Textile worker, railroad fireman, engineer

Notes: Selected Interviews from the Oral History Project (PHO) of the Archivo de la Palabra. Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historía. Mexico, 1972.

16

The average individual was born in 1892 and, therefore, around 18 years old when the revolution started.
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Appendix B: Political and Labor Activity
PHO Code
PHO/1/3
PHO/1/12
PHO/1/26
PHO/1/33
PHO/1/41
PHO/1/43
PHO/1/46
PHO/1/48
PHO/1/49
PHO/1/55
PHO/1/57
PHO/1/77
PHO/1/79
PHO/1/80
PHO/1/81
PHO/1/94
PHO/1/98
PHO/1/103
PHO/1/108
PHO/1/124
PHO/1/131
PHO/1/155
PHO/1/156
PHO/1/163
PHO-Z/1/122

Political Currents
Villismo
Maderismo, Carrancismo
Maderismo, Villismo
Villismo, Carrancismo, Obregonismo
Magonismo, Villismo
Villismo, Carrancismo
Villismo, Obregonismo
Zapatismo, Obregonismo
Maderismo, Villismo
Villismo, Carrancismo
Maderismo, Villismo
Maderismo, Villismo
Maderismo, Carrancismo, Villismo
Maderismo, Villismo, Carrancismo
Maderismo, Carrancismo, Villismo
Constitutionalism
Villismo
Carrancismo, Obregonismo
Maderismo, Villismo
Carrancismo
Carrancismo, Obregonismo
Villismo, Carrancismo
Maderismo, Villismo
Magonismo, Maderismo
Magonismo, Maderismo, Carrancismo

Political Organizations
Casa del Obrero Mundial of Irapuato
Anti-Reelectionist
Father was Anti-Reelectionist
Anti-Reelectionist
Anti-Reelectionist; brother in PLM
n/a
Anti-Reelectionist
Anti-Reelectionist, Reyes militia reserves
Supports Liberal press, Diario del Hogar
n/a
Anti-Reelectionist
Anti-Reelectionist
Anti-Reelectionist
Madero sympathizer
Anti-Reelectionist
n/a
n/a
Liberal Club of Dolores Hidalgo
Anti-Reelectionist
Read El Jocoso
n/a
Read El Padre Padilla, La Madre Martiana
n/a
n/a
Anti-Reelectionist Club Luis Moya

Labor Activism
Labor activist with Casa del Obrero Mundial
n/a
n/a
Railroad labor activist
n/a
n/a
n/a
Alliance of Mexican RR, Order of Drivers and Conductors
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Mining activist persecuted for organizing rebellion in 1911
Labor organizing, propaganda
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Participated in Aguascalientes strike of 1912
Aware of 1909 strike; no longer RR worker
n/a
n/a
Treasurer in Grand League of Carpenters
Circulo de Obreros Libres, Mexican Mechanics Union
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Appendix C: Participation in the Revolution
PHO Code
PHO/1/3
PHO/1/12
PHO/1/26
PHO/1/33
PHO/1/41
PHO/1/43
PHO/1/46
PHO/1/48
PHO/1/49
PHO/1/55
PHO/1/57
PHO/1/77
PHO/1/79
PHO/1/80
PHO/1/81
PHO/1/94
PHO/1/98
PHO/1/103
PHO/1/108
PHO/1/124
PHO/1/131
PHO/1/155
PHO/1/156
PHO/1/163
PHO-Z/1/122

Participation in the Revolution 1910-14
Enters armed conflict after Zacatecas in 1914, fights with Villa/Fierro in civil war, returns to civilian life after defeat in León
Joins revolution supporting Maytorena and Madero in 1910; Supports Carranza in Sonora in 1913 and throughout civil war
Nava Presa joins Calixto Contreras in 1913; Participates in Battle of Torreón, Trojan Train, Zacatecas and Aguascalientes Conv.
Joins revolution in 1914 under Villa, attack on Torreón, Zacatecas, Leales de Camargo; joins Carranza and later Obregón
Incorporated in 1913 under Manuel Medinabeitia; joins Villa’s general staff; fights in civil war, retreats to RR work
Enters revolution in 1913; moves to Zacatecas front in 1913; joins Carranza after surrender in civil war
Rebels with Calixto Contreras in 1913; Participates in Trojan Train, Tierra Blanca, Battle of Torreón; fights in civil war
Joins revolution in 1913 with Zapatista, smuggles trains; Zapata names him RR chief and Major, leads railroad squadron
Joins Madero’s rebellion in 1911 under José de la Luz Soto; joins Villa Brigade; follows Ángeles to join Villa in 1914
Joins revolution with Maclovio Herrera, Participated in battles from 1913-14, Tierra Blanca, Chihuahua, Jimenez, Torreón
Joined Madero after Battle of Casas Grandes in 1911; joins Villa and prepares military hospitals, works on RR sanitary brigade
Used telegraph to spy on army and inform rebels; worked as RR dispatcher for Abraham Gonzalez; joins Villa in 1916
Rebels with Luis Moya and Jesús Agustín Castro in 1910; joins RR volunteers of Torreón; joins Brigada Zaragoza in 1913
Joined Madero in Ciudad Juárez; railroad battalion with Abraham González; Trojan Train; Tierra Blanca, Torreón, Zacatecas
Joined revolution with Jesús Carranza, then joined Fierro; fought in Tierra Blanca, Torreon, San Pedro and Bajio campaign
Joined revolution; participated in arms smuggling; moved to the United States
Rebels with Pancho Villa; fought alongside with Leales de Camargo Brigade under Rosalío Hernández
Forced to move army troops under Huerta in 1914; sympathized with revolution; defected to Obregón in 1914
Fought for Madero in Chihuahua, bought weapons in Fort Bliss; joins Villa after 1913
Associated with Maderista railroad workers; joins revolution after 1913 with Martín Triana, and Natera in the Central Division
Abstained from politics, forced into conflict in 1914; defended Veracruz; supplied Carrancista troops of NE Division
Joined in 1914 with Leales de Camargo Brigade under Rosalío Hernández; joins Carranza after 1917
Fought for Madero in 1911; Joined Leales de Camargo Brigade under Rosalío Hernández after 1913, Dorados under Villa
n/a
Rio Blanco 1906; Worked on Interoceanic RR from 1913-14 and fought Zapatistas with Carranza; 1914-15 fought in Yucatán

Rank
Lieutenant coronel
Colonel, Deputy
Lieutenant coronel
Division General
Major
Second sergeant
Lieutenant coronel
Brigadier general
Major
First captain
First captain
Major
Lieutenant coronel
Division General
Major
n/a
Major
Lieutenant coronel
Colonel
Cavalry lieutenant
Colonel
General
Brigadier general
n/a
Brigadier general
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